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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis addresses the question of the implementation of the freedom of 
establishment (Article 49 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) in two 
EU member states with particular emphasis on impediments to the freedom. It is 
argued that despite a very long-standing and clear legal prohibition on restrictions 
to the freedom of establishment, there remain many practical obstacles which 
inhibit the right. This thesis’ hypothesis is that double taxation and double non-
deductibility of losses constitute hurdles to a complete freedom of establishment. 
As far as the methodology is concerned the approach chosen to test the 
hypothesis is as follows: first to set out a theoretical framework based on the non-
discrimination principle, the basic principles of the freedom of establishment right 
and the exemptions to that right. Then, right of freedom of establishment is tested 
as against the practice in three ways, each considered in a chapter: the requirement 
of the nationality prerequisite; the double taxation of companies operating in more 
than one EU member state; and the practice of double non-deductibility of losses. 
The research is inspired by the case study of an author’s businesses, SMEs 
who trade cross-border in the United Kingdom (UK) and subsequently in Poland. 
From a study of the implementation practices of both the UK and Poland this thesis 
suggests that the following form serious restrictions: double taxation and non-
deductibility of losses. Moreover, case law and existing literature identify taxation 
as a core impediment to the exercise of the freedom of establishment as taxation 
matters deter companies from relocating their whole business.  
This thesis examines how to balance the freedom of establishment and the 
tax powers of the EU member states. Taxation also plays a fundamental role in the 
development of the EU’s internal market. The thesis seeks a pragmatic solution 
which might be implemented effectively without resorting to substantial 
international harmonization.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 The thesis 
 
Freedom of establishment is a fundamental freedom of the European Union 
(EU).1 It forms one of four strands of the freedoms of the Internal Market.2 From a 
superficial perspective it might seem that all EU member states respect the basic 
requirement to remove all restrictions. However, national practices and provisions 
of EU member states regarding rules of the establishment vary significantly and 
some barriers to the freedom of establishment remain. This thesis’ hypothesis is that 
double taxation and double non-deductibility of losses constitute hurdles to a 
complete freedom of establishment. 
The removal of double taxation and high compliance costs would improve 
market access. Currently, there are 28 different corporate tax systems and both 
double taxation and double non-deductibility hinder the freedom of establishment. 
Taxation is identified as a core impediment to the freedom of establishment.3 The 
thesis seeks to balance the freedom of establishment and the tax powers of EU 
member states. Taxation also plays a fundamental role in the development of the 
Internal Market but the EU has limited competence in the field of taxation. The 
thesis examines whether there is a solution to eliminate the identified main tax 
obstacles without resorting to substantial international harmonization. Some 
solutions have been already proposed by the Commission but they have not been 
accepted as they are either politically difficult to achieve or ineffective to address 
adequately the systemic issues related to the principle of freedom of establishment. 
In addition, the thesis focuses on SMEs although most of the reasoning holds 
true also for larger companies. It is noted that SMEs comprise 99.8 per cent of all 
                                                          
1
 Article 49 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU Consolidated version of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European 2012/C 326/01 Union Official Journal C 326 , 26/10/2012 
P. 0001 – 0390. 
2
 Free Movement of Goods, Freedom of movement for workers, Freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services and Freedom of movement of capital. 
3
 See chapters 4 and 5. 
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undertakings in the EU and that SMEs have a special protection status in the EU.4 
Yet only about 5 per cent operate across borders.5 
There has been much written on the general topic of freedom of 
establishment and on the obstacles to the exercise of the freedom.6 The originality 
of this thesis, however, lies in the hypothesis and in the approach taken to establish 
the hypothesis, namely: the distinction between inbound and outbound cases to 
explain the case law of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) the distinction made 
between permanent establishment and subsidiary; the comparison between United 
Kingdom (UK) and Polish relevant national taxation provisions; and the focus of 
the examination on the Krankenheim case7 and on the Commission’s reform 
proposals.8 
                                                          
4
 Proposals for reform of the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth Directives: Proposal for a Directive 
of European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 77/91, as regards the 
formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, 
September 21, 2004, COM (2004) 730 final; Proposal for a Directive of European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Council Directives 78/660 and 83/349 concerning the annual accounts of 
certain types of companies and consolidated accounts, October 27, 2004, COM (2004) 725 final; 
Proposal for a Directive of European Parliament and of the Council on statutory audit of annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts and amending Council Directives 78/660 and 83/349, COM 
(2004) 177 final. 
5
 Enterprise and Industry – European Commission ‘Betting on Small Enterprises. Europe is good for 
SMEs. SMEs are good for Europe [Komisja Europejska Przedsiębiorstwa i Przemysł ‘Stawiając na 
Małe Firmy. Europa jest dobra dla MŚP. MŚP jest dobre dla Europy] [2008] 
https://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEwjlzcCDhc
nSAhXlIJoKHRMvA3kQFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fbookshop.europa.eu%2Fpl%2Fstawi
aj-c-na-ma-e-firmy-pbNB3008452%2Fdownloads%2FNB-30-08-452-PL-
C%2FNB3008452PLC_002.pdf%3Bpgid%3Dy8dIS7GUWMdSR0EAlMEUUsWb0000LnLCF94
W%3Bsid%3DCOoaYZppewsaY8sPgqOExvhMqilmMZ26Djk%3D%3FFileName%3DNB30084
52PLC_002.pdf%26SKU%3DNB3008452PLC_PDF%26CatalogueNumber%3DNB-30-08-452-
PL-C&usg=AFQjCNH2Bjkggq95ZuSCiTToIAsOVp424Q&bvm=bv.149093890,d.bGg&cad=rja . 
6
 Barnard Catherine ‘The substantive law of the EU. The Four Freedom’ (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2010); Borg-Barthet ‘Justin the Governing Law of Companies in EU Law’ 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing; Chalmers Damian, Davies Gareth, Monti Giorgio ‘European Union 
Law’ (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012); Paschalidis Paschalis ‘Freedom of 
establishment and private international law for corporations’ (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
7
 Discussed in Chapter 5. 
8
 Discussed in Chapter 6. 
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1.2  Methodology   
As far as the methodology is concerned the approach chosen to test the 
hypothesis is as follows: first to set out a theoretical framework based on the non-
discrimination principle, the basic principles of the freedom of establishment right 
and the exemptions to that right. Then, right of freedom of establishment is tested 
as against the practice in three ways, each considered in a chapter: the requirement 
of the nationality prerequisite; the double taxation of companies operating in more 
than one EU member state; and the practice of double non-deductibility of losses. 
Two EU member states, the UK and Poland, were selected for testing the 
practice. The main reason for the choice of the UK and Poland for the comparison 
lies on their opposite theories of the concept of the ‘nationality’ of a company. The 
UK is an example of the incorporation theory, whereas Poland applies the real seat 
theory. Furthermore, the UK is sometimes referred to as the Delaware of the EU 
because the UK attracts the incorporation of many businesses as it offers a 
deregulated environment and lower taxation.9 However, Poland is placed in 105th 
position in World Index of Business Freedom and it is even described as ‘mostly 
unfree’ by The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation.10  
To conclude the thesis recommendations as to reforms are undertaken. 
The research method adopted in the thesis is traditional black letter law 
approach. The research draws mainly on EU measures and CJEU case law as well 
                                                          
9
 43 percent of Top European locations for new Inward Investment projects with HQ operations in 
2012 were located in the UK, according to Financial Times Markets database; according to 
UNCTAD, 2011 the UK is a sixth largest trading nation in the world. 
‘With extensive air, rail, port and road networks, as a member of the EU, the UK provides ready 
market access to Europe. The UK also has a highly skilled workforce and four of the top ten 
universities in the world. In addition, the country has a world-class business infrastructure, with a 
legal system known for its clarity and ability to handle commercial disputes. English law is widely 
used in national contracts.’ HM Government 'A guide to UK taxation' [2013] 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/183408/A_guide_to
_UK_taxation.pdf . 
10
 ‘Bureaucracy still hinders entrepreneurial activity. Inconsistent application of the commercial 
code increases the cost of business formation and operation.’ [2011] Index of Economic freedom. 
 http://www.heritage.org/Index/Country/Poland#business-freedom . 
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as relevant Polish and UK taxation provisions. Other sources include policy and 
advisory documentation from relevant national organizations and supporting 
academic literature. 
  A teleological method of interpretation has been applied to the legislation 
examined.11 This means that the thesis seeks the ‘true intent’ of the law, its 
purpose.12 The author envisages that a literal interpretation would not suffice to 
examine the issue in depth. EU Treaties are concluded in many different languages 
and all languages are on par with each other. Differences in translation may occur 
in different language versions of the same source.13 A research based upon the 
literal interpretation might be neither complete nor clear. This approach is also 
supported by the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties of 23rd May 1969.14 
The Convention gauges that a treaty shall be interpreted in its context and in the 
light of its object and purpose.15 Moreover, the CJEU also applies the teleological 
method of interpretation.16 
The principle of the freedom of establishment provides that restrictions on 
freedom of establishment of nationals of an EU member state in the territory of 
                                                          
11
 Murray, John. Report of Mr. Justice John L. Murray President of the Supreme Court and Chief 
Justice of Ireland. Methods of Interpretation – Comparative Law Methods 
http://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&sqi=2&ved=0CFYQFjAE
&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcuria.europa.eu%2Fcommon%2Fdpi%2Fcol_murray.pdf&ei=NhwvUo2b
I8motAbljoH4CQ&usg=AFQjCNHLqG2GSglA7s2gxyhLt6fnGMRPuA&bvm=bv.51773540,d.b
GE&cad=rja . 
12
 Stawecki, Tomasz, Winczorek Piotr ‘Wstęp do prawoznawstwa’[The introduction to 
Jurisprudence] (Warszawa, Beck, 2014). 
13
 Monsenego, Jérôme. ‘Taxation of Foreign Business Income within European Internal Market’ 
(Göteborg, Intellecta Infolog, 2011) p.46. 
14
 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties of 23 May 1969 United Nation. 
15
 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties of 23 May 1969 United Nation. 
16
 Murray John ‘Report of Mr. Justice John L. Murray President of the Supreme Court and Chief 
Justice of Ireland. Methods of Interpretation – Comparative Law Methods’ 
http://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&sqi=2&ved=0CFYQFjAE
&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcuria.europa.eu%2Fcommon%2Fdpi%2Fcol_murray.pdf&ei=NhwvUo2b
I8motAbljoH4CQ&usg=AFQjCNHLqG2GSglA7s2gxyhLt6fnGMRPuA&bvm=bv.51773540,d.b
GE&cad=rja ; C-70/09 Hengartner and Gasser [2010] par. 36. 
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another member state shall be prohibited.17 As a consequence, the freedom of 
establishment is mainly based on negative integration. Negative integration or 
negative harmonisation refers to the removal of tariffs, quantitative restrictions and 
other barriers to trade or obstacles to free and undistorted competition.18  
There are three main types of comparisons which are applied in the 
comparative exercise of the tax provisions of the UK and Poland undertaken in the 
thesis. 
 
Firstly, a traditional comparison, so-called horizontal, provides that national 
orders are compared one to another. Secondly, there are two types of vertical 
relations between international and national levels. A top down comparison 
provides answers to how member states implement EU law. A bottom-up 
comparison, in terms of this thesis, will examine how national law rules affect those 
of EU law. The main argument to support the proposition that national norms or 
rules may affect the principles on a supra-national level lies in the fact that the key 
legislator for the EU, the Council, is composed of representatives of national 
governments. Moreover, lawyers drafting EU law come from different national 
legal backgrounds with different experiences and these differences may influence 
                                                          
17
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 2012/C 326/01 Union 
Official Journal C 326 , 26/10/2012 P. 0001 – 0390. 
18
 Scharpf Fritz 'Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?' (Oxford, Oxford Scholarship 
Online, 2011) p. 4. 
 
                                         Horizontal 
 
National level 
Top-down Bottom-up 
International level 
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the final shape of EU legislation and the resulting case law. This possibility has not 
been widely discussed in the published literature. It is acknowledged that 
comparisons between legal orders are complex and that non-legal aspects on the 
freedom of establishment are important. However, the research undertaken for the 
thesis is limited to legal issues. 
 
 
1.3 Motivation 
 
The thesis was inspired by the practical difficulties experienced by a Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME),19 with a primary establishment in Scotland 
(UK), when the SME decided to trade in both the UK and Poland. The SME sought 
to exercise the freedom of establishment by having a secondary establishment in 
Poland. The most severe hurdle experienced by SME was in relation to the national 
corporate taxation regimes of both countries. However, the choice of the field of 
taxation was not only of scientific interest but also due to the significant role of 
taxation and customs duties which have been reaffirmed by the Commission in the 
Lisbon Strategy Communication.20  
                                                          
19
 On 6 May 2003 the Commission adopted Recommendation 2003/361/EC regarding the SME 
definition, entering in force from 1 January 2005. It laid down criteria as below: 
 
Enterprise 
category 
Headcou
nt 
Turnover O
R 
Balance 
sheet total 
Medium-sized < 250 
≤ € 50 
million 
≤ € 43 million 
Small < 50 
≤ € 10 
million 
≤ € 10 million 
Micro < 10 ≤ € 2 million  . 
 
20
 Inter alia Communication to the Spring European Council - Working together for growth and jobs 
- A new start for the Lisbon Strategy - Communication from President Barroso in agreement with 
Vice-President Verheugen COM/2005/0024 final ‘Finally, in Europe, despite progress during the 
14 
 
1.4  Structure 
 
In order to prove the hypothesis, the thesis focuses on five topics presented in five 
chapters. Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical framework with a particular emphasis 
on the principle of non-discrimination, the freedom of establishment and 
exemptions. Moreover, the chapter provides an analysis of direct and indirect 
discrimination in EU law with particular focus on legal persons. The chapter 
investigates whether a legal person can be directly discriminated and what are basis 
to establish direct discrimination on a company. It is stated that protected 
characteristics are not identical for natural and legal persons and only the criterion 
of ‘nationality’ is identified as a prerequisite for direct discrimination as far as legal 
persons are concerned. The chapter analyses what might serve as a ‘nationality’ 
criterion for a company. 
 Chapter 3 begins with the presentation of the most significant case law concerning 
the scope of the freedom. It is followed by a ramification of inbound and outbound 
cases depending on whether the restrictions are being imposed by the home or host 
EU member state. This ramification provides a possible justification for the 
decisions of the CJEU and establishes consistency in CJEU’s line of rulings. 
Chapter 4 examines double taxation as experienced by a legal person seeking 
permanent establishment and a subsidiary. Chapter 5 is dedicated to offsetting 
negative incomes generated by either subsidiaries or by permanent establishments. 
In particular, these chapters examine whether double taxation or offset losses 
(double non-deductibility of losses) are treated differently depending on whether 
they have been incurred by subsidiaries or by permanent establishments.  
The notions of permanent establishment and subsidiary are defined in Chapter 4. 
This thesis refers to the notion of permanent establishment used by tax and 
corporate lawyers, closely defined, in particular, by Articles 5 and 7 of the model 
tax convention drawn up by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
                                                          
first five years of Lisbon, there is still insufficient risk capital available to start up innovative young 
businesses and current tax rules discourage the retention of profits to build up equity.’ 
15 
 
Development (OECD).21 This definition has been recognised by the CJEU in a 
number of rulings.22 Thus, Article 5 of the OECD model tax convention provides 
that the term ‘permanent establishment’ means a fixed place of business through 
which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried out. Contrary, a 
‘subsidiary’ is a legally independent subdivision in another member state and 
constitutes a separate legal entity. OECD’s Glossary of Industrial Organisation 
Economics and Competition Law provides that ‘a subsidiary is a company 
controlled by another company and (...) [a subsidiary] is a corporation with its own 
charter and is not a division of the controlling company.’23 
Chapters 4 and 5 inlay a particularity of national legal provisions in respect of 
double taxation and double non-deductibility of losses both in the UK and Poland. 
The current line of CJEU rulings is used as a comparative basis for the examination, 
in practice, of national legal provisions of the selected EU member states. 
Chapter 6 reviews past and current law reform proposed by the European 
Commission in respect of corporate taxation. The chapter analyses the current 
reform initiative and suggests amendments to the current proposals which might 
limit efficiently this significant barrier to the freedom of establishment. Based on 
past proposals, the feasibility of new proposals is assessed. 
The law is as it stands on 1st January 2016. 
                                                          
21
 Article 5 OECD model tax convention provides ‘1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term 
‘permanent establishment’ means a fixed place of business through which the business of an 
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. 
2. The term ‘permanent establishment’ includes especially: 
a) a place of management; 
b) a branch; 
c) an office; 
d) a factory; 
e) a workshop and 
f) a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural 
resources.’ 
22
 Inter alia C-336/96 Gilly [1998] ECR I-02793; C-414/06 Lidl Belgium GmbH & Co KG v 
Finanzamt Heilbronn [2008] ECR I-3601. 
23
 Khemani Shyam ‘OECD’s Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition 
Law’ [1990] http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/2376087.pdf . 
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CHAPTER 2: THE SCOPE OF THE FREEDOM 
OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
2.1 The Scope of the Freedom of Establishment in the European 
Union 
 
The freedom of establishment can be exercised by primary or secondary 
establishments. Primary establishment describes a situation where a person decides 
to move a business to another member state; that is, a relocation of the primary 
establishment to another member state. Secondary establishment includes the 
creation of branches and subsidiaries in another member state, so the person has a 
business presence in two member states. 
 The freedom of establishment, understood as primary establishment, is 
embedded in the first sentence of Article 49 TFEU: ‘restrictions on freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member 
State shall be prohibited (…).’24 This holds true both for natural and legal persons. 
EU nationals benefit from the freedom of establishment as a natural person when 
working in another member state in a self-employment capacity.25 In respect of 
legal persons, this includes setting up a new business and relocation of central 
management and control of a company to another member state. In the following 
sections of the thesis, the focus is mainly on legal persons and examines the relevant 
case law.  
                                                          
24
 Supra, Chapter 1 no. 1. 
25
 C-143/87 Stanton [1988] ECR 3877. 
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2.2 Non-Discrimination Principle and the Freedom of 
Establishment 
 
The principle of non-discrimination is a crucial principle of EU law.26 First, it is 
expressly included in the Treaty.27 Article 18 TFEU states, ‘Within the scope of 
application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any special provisions contained 
therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.’28  
Secondly, Article 19 TFEU29 provides that ‘Without prejudice to the other 
provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them 
upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special 
legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, 
may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’ 
As established by Article 19 TFEU, discrimination based on protected 
characteristics is widely stipulated in a number of directives30 and in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.31 However, it is very unlikely that a 
company might be discriminated against based on most of the protected 
                                                          
26
 Ellis Evelyn, Watson Philippa ‘EU Anti-Discrimination Law’ (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013) 
p.44; C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland v Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) [1999] ECR I-2664 par. 
22. 
27
 Article 18, 19(1), 45(2) and 157(2) TFEU supra, no. 1. 
28
 Supra, Chapter 1 no. 1. 
29
 Supra, no. 1. 
30
 Inter alia Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (Race Directive), Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing 
the principle of equal treatment between men and women as regards access to and supply of goods 
and services, Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 
on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women 
in matters of employment and occupation (Recast Directive). 
31
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2010/C 83/02. 
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characteristics such as disability, gender reassignment, sexual orientation, marriage, 
civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief or sex.32  
 Thus, only Article 18 TFEU is analysed,33 in terms of the circumstances under 
which a company may be discriminated against based on nationality. This is a 
complex subject as a legal person does not have nationality sensu stricte. Therefore, 
it is highly controversial to state that a company is discriminated against on grounds 
of nationality.  
 It is shown in Chapter 3 that there are different types of links that could be 
applied to establishing the governing law of a company. There are two basic 
theories: the incorporation and the real seat theory. However, these theories are only 
examples;34 each member state establishes its own criteria to link a company to its 
legal system.  
The issue of nationality was widely debated at the beginning of the twentieth 
century.35 It was argued that nationality for natural and legal persons does not have 
the same meaning and this can be demonstrated by illustrative examples.36 The 
removal from the company registrar results in a status of ‘non-existence’ which is 
not the case for a natural person. As a consequence, there is no unique 
understanding of company ‘nationality’. Moreover, as it has already been observed, 
a company might become ‘apatride’ or ‘national’37 of more than one member 
                                                          
32
 A direct discrimination can be observed in case of any protected characteristic. However, as 
mentioned, this study focuses on the discrimination of a company and nationality criteria constitute 
only one relevant element. Further details of direct discrimination based on the other protected 
characteristics can be found in the following: 'What's the difference? Direct and indirect 
discrimination?' [2013] Workplace Snippets, ACAS 
http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=4614. 
33
 Professor Nina Półtorak suggested that Article 18 is directed only to the EU institutions and does 
not apply to member states. Therefore, it cannot solely be the legal basis for an individual claim. 
Półtorak Nina ‘Zakres związania państw członkowskich Kartą Praw Podstawowych UE’ [author’s 
translation: The scope of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union] 
(2014, Europejski Przegląd Sądowy) p. 17. 
34
 See section 3.1. 
35
 Niboyet, Jaun. ‘Existe-t-il vraiment une Nationalité des Sociétés?’ [1927] Journal de droit 
international p.30. 
36
 Paschalis Paschalidis ‘Freedom of establishment and private international law for corporations’ 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) p. 73. 
37
 Instead of 'nationality', the terms of 'incorporation', ‘registration', 'legal personality' or 'legal status' 
can be used. Arguably, these terms are not perfectly selected but this cannot be the case, as there are 
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state.38 In Überseering,39 the case which is analysed in Chapter 3.3.3, the company 
was ‘quasi-national’ of more than one member state.40 In this landmark case, both 
The Netherlands and Germany claimed to be an appropriate state to govern the 
company. Arguably, the notion of nationality is not a useful tool to resolve a 
problem in a situation of double company ‘nationality’.41 According to German 
provisions, the company should be established in Germany and be granted ‘German 
nationality’, whereas The Netherlands perceived Überseering as a ‘Dutch national’. 
Thus, the term ‘nationality’ is not helpful in deciding upon the rights of member 
states.42  
Nonetheless, the notion of company ‘nationality’ is important for an 
undertaking and has great significance in the context of discrimination. In 
Überseering, the CJEU ruled that Germany could not deny legal personality to a 
company duly incorporated in another member state, unless it is justified by 
overriding public interest. In other words, by denying legal personality Überseering 
was being subject to discriminatory treatment. 
The question as to whether a company can be directly discriminated against 
on grounds of nationality43 has great significance.44 The different criteria apply 
depending on whether the discrimination is direct or indirect.45  
                                                          
substantial differences between the nationality of a natural person and the 'quasi-nationality' of a 
company. 
38
 See section 3.1. 
39
 C–208/00 Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH [2002] ECR 
I–9919. 
40
 See section 3.1. for detailed analysis. 
41
 For an opposite view, see Feria Rita de la, Vogenauer Stefan ‘Prohibition of Abuse of Law. A 
New General Principle of EU Law?’ (Oxford, Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Co, 
2011) p. 337. 
42
 For a detailed analysis of this case see 3.1. 
43
 Forshaw Simon, Pilgerstorfer Marcus 'Direct and indirect discrimination: is there something in 
between?' [2008] Industrial Law Journal p. 348. 
44
 Ibid., p. 347 Forshaw Simon and Pilgerstorfer Marcus distinguished ‘quasi-direct discrimination’ 
or establish a ‘form of discrimination’; see also C-127/92 Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority 
[1993] ECR I-5535. 
45
 Article 200.1 TFEU, supra, no. 1. This problem is also regulated in a number of secondary 
legislative measures: Council Directive 2000/42/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin; Council Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
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Figure 1. Direct and Indirect Discrimination. 
 
 
 
It is noteworthy that this issue has not been the subject of the CJEU 
consideration.46 Advocate General Léger has observed the Court does not inquire 
into whether the discrimination was direct or indirect. The Court states that there is 
a difference in treatment which creates a disadvantage for economic operators who 
have exercised the freedom of establishment and could deter them from exercising 
such rights.47  
Consequently, the classification of direct and indirect discrimination is not widely 
discussed in the literature.  
 However, the problem has been identified by Sunberg-Weitman Brita48 who 
based her remarks on Steindorf.49 She suggested that the discrimination against a 
company is indicated by ‘the crossing of the national framework.’50 Thus, it is 
                                                          
employment and occupation; Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing 
men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services. It is also confirmed in Article 21 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights on the European Union OJ 2012/C 326/391. 
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 The notion of nationality was not mentioned in Überseering. 
47
 Opinion of Advocate General Léger delivered on 2 May 2006 in C-196/05 Cadbury Schweppes 
[2006] ECR I-7995 par. 74. 
48
 Sunberg-Weitman Brita ‘Discrimination on grounds of nationality. Free movement of workers 
and freedom of establishment under the EEC Treaty’ (Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing 
Company 1977) p. 93. 
49
 Stiendorf E. ‘Der Gleichheitssatz im Wirtschaftrecht des Gemeinsamen Markets’ [1965] Berlin. 
50
 This approach is supported by Article 79 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
Consolidated Version at OJ 2002/C 325/33 (EEC). The article provides that international 
discrimination against capital may be based on the place of residence of the owner or on the place 
where the capital is invested. Furthermore, Article 95 EEC stipulates that taxation may not be 
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submitted that a company can be discriminated against on the grounds of its 
nationality, even though the definition of nationality differs from the notion used 
for a natural person. It is surprising that there is no further research in this matter. 
If it is assumed that direct discrimination is based solely on nationality criteria sensu 
stricte, the right of companies would be significantly narrowed in comparison with 
natural persons.  
 It seems contradictory to Article 18 TFEU,51 especially in the context of the 
wording of Article 54 which states that ‘companies and firms’ shall be treated in 
the same way as natural persons. Companies may be deprived of protection against 
direct discrimination, whereas a natural person benefits from it. However, the 
Treaty does not define nationality and avoids using the term ‘nationality’ in relation 
to companies. In this context, Steindorf is right in highlighting the difference in 
definition between a company’s nationality and that of a natural person. However, 
the criterion of ‘the crossing of the national framework’ seems to be too wide. It 
may result in the assumption that any discrimination against a cross-border 
operating company is direct. 
It is proposed linking the ‘nationality’ of a company to factors that connect 
it to a legal system. A member state is free to choose a factor which links a company 
to that state’s legal system. As a result, it cannot be unambiguously defined 
company ‘nationality’.52 Nonetheless, it is also contended that a residence criterion 
cannot always serve as a substitute for the nationality of a company. If a company 
is governed by the incorporation theory, it can have its place of management outside 
the country of incorporation. However, it has no impact on the governing law 
applied. Even though a company moves its place of residence, it still has the 
                                                          
imposed on the products of other member states in excess of that imposed on similar domestic 
products. In addition, Article 67 EEC prohibits discrimination based on nationality, the place of 
residence of the parties or the place where such a capital is invested. However, all these provisions 
are not included in the TFEU. 
51
 Sunberg-Weitman Brita ‘Discrimination on grounds of nationality. Free movement of workers 
and freedom of establishment under the EEC Treaty’ (Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing 
Company, 1977) p.93. 
52
 There are two main theories: real seat and incorporation. However, there is no state which applies 
either theory in its pure version. 
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‘nationality’ of a state of incorporation.53 In the below section the factors which 
link a company to a legal system are examined to determine whether discrimination 
is direct or indirect.  
 
 
2.2.1 Direct Discrimination 
 
It has been established that a company may be directly discriminated against. 
The direct discrimination looks for a form, irrespective of the outcomes it creates. 
Nonetheless, direct discrimination can be overt or covert.54 If a direct 
discriminatory treatment is observed, it can be allowed only by express 
derogation.55  
 First, expressed derogation to the freedom of establishment is rooted in Article 
52 TFEU56 which states:  
‘the provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not 
prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on 
grounds of public policy, public security or public health.’ 
There is no doubt that public policy, security and health are substantial 
values for a society. These terms are not expressly defined which leaves scope for 
different interpretations. Secondly, Article 52 TFEU, as a derogation to a 
fundamental freedom of the EU, is construed narrowly.57  
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 Additionally, Steindorf proposed a ‘crossing of the national framework’ would be equal to direct 
discrimination. Stiendorf E. ‘Der Gleichheitssatz im Wirtschaftrecht des Gemeinsamen Markets’ 
[1965] Berlin. 
54
 An opposite and early ruling can be found in CJEU (C-43/75 Second Defrenne [1976] ECR 455). 
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been explained in 19/81 Burton v British Railways Board [1982] ECR 555. See also Ellis Evelyn, 
Watson Philippa ‘EU Anti-Discrimination Law’ (Oxford, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2013) p. 145. 
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 Supra, Chapter 1 no. 1. 
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must be met. The law in question must ‘1) have legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty, 2) they 
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order to attain the objective in mind.’ Kiikeri Markku added that rules must be unique and not less 
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Indeed, the CJEU seldom allows national discriminatory measures to 
prevail. In Royal Bank of Scotland,58 the Court considered whether Greece had 
entrenched discriminatory treatment. Greece had granted the possibility of a lower 
rate of tax only to domestic business. A company having its seat in another member 
state and carrying business in Greece was excluded from this advantage.59 Indeed, 
Greek companies benefited from 35% taxation rate, whereas companies having 
their seat in another member state were subjected to a 40% tax.60 
 
Figure 2 Royal Bank of Scotland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Court first ruled that direct taxation falls within the competence of 
member states but it must be exercised consistently in accordance with EU Law to 
avoid any discrimination ‘on grounds of nationality.’61 The CJEU reaffirmed that 
the non-discrimination principle constitutes one of the most fundamental provisions 
of EU law and it is directly applicable to the member states.62 The Court highlighted 
that freedom of establishment provides for the right of a company or a firm formed 
in accordance with the law of a member state and having a seat, a registered office, 
a central administration or a principal place of business within the EU, to pursue an 
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http://www.kiikerilaw.com/Sijoittautumistutkimus.englanti.pdf, p. 64. 
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 C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland v Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) [1999] ECR I-2664. 
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 Ibid, par. 18. 
60
 The corporate tax in Greece has been, since 2015, 29%. More information on current and historical 
corporate tax rates in Greece can be found in https://tradingeconomics.com/greece/corporate-tax-
rate . 
61
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[1995] I-225 par. 21, 26; C-80/94 Wielockx [1995] ECR I-2493 par. 16, C-107/94 Asscher [1996] 
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activity in any member state of the EU, including Greece, through a branch or an 
agency. The Greek code introduced a difference in treatment in the calculation of 
tax on the profits of companies depending on whether companies have their seat in 
or outside Greece. In particular, a Greek undertaking, in certain conditions relating 
to the legal form and the nature of shares issued, might be taxed at the rate of 35% 
instead of 40%. 
The Court noted that there was a substantial difference in treatment between 
residents and non-residents undertakings arising from unlimited or limited tax 
liability.63 However, in these circumstances, both residents and non-residents 
undertakings are in a similar situation.64 The Court concluded that the Greek 
government failed to establish ‘any distinction such as to justify a difference of 
treatment between the two categories of companies.’65 
The CJEU stated clearly that any discrimination, on grounds of nationality, 
is prohibited.66 and found that Greece discriminated against companies with their 
seat in another member state.67 The Court expressly declared that this constitutes a 
direct discrimination which might be justified only by expressed derogation.68  
A residence requirement is often perceived as an example of indirect 
discrimination.69 However, Christa Tobler wisely observed that whether such 
discrimination should be seen as indirect depends on the legislative framework. 
Depending on the area, the differentiation ground of residence can give rise to either 
direct or indirect discrimination. The Treaty rules on free movement provide an 
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 Ibid, par. 29. 
64
 Ibid, par. 30. The same solution was issued in C-270/83 Commission v. France (tax credits) [1986] 
ECR 273. The CJEU found that granting tax credit only to companies with their registered office in 
France was discriminatory.  
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 Ibid, par.28. 
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 Ibid, par.19. 
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 Ibid, par.30. 
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 Ibid, par. 32: ‘it is necessary to examine whether discrimination such as that in question in the 
main proceeding may be justified. According to settled case-law, only an express derogating 
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recurrent theme in the Court's case law as a form of indirect discrimination on grounds of 
nationality.’ C-224/02 Pusa [2004] ECR I-5763. 
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illustrative example. Thus, the relevance of a differentiation based on residence was 
obvious under the original rules on free movement of capital which prohibited ‘any 
discrimination based on the nationality or on the place of residence of the parties or 
on the place.’70 
The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) is a key example, in which a residence 
requirement works as ‘nationality’ for companies. In the analysed case, a seat in 
another member state was a criterion to tax a company or firm at a higher rate. As 
mentioned above,71 there is a general acceptance that a company or firm might be 
directly discriminated against even though it does not possess ‘nationality’ sensu 
stricte. Moreover, Article 54 TFEU states that ‘companies and firms’ shall be 
treated in the same way as natural persons. 
As already discussed, the consequences of establishing that a company 
could be discriminated against indirectly provide that the rights of companies or 
firms are not equal to those conferred on natural persons. To justify an indirectly 
discriminatory measure, it is sufficient to indicate a justified reason, whereas to 
justify a direct discrimination, it is necessary to rely on an express Treaty 
derogation. It is proposed, therefore, to examine whether discrimination is direct or 
indirect and whether it based on factors which link a company to a legal system. 
Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the test will be applied to the 
governing law of a company exercising freedom of establishment (the member state 
of registration or the member state where the real seat is located) or the legal system 
of a host member state.  
 
Figure 3. Indirect Discrimination – test applied to the governing law of a 
company exercising freedom of establishment. 
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Figure 4. Direct Discrimination – test applied to legal system of the host 
member state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
In both cases discrimination might be observed but classified as direct or 
indirect depending on the legal system applied. This is observed based on the facts 
of the Royal Bank of Scotland. The company exercising freedom of establishment 
was established in the home state governed by the incorporation theory and it 
exercised the freedom of establishment in a state which adhered to the real seat 
theory. 
It is argued that the legal system of a host member state should be applied 
to the test. In the examined case, this would be Greek law. Greece is governed by 
the real seat theory which links a company to the place of its seat. Moreover, the 
discrimination is based on the criterion of a company’s seat. Accordingly, it is direct 
discrimination, because it is based on residence (seat) criterion and concerns a 
company governed by a real seat theory legal system. This is supported by the 
Court’s decision in Royal Bank of Scotland that the discrimination was direct. 
Accordingly, the CJEU applied the test to the legal system of the host member state. 
 
Figure 5. Direct discrimination in RBS. 
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another member state. In the analysed case, Greece used the same criterion (a seat) 
to link a company to its own legal system and, simultaneously, applied it as a 
criterion to differentiate the tax rate. As a result, the Court decided that the national 
provisions in question would be precluded.72 The case underscores the difficulties 
with providing an all-purpose criterion for a direct discrimination for companies. 
Moreover, as discussed below, even in classic circumstances such as exercising 
official authority, the Treaty might be interpreted in a manner which limit 
discrimination.  
 The second express Treaty derogation states that the provisions of this Chapter 
shall not apply – so far as any given member state is concerned – to activities which 
in that state are connected, even occasionally, to the exercise of official authority.73 
The derogation must be interpreted ‘in a manner which limits its scope to what is 
strictly necessary for safeguarding the interests which that provision allows the 
member states to protect.’74 
 A number of rulings might be cited here to demonstrate the Court’s approach, 
indicating that the CJEU on very rare occasions found a derogation to be justified.75 
In Commission v Belgium, Spain, France, Portugal, Austria, Luxembourg, 
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 C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland v Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) [1999] ECR I-2664 par. 34. 
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 Article 51 TFEU. 
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 C-114/97 Commission v Spain [1998] ECR I-6717, but also C–473/93 Commission v Luxembourg 
[1996] ECR I–3207. 
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 The Court has already decided that the following activities are not directly and specifically 
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Belgium [2000] ECR I-1221; C-283/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4363; C-465/05 
Commission v Italy [2007] ECR I-11091; C-404/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-10239; 
C-393/05 Commission v Austria [2007] ECR I-10195; C-405/01 Colegio de Oficiales de la Marina 
Mercante Española [2003] ECR I-10391; C-55/93 Van Schaik [1994] ECR I-4837.  
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Germany, Greece,76 member states had limited access to the profession of notary, 
stating that exercising this profession is connected to the exercise of an official 
authority. This case is relevant to determine whether a company can be directly 
discriminated against as the problem is addressed both to law firms and individuals 
providing notary services.77 
The Court did not find that the profession of notary constitutes an exercise 
of the official authority. The main function of notaries is to provide a special status 
to documents, provisions and forms of conduct. Without the notaries’ authorisation, 
it would be nothing more than a private will. Nevertheless, the CJEU did not find 
that any of the activities undertaken by notaries were connected to an official 
authority.78  
 It must be noted that the Commission was supported only by the United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland. Other member states claimed the opposite. It is a 
characteristic of the UK that the profession of notary is associated with the 
profession of solicitor.79 Moreover, the ruling recalls the earlier case, Reyners.80 In 
Reyners the Court ruled that the profession of advocate (solicitor) is not considered 
as being one where there is inherent exercise of official authority. In continental 
Europe, the role of notary has a long-established tradition as a separate profession 
from that of solicitors mainly for exercising public authority duties.  
 In Commission v Belgium, Spain, France, Portugal, Austria, Luxembourg, 
Germany, Greece the interpretation was contrary to the view of the majority of 
member states.81 The judgement has not yet been widely discussed. According to 
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 C-47/08 Commission v Belgium, Spain, France, Portugal, Austria, Luxembourg, Germany, 
Greece [2010] ECR I-4105. 
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some commentators, notaries are conducting an activity in the public interest to 
assure the legal certainty of documents and are personally liable to their clients. 
Thus, this activity is not an exercise of official authority.82 
 Moreover, it is in accordance with the wording of the Services Directive.83 
Article 2(2)(i) excludes from the scope of the Directive ‘activities which are 
connected with the exercise of official authority as set out in Article 45 of the 
Treaty.’ The Services Directive stipulates separately in article 2(2)(1) that the 
Directive does not apply to ‘services provided by notaries and bailiffs who are 
appointed by an official act of government.’84 These exclusions are added in the 
final stages of negotiation. It points out clearly that member states perceive a 
difference between institutions exercising the official authority and notaries.85 
 It is regrettable that the Court did not follow the Advocate General’s Opinion. 
The AG stated that the process of European integration is sufficiently advanced to 
abandon an official authority exception.86 Arguably, this means that the derogation 
of Article 51 TFEU is not a strong one and the development of the EU community 
is advanced enough to remove all burdens and to enable non-nationals to exercise 
public authority.87 It also raises the question whether Article 51 TFEU is still valid. 
The AG’s Opinion is not far from stating, following arguments, that EU society is 
mature enough to abolish all restrictions and not allow any direct discrimination on 
the ground of nationality.  
 This part of the thesis focused on direct discrimination. First, it sought criteria 
to determine when direct discrimination of a legal person is to be established. 
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However, such universal criteria do not exit, as member states’ legislation varies in 
stipulating what connects a company to a legal system. In conclusion, a court needs 
to establish in concreto whether discrimination is direct or indirect. This has great 
significance as direct discrimination is an aggravated form of discrimination and 
legal persons deserve special protection. Thus, it can only be justified by an express 
derogation.  
 Having discussed direct discrimination, the thesis now proceeds to examine the 
meaning of indirect discrimination.  
 
 
2.2.2 Indirect Discrimination 
 
Indirect discrimination focuses more on substantive equity, than on formal 
equity.88 Simon Forshaw concluded that treating two entities in the same manner 
(by the application of a separating rule) might create inequality. There are 
differences between individuals and substantive inequalities might be justified and 
a balancing act is required between the needs of the putative discriminator (for 
example, an employer) to apply separating rules and the discriminatory effects 
which the application of such rules creates.89 
Indirectly discriminatory measures can be objectively justified. The Court 
has already entrenched a test to apply. An objectively justified reason must satisfy 
the Gebhard test. In a leading case, Gebhard,90 the CJEU ruled on the question of 
whether Italy could impose conditions on non-national lawyers in Italy. The Court 
held that restrictions might be justified only if ‘applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; 
                                                          
88
 Forshaw Simon, Pilgerstorfer Marcus 'Direct and indirect discrimination: is there something in 
between?' [2008] Industrial Law Journal p. 351. 
89
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they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; 
and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.’91   
 The issue of indirect discrimination is further illustrated by Pfeiffer92 and 
Futura & Singer.93 The first case concerns a trademark problem and the second a 
tax issue. Member states have competence in these two fields but the national 
provisions must be exercised consistently with EU law and avoid discrimination. 
 In Pfeiffer94 two companies asked to trade under the name ‘Plus’. The name 
‘Plus’ was registered in 1969 in Austria by Pfeiffer and in 1989 in Germany by 
Löwa. Löwa sought to use the same trade name across all EU member states to 
reduce the costs of marketing. It claimed the right to trade under the same name 
‘Plus’ anywhere in the EU based on the freedom to provide service and the freedom 
of establishment. However, Pfeiffer requested a restraining order from Austrian 
authorities against Löwa being able to trade in Austria under the trade name ‘Plus’. 
Pfeiffer claimed that both businesses traded in similar products and, therefore, there 
was a great risk of confusion.95 
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First, Advocate General Mischo doubted if such a restraining order might 
be considered as ‘means of arbitrary discrimination.’96 In his Opinion, the AG 
provided an analysis of whether a restraining order such as that contemplated in the 
main proceedings is contrary to Article 52 of the Treaty.97 The AG concluded that 
the Treaty does not preclude a national provisions requiring that, in the case of 
specific designation of undertakings which are liable to be confused, the one with 
earlier priority is to be protected and prohibiting an undertaking without priority in 
this particular member state from using a name which is already in use in another 
member state.98 
The Court found that such a restraining order is contrary to the freedom of 
establishment,99 and convincingly demonstrated that it is in accordance with the 
previous ruling. The restraining order constitutes a restriction on the right of 
establishment if they are liable to place the companies in a less favourable factual 
or legal situation than those from the state of establishment (the home state).100 
Indeed, in the analysed case the foreign entity is not allowed to trade under a 
lawfully obtained name. Thus, a restraining order must have a hindering effect on 
the undertaking. However, the CJEU observed that a protection of trade names 
constitutes a primary aim of national laws101 and an overriding value.102 
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Furthermore, the risk of confusion does in fact exist and the restraining order sought 
by Pfeiffer is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective pursued and does 
not go beyond what is necessary. The CJEU ruled that ‘Article 52 of the Treaty 
does not preclude a restraining order such as that which may be made against 
Löwa.’103 
This case is a good example of derogation based on public policy and 
examines a process of balancing interests. In this situation, there are two interests: 
freedom of establishment and protection of trademarks. There was no international 
register of trademarks at the time of the ruling which might have created difficulties, 
in particular, if two or more companies conducted similar activities and offered 
similar products. It is also obvious that the conflict exists between interests and 
there is a need to decide which one is overriding.  
The Court concluded that a restraining order to prevent the use of a 
trademark is a restriction on the freedom of establishment. The restriction might be 
applied only if the national measure met the Gebhard test. Both the Court and AG 
Mischo concluded that all four conditions had been fulfilled. The measure had been 
applied in a non-discriminatory manner, it was justified by imperative requirements 
in the general interest and suitable for securing the attainment of the objective 
pursued and did not go beyond what was necessary in order to attain the objective. 
In this case, the CJEU ruled that the protection of the trademark had an overriding 
value over the freedom of establishment and so the issue of the restraining order 
was justified. 
This case is an excellent example of a balancing process carried out by the 
CJEU. The Court strives and will continue to strive to find a balance between 
freedom of establishment and other protected interests. Also, the protection granted 
to trademark rights by national and international conventions varies depending on 
the weight accorded to these competing rights. In case of patent protection, the 
problem has been resolved by introducing enhanced cooperation. Currently, there 
is a unitary system of registering a patent across most of the EU member states. 
It has been noted that there was no common system of trademark and no 
common policy of trademark protection.104 This might lead to the situation where a 
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company cannot use a uniform name or trademark in all member states. It is 
appraisable that the CJEU noticed that this situation had a hindering effect on a 
cross-border activity of an undertaking.  
The second case refers to direct taxation. Direct taxation lies within a 
competence of member states. Nonetheless, national provisions on taxation must be 
exercised consistently with European law. In Futura & Singer,105 a branch of a non-
resident company wished to carry forward previous losses for the years 1981-1986. 
However, Futura did not have a proper account for this period. Luxembourg law 
allowed non-resident taxpayers to deduct previous losses only if ‘they are 
economically related to income received locally and that accounts are kept within 
the country.’ Futura provided only an apportionment (estimation) of its total 
income. As a result, a Luxembourg tax authority refused to allow set-off on the 
basis of an apportionment.106 
First, the CJEU decided whether a member state may impose a condition 
that the losses be economically linked to the income earned in that state. The Court 
stated that although direct taxation is outside the competence of the EU, member 
states must exercise their competence consistently with EU law and avoid any 
discriminatory treatment. The Court repeated that there is a substantial difference 
between residents and non-residents which is in conformity with the fiscal principle 
of territoriality to tax non-residents only on income and losses arising from their 
Luxembourg activity, while residents are assessed to tax on all their income and 
losses.107 This relates to the assumption that double non-deductibility of the losses 
and double taxation are compliant with the current status of the EU law.108 
Secondly, the Court ruled on whether a member state may require keeping 
proper accounts. Accordingly, a company needs to keep separate accounts that 
comply with the tax accounting rules in another member state. These documents 
need to be held at the place of establishment of its branch.109 The CJEU concluded 
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that this may constitute a restriction on the freedom of establishment. As a result, it 
may be allowed only if it is justified by an overriding public interest and the 
conditions of the Gebhard test are satisfied. 
Nonetheless, in the current case, the Court concluded that the requirement 
of keeping proper accounts was essential. The Commission suggested that a set of 
accounts should be located in the member state of the seat of the concerned 
company. However, the CJEU noted that rules on keeping accounts vary from 
member state to member state. The accounts kept by a non-resident taxpayer 
according to home member state rules may not have provided the required 
information. The CJEU decided that the requirement was justified and the freedom 
of establishment may be limited in these circumstances.110  
The Court ruled that ‘the effectiveness of fiscal supervision constitutes an 
overriding requirement of general interest capable of justifying a restriction on the 
exercise of fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty.’111 The derogation was 
applied without discrimination and took into account general good concerns within 
organisation, qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability.  
The ruling has been criticised for confirming the necessity to keep accounts 
in the host member state. Pascal Faes argued that it is sufficient that non-resident 
taxpayers demonstrate clearly and precisely the amount of losses arising from their 
Luxembourg activities if the accounts are located outside Luxembourg.112 
Convincingly, if accounts are in accordance with the standards and regulations of 
the Luxembourg tax system, there is no need for them to be located in Luxembourg. 
It is submitted that less restrictive measures are possible; for example, the 
Luxembourg tax authority could be entitled to request all documents for inspection. 
Thus, in this respect, the discriminatory measure goes further than required to attain 
the aim. 
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The ruling has provoked debate on the future of tax harmonisation in 
Europe.113 Craig William argued that the main justification acceptable for a 
restriction is for the member state to prove that there are differences in tax situations 
that can justify the disadvantage.114  
As it was previously stated, the issue of discrimination is one of the most 
discussed in EU law. The freedom of establishment, as one of the EU freedoms, 
prohibits direct and indirect discrimination. Both direct and indirect discriminatory 
treatment can be observed in relation to a legal person.  
 
2.3 Concluding Observations 
 
This chapter outlined the principle of discrimination in relation to the freedom 
of establishment. The freedom of establishment is not absolute. Other rights or 
interest might prevail and thus, a freedom is limited. There are two types of 
discriminatory measures: a direct discrimination and indirect discrimination. The 
ramification is crucial as there are different criteria to justify direct and indirect 
discrimination.  
First, it is considered that both natural and legal persons might be directly 
and indirectly discriminated. The direct discrimination might prevail only if it is 
expressly derogated in the Treaty. The chapter examined the criteria for indirect 
discrimination for legal persons. A company can be directly discriminated against 
based on ‘nationality.’ However, the meaning of company nationality varies 
depending on the national legal system. It is argued that the criteria for direct 
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discrimination of a company is inherent to the provisions for the connecting factors 
to link a company to a legal system. This solution is based on analysis of current 
case law of the CJEU. 
Secondly, the indirect discriminatory measure might be saved based on 
justified reason. The Gebhard / proportionality test provides criteria for justifying 
indirect discrimination. The indirect discrimination and proportionality test was 
presented based on Pfeiffer and Futura & Singer. The particularity of 
discrimination in scope of the freedom of establishment can be observed is the so-
called ‘doctrine of abuse’ which refers to situations where an indirect 
discriminatory treatment is justified by the misuse of law. It relates both to objective 
and subjective criteria. The objective criterion is met when despite formal 
observance of EU law, the objective pursued by the freedom of establishment has 
not been achieved. The subjective circumstances arise when the intention is to 
evade provisions of national law that would normally apply. A detailed analysis is 
presented in the following Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3: NATIONALITY 
3.1 Governing Law of a Company: Real Seat Theory and 
Incorporation Theory  
 
When examining the primary establishment, it is necessary to discuss conflicts 
in corporate laws. There are two main theories about the legal system that governs 
companies: the real seat theory and the incorporation theory. 
 The real seat theory dates to the nineteenth century and is accepted by the 
majority of civilian law systems.115 Accordingly, a company is governed by the law 
of a country where it has its ‘real’ seat.116 A real seat can be understood as a central 
management or control centre.117 Thus, a company is not free to choose a governing 
law but rather it is linked to the place where it operates.  
One argument against the real seat theory is that in today’s world it is 
difficult to determine a company’s real seat.118 It may lead to long disputes if the 
place of management does not correspond with, inter alia, the place of a main 
business or the place where the main business of a company is undertaken. 
Conversely, the real seat theory aims to establish the closest connection to the place 
of residence.119 This works as a ‘double-edged sword.’120 It affects both companies 
incorporated abroad but having a centre of management in the real seat governed 
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country and companies incorporated under domestic law and having a centre of 
management abroad.  
Moving a seat from a country governed by the real seat theory to a country 
governed by the incorporation theory may mean that the company would be an 
‘apatride’.121 It would lose its link to the state of origin and not gain a link with a 
host state.122 The situation is analysed below123 taking into consideration the 
seminal case of Cartesio.124 
In contrast, the incorporation theory allows founders of a company to choose 
freely a state it can be incorporated and, consequently, a governing law.125 A 
company is governed by the law of the state where the act of incorporation is 
completed.126 Thus, the place of an activity of a company is irrelevant. Moving a 
seat from a home state would not have consequences for a company governed by 
the incorporation theory. A company would be able to operate exclusively in a 
foreign state but be governed by the national law of the state of incorporation. 
The incorporation theory which dates to the eighteenth century,127 is 
strongly applied in common law countries such as the UK and the United States 
(US) but it is also adopted by some civilian systems, as in The Netherlands,128 
Switzerland and Russia.  
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The advantages of the application of the incorporation theory are legal 
certainty, predictability, party autonomy and security of transaction.129 However, 
the main disadvantage of the theory is that the founders of a business might choose 
freely to incorporate in a state with a lax company law. Thus, they are allowed to 
circumvent the rules of the state of operation. It has been observed that in states 
where companies are required to adhere to the theory of incorporation, lenient rules 
are offered to attract many businesses to incorporate in their jurisdiction. Delaware 
is one American state which offered lenient rules and attracted businesses from 
across all the US to incorporate there. Other states had to change their rules to 
become more ‘competitive’ with Delaware. It is sometimes described as a ‘race to 
the bottom’ or ‘law beauty competition’ but most frequently, the ‘Delaware 
Syndrome’.130 As a result, there is no state in the world that applies the 
incorporation theory in its purest version. Some states protect themselves from 
pseudo-foreign companies,131 for example, the US and The Netherlands. An entity 
is regarded as pseudo-foreign if it has no connection, except the act of 
establishment, in the state of incorporation and the centre of management and 
activities are undertaken somewhere else.132 However, as far as EU law is 
concerned, as analysed below in Centros133 and Cadbury,134 the CJEU has not 
completely accepted the theory of incorporation as part of the EU legal order.135 
The ‘European version’ of this doctrine is examined below in the landmark case 
Cadbury.136 
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It needs to be highlighted that neither the incorporation theory nor the real 
seat theory is ideal. The theory (incorporation theory or real seat theory) chosen by 
a member state concerns the private international rules which are not, per se, 
contrary to the EU law. These rules are neutral and abstract. To provide an example, 
the rule that a Polish legal order shall apply is not contrary to EU law.137 Only the 
legal content of Polish/national norm might be contrary to EU law. Any 
incompatibility stems from the content of the applicable substantive national law 
and its effects in a specific case. Thus, the theory is not the most crucial issue for 
this thesis. To support the view of the author, this issue is not and should not be, a 
subject of a CJEU ruling.138  
Nonetheless, there is strong debate139 as to whether the CJEU should adopt 
the incorporation or the real seat theory. Moreover, the main objective of this thesis 
is to determine the hurdles of freedom of establishment. As noted above, the 
discussion on advantages or disadvantages of this theories does not contribute to 
reach this aim. 
 Instead, research should be undertaken to answer two main questions 
concerning primary establishment. First, does a home member state have an 
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obligation to retain the legal personality of an emigrating company (outbound 
cases)? Secondly, should a host member state recognise the fact that the undertaking 
has been incorporated by the law of another member state and according to that law 
its activities are governed by the home state (inbound cases)? Answering these 
questions helps to define the freedom of establishment and the ‘borders’ of freedom. 
It is considered whether the freedom of establishment is an absolute right. If it is 
not, what are the limits of this freedom? This is essential, as it is not possible to 
state whether there is a hurdle to the freedom which is not well defined. 
 There are no Treaty expressed provisions to answer these questions. 
Nevertheless, the CJEU interprets and rules on the applicability of EU law when 
such questions are referred to the Court by national courts.140  
 In order to analyse how the CJEU answers these questions, the rulings are 
considered depending on whether the company encountered problems when exiting 
the member state of incorporation (i.e. restrictions imposed by the state of 
incorporation, the home state) or when seeking primary or secondary establishment 
in another member state (restrictions imposed by the host state). 
 
3.2 Outbound Cases 
 
The outbound cases examine the rights and obligations of a home member state 
to answer the question of whether a home member state has an obligation to retain 
legally the personality of emigrating companies. There are two landmark rulings141 
in this field which, chronologically, are: Daily Mail142 and Cartesio.143 
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3.2.1 The Daily Mail  
 
In Daily Mail,144 the UK newspaper sought to move its central management 
and control to The Netherlands. The main aim of relocation was to avoid UK capital 
gains tax. At the time of the proceedings, the Treasury was required to provide 
consent for a UK incorporated company to move outside the jurisdiction and retain 
its status (legal personality) as a UK company. Daily Mail is an example of an 
outbound case and thus relevant to determining whether a home member state has 
an obligation to retain the legal personality of an emigrating company. 
 The CJEU ruled that the Treaty does not confer a right on a company to move 
to another member state, while retaining its legal status in the member state of 
origin.145 In other words, an emigrating company has no right under EU law to 
retain its legal personality (status) under the law of the member state of origin. If 
such a right exists, it is conferred by the national law of the member state of origin 
and not by EU law. Thus, the freedom of establishment must be understood as not 
covering the right to retain legal personality in case of relocation to another member 
state. Furthermore, it states the limits of this examination. Notably, the CJEU did 
not found any hindrance to the freedom of establishment, as argued in cases such 
as Royal Bank of Scotland,146 Commission v Belgium, Spain, France, Portugal, 
Austria, Luxembourg, Germany, Greece,147 Pfeiffer148 and Futura & Singer149 
which were discussed in the previous chapter. Nonetheless, Daily Mail clearly 
concluded that this situation was not covered by the freedom of establishment.  
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Thus, the lack of a possibility to relocate the primary establishment and 
retain legal personality cannot be classified as a main restriction to the freedom of 
establishment. Eddy Wymeersch argued that the Daily Mail ruling represents a 
textual reading of the Treaty.150 Moreover, the CJEU stated that ‘unlike natural 
persons companies are creatures of the law and in the present state of Community 
law creatures of national law. They exist only by virtue of the varying national 
legislation which determines their incorporation and functioning.’151 As vividly 
described in the literature, a ‘company will be killed at the border.’152 
Immediately after this ruling, there were a number of critical views 
expressing the fear that such a restrictive could hinder EU integration.153 Some 
authors perceived the ruling as a confirmation of the prevalence of the real seat 
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theory.154 On the other hand, some French authors argued that the Daily Mail ruling 
constituted the end of the era of the real seat theory. 155  
Both these conclusions are surprising for various reasons. First, as 
Christiann Timmermans remarked, ‘question of international company law, of a 
conflict rule regarding the company’s status, did not really arise in the Daily Mail 
case.’156 Secondly, it is noteworthy that both concerned states were governed by the 
incorporation theory and the issue of the real seat theory did not emerge at all.  
Justin Borg-Barthet suggested the ruling safeguards member states from the 
necessity to recognise pseudo-foreign companies incorporated under the law of 
other member states.157 This view cannot be accepted. The CJEU did not consider 
whether the Daily Mail could ask The Netherlands to move to its territory. Instead, 
the issue concerned was whether the Daily Mail could leave the UK and keep its 
legal personality (outbound case). In Daily Mail, the Court explicitly ruled that the 
right to retain legal personality when moving out of the member state of origin is 
not guaranteed by the Treaty. As a result, the activity of the UK Treasury is not 
discriminatory and does not have a hindering effect on the freedom of the 
establishment.  
Daily Mail was delivered in 1988 but, from the present perspective, the case 
has slowed down companies’ mobility within the EU. However, there is no explicit 
right for a company to retain its legal personality if it moves its seat. Interestingly, 
the UK repealed the regulations requiring HMRC consent prior to the move of a 
company outside the UK158 in the same year that the Daily Mail ruling was 
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delivered. It might be understood that the UK is eager to accept more cross border 
mobility of companies despite the fact EU law does not provide such an obligation. 
 
3.2.2 Cartesio Oktato Es Szolgaltato Bt  
 
On 16 December 2008, the Cartesio159 ruling was delivered, over 20 years after 
Daily Mail. The case concerned a limited partnership which sought to transfer its 
operational headquarters from Hungary to Italy, while remaining registered in 
Hungary. The registrar of the commercial register run by the Hungarian court 
refused to enter a new foreign address in the local register and this was justified on 
the basis that Hungarian law does not allow it. According to the Hungarian 
provision, partnerships should be dissolved and then reregistered in a host member 
state. Consequently, the Hungarian commercial court asked the CJEU if Hungarian 
rules were compatible with the freedom of establishment. It is worthy to recall 
Advocate General Maduro’s Opinion in this case. The AG recommended that to 
exercise effectively the freedom of establishment, there is a need to have at least 
some degree of mutual recognition and coordination of the different national 
systems. However, the CJEU did not follow AG’s approach. In this seminal ruling, 
the CJEU based its reasoning on the Daily Mail. The decision was a confirmation 
of the previous rulings stating that:  
 
‘Articles 43 EC and 48 EC are to be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a 
member state under which a company incorporated under the law of that member 
state may not transfer its seat to another member state whilst retaining its status as 
a company governed by the law of the member state of incorporation.’160  
Thus, the CJEU has explicitly confirmed that member states are entitled to apply 
real seat theory.  
 
 Returning to the first question posed: does a home member state have an 
obligation to retain the legal personality of an emigrating company? Based on 
existing case law, it is clear that such an obligation does not exist. As noted above, 
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Cartesio was delivered at the end of 2008 and followed the Daily Mail case. One 
of the submissions argued by the Daily Mail was based on Article 293 EEC which 
was repealed a year after Cartesio, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force.161 
The article required member states to enter into negotiations with a view to 
abolishing double taxation in the EU. As a result, without further action of member 
states, the transfer of a company does not require retaining its legal personality in 
its state of origin. Would it have made any difference if the ruling had been given a 
year later? Probably not as it seems that article 293 EEC did not have significant 
influence on the Court.162 Notably, in the earlier case of Überseering,163 it was 
explicitly rejected that this article ‘does not constitute a reserve of legislative 
competence vested in the member states.’164 
 The ruling was highly criticised as inconsistent with previous rulings165 which 
mainly stemmed from the fact that commentators did not notice the difference 
between inbound and outbound cases. This difference was pointed out both by AG 
Maduro in his Opinion and by the judge rapporteur in extra-judgement writing.166 
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 It should be noted that the national regulations of European states have been 
changed significantly. French company law expressly admits the transfer of the 
registered seat when changing applicable law and to do so a unanimous decision 
needs to be taken in the general meeting of the company.167 Dutch law allows the 
transfer if both states recognise the survival of companies. Swiss law expressly 
states that a company may transfer abroad its registered seat and keep its legal 
personality.168 The change has been observed since the Daily Mail was delivered. 
There are more and more states which accept the need to retain legal personality in 
the state of origin. It was previously noted that the significant change of law would 
be beneficial to the exercise of the freedom of establishment. AG Maduro in his 
Opinion proposed a law reform. 169 He suggested that letter box companies should 
not benefit from the freedom of the establishment. Therefore, the doctrine of abuse 
might be applied in both types of cases, Daily Mail and Centros and the ramification 
of inbound and outbound cases might be abandoned.  
 Of the inbound and outbound cases, both Daily Mail and Cartesio are ‘exit’ 
types. Current EU law does not permit an entity to retain its legal personality if it 
moves its seat to another member state. To qualify for outbound cases, the two 
criteria from Article 54 TFEU need to be met. First, an entity is incorporated under 
the laws of a member state. Secondly, the registered office, the real seat of the 
principal place of business, should be located in this member state. In Cartesio, both 
requirements were satisfied in Hungary and, consequently, the Hungarian law 
needed to be applied. This application is correct regardless of whether a real seat or 
incorporation theory is adopted. It is explicitly stated in Cartesio: 
‘a member state has the power to define both the connecting factor required of a 
company if it is to be regarded as incorporated under the law of that member state 
and, as such, capable of enjoying the right of establishment and that required if the 
company is to be able subsequently to maintain that status.’170  
                                                          
judgement were still unchanged, namely, that no Community legislation or international agreement 
between member states has been adopted on the issue.’ 
167
 Article L. 225-97 of the French Code de commerce. 
168
 Swiss federal law on Private International Law, 18 December 1987. 
169
 Opinion of AG Maduro in Cartesio par. 29. 
170
 C-210/06 Cartesio Oktato Es Szolgaltato Bt [2008] I-9641 par.110. 
49 
 
Consequently, if the legal personality is granted by a home member state, does a 
host member state have to recognise it? The next section on inbound cases aims to 
answer this question. 
 
3.3 Inbound Cases  
 
The second type of cases refers to inbound situations which cover both primary 
and secondary establishment. The CJEU has adopted a common approach to 
inbound cases. For this reason, both secondary and primary establishment are 
analysed. The first two cases, Centros171 and Inspire Art,172 concern secondary 
establishment. Another two cases, Überseering173 and Vale,174 are examples of 
primary establishment. Both groups of cases are presented to answer the question 
as to whether a host member state has an obligation under EU law to recognise an 
immigrating company.  
 
 
3.3.1 Centros  
 
Centros175 concerns the refusal of the Danish Trade and Companies Board to 
register a branch of a formally incorporated foreign company. This private English 
company had been set up by shareholders residing in Denmark. The only reason to 
incorporate in the UK was to circumvent Danish minimum capital requirements. 
The business planned to operate solely in Denmark.  
 The CJEU ruled that Mr and Mrs Bryde, by forming a limited liability company 
in the UK, had made use of the freedom of establishment. In other words, they did 
exactly what is allowed by the Treaty. The CJEU stated that a general prohibition 
was not compliant with the Treaty. However, member states might apply derogation 
in concreto: ‘case by case, take account – on the basis of objective evidence – of 
abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of the persons concerned in order, where 
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appropriate, to deny them the benefit of the provisions of Community law on which 
they seek to rely, they must nevertheless assess such conduct in the light of the 
objectives pursued by those provisions.’176  
The case was widely commented upon and opinions were divided.177 Ebke 
Werner argued that the case concerned only secondary establishment and this 
solution should not be reconciled with Daily Mail as the latter concerned matters of 
a primary establishment.178 It is true that this ruling may, at first sight, be difficult 
to reconcile with Daily Mail.179 However, there is a binary result of accepting the 
view that a home state has the power of ‘life and death’ of a company. Only a home 
member state that ‘gives birth’ to a company might impose a ‘life sentence.’ As 
long as a home member state allows a company to retain legal personality, it is 
‘alive’ and needs to be recognised as such by other member states. Member states 
are sovereign in choosing the factors that determine the existence of a company. 
Therefore, a company granted legal personality in one member state becomes an 
existing legal entity across the EU.  
Secondly, comments published shortly after the Centros ruling concluded 
that the case abolished the real seat theory.180 This group of scholars argued that the 
CJEU supports the most favoured treatment principle. As a result, even pseudo-
foreign entities might benefit from the freedom of establishment.  
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The opposite view has been presented by Roth Wulf -Henning, who claimed 
that Centros dealt with a matter of substantive law and not the conflict of laws. 181 
In fact, both concerned member states, the UK and Denmark, were governed by the 
incorporation theory. The ruling did not include a discussion of the real seat theory. 
Arguably, therefore, the approach presented by Roth Wulf -Henning is 
legitimate.182 Moreover, according to some commentators, Centros should be 
considered as a significant contribution to the doctrine of abuse.183 However, this 
position is not convincing. Centros clearly stated that establishing a company in 
another member state to benefit from its corporate legislation is not an abuse184 
However, the ruling remains silent as to what is an abuse.185 Further elaboration of 
abuse theory is found in section 3.4. 
In summary, Centros Ltd was lawfully incorporated in the UK and the 
Danish institutions could not deprive it from possessing legal entity. A general 
prohibition would constitute a restriction to the freedom of establishment. However, 
as it previously stated, the freedom of establishment is not an absolute right and 
might be denied if it is justified by an overriding public interest. This has to be 
examined in concreto. However, according to double taxation treaties, a foreign 
company might have to establish a secondary establishment in a host member state 
if the conditions apply. All in all, the actions of Centros Ltd were perfectly legal.  
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3.3.2 Inspire Art  
 
The later ruling in Inspire Art186 repeated the solution adopted in Centros. The 
facts of this case were unquestionably similar to those of the earlier case.187 Inspire 
Art Ltd, a pseudo-foreign UK company, sought to establish a branch in The 
Netherlands to circumvent provisions on minimum capital requirements. However, 
a Dutch regulation on pseudo-foreign companies stipulates minimum capital 
requirements. Otherwise, the directors of a pseudo-foreign company are jointly and 
severally liable for a company’s debts. 
The CJEU ruled that such a requirement could hinder the freedom of 
establishment and the CJEU proceeded to examine if the restriction might be 
justified. The Dutch government188 submitted that the restriction was justified by 
prevention of fraud, the protection of creditors, the effectiveness of tax inspections 
and the fairness of business dealings.189 The government indicated that minimum 
capital requirements exist in all member states except Ireland and the UK. 
Moreover, the government submitted that the measure applied was necessary to 
allow a foreign entity to establish a branch in The Netherlands. On the other hand, 
the Commission claimed that Inspire Art was a foreign company and all those 
concerned were sufficiently informed, for example, by the unusual suffix ‘ltd.’ 
The Court ruled that derogation could not be justified under Article 52 
TFEU. The CJEU agreed that protection of fairness of business and efficiency of 
tax inspections might become an overriding reason to justify the restriction. 
However, in Inspire Art the Dutch government did not discharge the burden of 
proof. Inspire Art is a step forward from Centros as it provides that not only the 
existence of a foreign company but also all the rules governing the company must 
be respected.190 The limited liabilities of owners and directors of a foreign business, 
if granted by a home member state, must be accepted by a host member state. This 
means that a home member state decides on the life and death of a company and 
prescribes the constitution and rules of the entity. 
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It was claimed that Inspire Art constituted the end of an era of the real seat 
theory.191 The ruling in Inspire Art was understood by Michel Menjucq as 
representing an urgent need for modification of the French legal system,192 as 
French private law stipulated a restriction equivalent to that in The Netherlands. 
The ruling sparked a debate on creditor protection in the EU.193 However, 
discussion which might become a priori example of justified reason, is not possible. 
Even when the case was under the scrutiny of the CJEU, the German government 
asked how member states could combat pseudo-foreign companies. The CJEU did 
not provide an answer but AG Alber suggested that this question should be 
addressed to member states directly.194 
 The questions of a proportionality test and requirements that might justify a 
restriction were examined in Chapter 2. Thus, the discussion continues by analysing 
two landmark decisions concerning inbound situations within the scope of the 
primary establishment. 
 
3.3.3 Überseering  
 
In this landmark case, German nationals acquired shares of a Dutch company 
and became its sole directors. Both were residents in Germany and controlled and 
managed the company from Germany at all times. Überseering ordered work to be 
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carried out in Germany and as this was defective the company decided to sue the 
German contractor in the German courts.  
 German law provided that a company incorporated in another member state 
and having its centre of administration in Germany did not possess legal capacity 
in Germany.195 The national court decided that the actual centre of administration 
had been transferred to Düsseldorf ‘once its shares had been acquired by two 
German nationals’ and Überseering should be incorporated in Germany.196 In other 
words, the legislation presumed a transfer of the seat even if the company did not 
wish to move elsewhere. The German government argued that its reasoning 
followed the Daily Mail ruling.197 In effect, Überseering could not prosecute the 
construction company for defective work. However, the CJEU found that the 
company had legal capacity and was duly incorporated in The Netherlands. 
Germany could not deny the legal capacity of a company duly incorporated in 
another member state.  
The ramification of inbound and outbound cases can be traced to this ruling. 
The CJEU stated that Cartesio cannot be based on Daily Mail as the latter applies 
to the relations between the company and the state of incorporation.198 In Daily 
Mail the ruling refers to retaining legal existence in the UK and having central 
management and residence in the other member state. By contrast, Überseering 
maintained its legal personality in The Netherlands. It was a question of whether 
the company had legal capacity to sue in Germany.  
Furthermore, the question was whether such treatment amounted to a 
restriction. The CJEU decided that rules which are liable to hinder or make less 
attractive the exercise of a fundamental freedom must (1) be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner, (2) justified by imperative requirements in the general 
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interest, (3) suitable for securing the attainment of the objective that they pursue 
and (4) they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain their 
objective.199 In this seminal case, the CJEU did not find any justification to deny 
judicial protection based only on the fact that the company was registered in another 
member state. 
Some commentators argued that the CJEU ruled in favour of the 
incorporation theory and established the end of the real seat theory. In their 
opinions, the German legislation which governed by the real seat theory was 
contrary to the EU.200 On the other hand, Peter Dyrberg201 stated that the CJEU 
ruled only that the real seat theory could be used to indicate a connecting factor to 
the governing company law. Erk Nadja Kuba noted that the CJEU did not even use 
the term of the real seat in its ruling.202 This view should be accepted as governing 
company law is not per se compatible with EU law. The CJEU did not rule on the 
compatibility of the real seat theory. Instead, it ruled on whether a member state 
could not deny the legal capacity of a company duly incorporated in another 
member state. Thus, the Court examined whether the application of substantive law 
causes the breach. Indeed, the CJEU stated that the incorporation theory is accepted 
by EU law. If an undertaking is legally established and is granted legal capacity in 
one member state, the concerned undertaking possesses capacity in all member 
states. A host member state cannot require from the undertaking to be (again) 
incorporated according to the host member state law. Such a requirement would 
cause the infringement and is not compatible with the freedom of establishment. 
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3.3.4 Vale Epitesi kft 
 
The final ruling to be considered also helps to answer the second question as to 
whether a host member state has an obligation to recognise the legal personality of 
an immigrating company. In Vale Epitesi kft,203 an Italian company, Vale 
Construzioni S.r.l (limited liability company) transferred its seat to Hungary. It was 
required to liquidate the company and remove it from the Italian register and then 
to apply for a new incorporation in Hungary. Vale Epitesi S.r.l. claimed to be 
registered as the legal successor of the Italian company.  
In Vale, the company was refused re-registration as the successor of the 
Italian company. Nonetheless, such a conversion was available for Hungarian 
companies. The CJEU stated that it would be discriminatory to allow purely 
domestic companies to convert and did not permit foreign companies to do the 
same.  
The CJEU clearly ruled that denial of conversion and registration as a 
successor might hinder the freedom of establishment. The derogation might be 
saved purely on the basis of an overriding reason of public interest.204 The Court 
noted that in some particular situations, for example, ‘protection of the interests of 
creditors, minority shareholders and employees, the preservation of the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision and the fairness of commercial transactions,’205 
the national law could deny a conversion. However, this could not be done in a 
general manner, as it makes any cross-border conversion impossible. The 
conversion shall be possible when it is available for national companies.206 
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Conversely, the European Court was clear that conversion is possible only 
by virtue of national law.207 If national law does not allow conversion both for 
national and non-national companies, it would then be considered as compatible 
with EU freedoms. Otherwise, nationals would be put in a less advantageous 
position (reverse discrimination).208 
Reverse discrimination takes place when nationals are in a worse position 
than non-nationals.209 According to case law, the Court has prohibited reverse 
discrimination where member states subjected their own nationals to more 
burdensome requirements than non-nationals.210 In Asscher v Staatssecretaris van 
Financiën the Court stated that  
‘Article [49 TFEU] nevertheless cannot be interpreted in such a way as to exclude 
a given member state's own nationals from the benefit of Community law [the EU 
law] where by reason of their conduct they are, with regard to their member state 
of origin, in a situation which may be regarded as equivalent to that of any other 
person enjoying the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Treaty.’211 
It should be noted that in terms of the free movement of goods, the CJEU 
has ruled on reverse discrimination issues212 only if a member state wished to 
proclaim the non-discrimination principle in its national legal systems. Member 
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states are free to decide if they wish to protect their nationals against placing them 
in a less favourable situation than non-nationals. Even if they do so, the national 
juridical system, not the CJEU, should deal with the matter. 
This was shown in Guimont213 (the so-called Ementhal case) which 
concerned a French national producing Ementhal cheese. There was a special 
regulation describing the qualities of cheese and, accordingly, a cheese must 
possess rind in order to be labelled ‘Ementhal.’ The defendant argued that in other 
member states the cheese did not have rind and that he was entitled to use the name 
even if his own product did not have rind. The French authorities claimed that the 
regulation on cheese was created to protect consumers and was of overriding value 
to the freedom of establishment. Mr Guimont claimed that he was subjected to 
reverse discrimination. The CJEU agreed and found that less restrictive measure 
was possible, i.e. the ‘Ementhal’ name could be used but some additional 
information must be included on the label. Notably, the decision was in line with 
the ruling prohibiting even non-discriminatory measures but which could hinder 
exercising the right of establishment. 
The different approach of the CJEU was welcomed in VALE. In this case, 
the following rule was issued:  
As regards the principle of equivalence, the Court notes that, pursuant to that 
principle, a member state is not required to treat cross-border operations more 
favourably than domestic operations. That principle merely implies that the detailed 
rules of national law aimed at safeguarding the rights which individuals derive from 
European Union law cannot be less favourable than those governing similar 
situations under national law.214   
 
In this case, the prohibition of reverse discrimination becomes a general 
principle and does not need to be based on national provisions. Moreover, the Court 
ruled that a company may provide documents from a host member state and these 
need to be accepted. Otherwise, the conversion formally allowed would not be 
possible in practice.215  
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3.4 Doctrine of Abuse in the EU 
A prohibition of (tax) abuse is a legal principle216 developed by the CJEU 
which prevents a person from relying on a right in law where such reliance would 
constitute an abuse of that right.217 The doctrine of abuse in the EU is traditionally 
connected to a 1974 CJEU.218 In Van Binsbergen,219 CJEU stated: 
‘A member state cannot be denied the right to take measures to prevent the 
exercise by a person providing services whose activity is entirely or principally 
directed towards its territory of the freedom guaranteed by Article [49 EC] for the 
purpose of avoiding the professional rules of conduct which would be applicable to 
him if he were established within that state.’220  
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The CJEU based the abuse theory on a business purpose test which originated 
from the Common Law Countries. The test determines whether a transaction has 
any economic sense, besides a fiscal one. Nonetheless, the theory is based also on 
Civil Law Countries’ legal measures such as Generalklausel conception which 
describes an abuse as mistreatment of legal instruments or forms.221 It was followed 
by further development of the abuse theory in the so-called broadcasting cases,222 
and eventually extended to the freedom of establishment in Knoors,223 
Bouchoucha,224 Singh,225 Halifax226 and Cadbury Schweppes.227 
The issue of abusive establishment is mentioned in the recitals of the 
Services Directive: ‘According to this definition, which requires the actual pursuit 
of an economic activity at the place of establishment of the provider, a mere letter 
box does not constitute an establishment.’228 It is pointed out that the Services 
Directive has been implemented to promote the freedom of establishment to provide 
services in the EU.229 The Directive is ‘to a large extent, nothing more than a 
codification of existing ECJ [CJEU] case law.’230 However, the first Commission’s 
proposal provided that the Directive should cover all economic activities involving 
services.231 The final version of the Services Directive has a much more limited 
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scope.232 Moreover, a letter-box company does not constitute an establishment233 
and it is not subject to the regime of the Services Directive. Thus, can the provisions 
of the Directive reflect the freedom of establishment for letter-box companies? 
Paschalis Paschalidis cautiously stated that the Services Directive cannot deprive 
entities from rights provided by the Treaty. 234 It is should be agreed that the Service 
Directive only stipulates that a letter box company might be deprived from the 
benefits of Articles 9-14 of the Directive. As a result, the Services Directive does 
not have significant impact on the freedom of establishment and the theory of abuse. 
Before examining tax abuse, it should be recalled the difference between tax 
abuse and tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is a type of tax abuse. Tax abuse is a non-
proper use of a right, whereas tax avoidance is a circumvention of law. There is a 
classic ramification of tax abuse to an abuse of law and an abuse of right. Abuse of 
law may relate to a situation where a person relies on a European legal right to 
circumvent or displace national law. In other words, a person uses a legal tool to 
avoid national law (act contra iuris).235 Abuse of right concerns a person seeking 
to take advantage of a right in European law but in a manner contrary to its spirit 
and its result is illegitimate. For instance, the tool that is used is legal but the tax 
reduction is illegal. This is referred to as act intra iuris.236  
The doctrine of abuse is illustrated by the seminal case Cadbury 
Schweppes.237 In this case national anti-avoidance provisions were under the 
scrutiny of the CJEU. The provisions were aimed at countering the practice 
whereby a UK resident company transfers its taxable profits to a company it 
controls, which was established in another state and applies a substantially lower 
rate of taxation than that in effect in the UK.238 
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Figure 6 Cadbury Schweppes  
 
 
239
 
 
Cadbury Schweppes has a UK-based parent company which indirectly owns 
two Irish subsidiaries. These subsidiaries were subjected to 10% tax burden in 
Ireland but the UK tax authority (HMRC) applied Controlled Foreign Companies 
[CFC] rules and claimed tax on incomes incurred by subsidiaries. The Special 
Commissioners referred the case to the CJEU.  
First, the Court examined whether establishing and capitalising companies 
in another member state, solely because of a more favourable tax regime available 
in that member state, is an abuse of the freedom of establishment.240 In Cadbury 
Schweppes the Court, based on the rulings of Centros241 and Inspire Art,242 decided 
that establishing a company in another member state for the sole purpose of 
obtaining tax advantages does not suffice to constitute an abuse of freedom.243 
                                                          
239
 Based on Monsenego Jérôme ‘Taxation of foreign business income within European Internal 
Market’ (Intellecta Infolog, Göteborg. 2011) p. 112. Jérôme Monsenego suggested that Cadbury 
Schweppes is a sign that the CJEU is critical of the principle of worldwide taxation p.119. 
240
 C-196/05 Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995 par. 34. 
241
 C-212/97 Centros Ltd [1999] ECR I-1459 p. 52, par. 66. 
242
 C-167/01 Inspire Art [2003] ECR I-10195. 
243
 C-196/05 Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995 par. 37. 
Cadbury Schweppes Overseas 
Limited 
UK-based Parent 
Holding 
Other group companies 
Subsidiary 
Ireland 
Subsidiary 
Ireland 
 
63 
 
Some authors244 suggest that these cases are difficult to reconcile despite the 
ruling and Centros245 and Cadbury Schweppes are not connected.246 In Cadbury 
Schweppes, the Irish subsidiary did not have a real establishment in Ireland, nor in 
any other member state. It was suggested that Centros refers to the rights of 
founders and not to the right of the company itself. Thus, a company does not exist 
before its creation. The commentators claimed that this solution is supported by 
inconsistency in the ruling itself, as it refers sometimes to the company and other 
times to Danish nationals. Furthermore, the argument for a different situation to that 
of Cadbury Schweppes is that the subsidiary does not have a real establishment 
anywhere in the EU. This view247 was based on Advocate General La Pergola’s 
Opinion in Centros.248 It was argued that tax matters needed to be treated differently 
by the CJEU, because direct taxation lies outside the competence of the EU. 
However, member states might use their sovereignty only with respect to EU law, 
including the freedom of establishment. In Cadbury Schweppes, the domain of 
competence of the EU and the domain of the member state overlapped. 
These arguments cannot be supported. It must be noted that Cadbury 
Schweppes gives a right to taxpayers to test a domestic anti-abuse measure if in 
accordance with EU law. It is clear from the wording of the ruling that the Court 
relied on Centros.249 A tax provision, as well as any other provision, may be 
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prohibited if it hinders the freedom of establishment.250 It is such if the challenged 
provision does not deserve protection and is not proportionate to safeguard a tax 
system.251 This view is supported by Paolo Piantavigna, who has commented:  
‘the immediate precedent of Cadbury Schweppes (are) Daily Mail, Segers, Centros 
and Inspire Art, regarding freedom of establishment. The ECJ has imported in tax 
law issue born in corporate law, because it does not distinguish among legal matters 
but on the basis of diverse freedoms. In these cases, the benchmark is the same, id 
est, freedom of establishment.’252 
Secondly, the CJEU proceeded to examine whether the freedom of 
establishment precludes the application of legislation, for example, on CFCs 
[Controlled Foreign Companies] and if such provisions might be viewed as a 
restriction. The Court stated that member states must exercise their competence in 
direct taxation consistently with EU law. It was decided that different tax treatment 
creates tax disadvantages.253 The application of the CFC provisions result in the 
taxation of the resident company on profits of another legal person. It has a 
hindering effect on the freedom of establishment.254 However, the Court added 
immediately that member states cannot attempt to circumvent their national 
legislation. Member states must not improperly or fraudulently take advantage of 
the provisions of EU law.255  
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The CJEU established two requirements for conduct to be judged abusive: 
first, an objective element which can be independently verified by a third party in 
terms of premises, staff and equipment256; secondly, a subjective element which is 
the CFC motive test.257 In particular, the subjective element raises the question of 
its necessity. There are two groups of commentators: those who claim that a 
subjective element is essential and those who consider it indispensable. For most, 
the subjective element is not important in cases of an abuse of law.258 Paolo 
Piantavigna suggested that a tax motive becomes irrelevant if there is an objective 
economic justification for the transaction.259 It was considered whether a right is 
abused based solely on objective observation of the third party regardless of a 
taxpayer’s intention. This view is in accordance with TV10, Levin, O’Flynn and 
Centros. If freedom goals are achieved, private abusive aims should not matter. 
Moreover, Paolo Piantavigna argued that applying a subjective test may lead to a 
paradox, whereby EU protection is denied even when a transaction concretizes EU 
aims.260  
The opposite solution was presented by Rami Karimeri,261 who claimed that 
the motive test protects taxpayers’ bona fide. Taxpayers who have an intention to 
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abuse the right should not be grouped with those who have no such intentions. 
However, it is difficult to state if the intention is ‘good.’ As wisely noted by HMRC 
Guidance Manual on CFC Rules: ‘one man’s tax avoidance is another man’s tax 
efficiency.’262 
The commentators have strong justifications for their views and each group 
of commentators presents rational arguments. The opinions might be reconciled if 
the motive test is applied specifically in cases where a lack of genuine activity has 
already been established. Only then does a motive test not lead to nonsensical 
outcome. One might envisage a situation where a taxpayer has a genuine business 
abroad but a taxpayer’s main intention is to circumvent tax provisions. Only if an 
investigation leads to the conclusion that there was no genuine activity can the 
intention of a taxpayer be considered. This interpretation is in accordance with the 
CJEU.263 
However, the Court is not strict when examining the burden of proof. Thus 
a resident company establishes a subsidiary in another member state cannot per se 
set up a general presumption of tax evasion.264  
Thus, there is presumption of legitimate exercise of freedom by a taxpayer 
which leads to the conclusion that burden of proof is imposed on the state and its 
qualified tax authorities. Nonetheless, the Court added in paragraph 71 that the 
competent national authorities have to decide on the matter of abuse in the light of 
the evidence furnished by a resident company. The issue of burden of proof should 
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be interpreted in light of the Opinion in this case.265 The AG Léger concluded that 
preparing proof is not an unreasonable workload for tax authorities.266  
It is of note that the doctrine of abuse has been developed over time but the 
meaning of letter-box companies is still unclear. The doctrine formulated in 
Cadbury Schweppes has been followed by the CJEU, whereby national tax 
regulations were tested, in particular, Cadbury Schweppes,267 and Test Claimants 
in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation.268 
 
3.5 Concluding Observations 
 
The chapter briefly analysed the different types of establishment: primary 
establishment and secondary establishment; real seat theory and incorporation 
theory; and inbound and outbound situations. There are two basic ways of 
exercising freedom of establishment which are primary and secondary 
establishment. These two should be treated equally. Moreover, the real seat theory 
or incorporation theory cannot be, per se, contrary to the EU law. 
Consequently, the thesis introduced ramification into inbound and outbound 
cases. As indicated above, this line of reasoning has been adopted by the CJEU. 
Only such reasoning can highlight the consistency of the CJEU rulings. The basic 
difference between inbound and outbound cases is that a home member state does 
not have an obligation to retain the legal entity of the emigrating company. The 
national rule is not treated as a restriction and member states are entitled to deny 
the retention. However, a host member state must recognise an immigrating 
company. The freedom of establishment is not an absolute right and it can be denied 
by an overriding public interest.  
Moreover, this chapter aimed to determine when obstacles or hindrance to 
the freedom of establishment might be legal and justified. In Chapter 2, it was 
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argued that the freedom of establishment is not absolute. Other rights or interest 
might prevail and, thus, a freedom is limited. There are two types of discriminatory 
measures: direct discrimination and indirect discrimination. The second part of this 
chapter examined the qualified form of indirectly discriminatory measure which is 
an abuse theory. This provides conditions to combat non-genuine establishments 
and introduces the notion of a letter-box company and genuine economic activity 
which remain at the heart of the theory. It is concluded that neither the CJEU nor 
any other EU institution has defined what a letter-box company is. However, it 
would not be reasonable to interpret the Services Directive or Cadbury Schweppes 
in a way that deprives a letter-box company from the right to exercise the freedom 
of establishment. Nonetheless, a letter-box company might benefit from the 
freedom of establishment in a limited way and merely a business conducting a 
genuine economic activity is entitled to benefit fully from the freedom.269 
Cadbury Schweppes ‘widened’ the scope of the freedom of establishment 
and is ‘an invitation’ for taxpayers to test their national tax provisions in a cross-
border situation.270 The rights of an undertaking might be restricted only when it is 
justified and a restriction passes a so-called Gebhard test which was presented in 
the preceding chapter. In particular, it was noted that it is easier for member states 
to protect interests related to their sovereign powers (i.e. taxation in Cadbury 
Schweppes) than to private interest (i.e. corporate law Centros).271 Thus, taxation is 
the main obstacle to the freedom of establishment and is the subject of detailed 
analysis in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: DOUBLE TAXATION 
 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, double taxation of undertakings operating in 
more than one EU member state is not contrary to international law, but it may, 
nevertheless, constitute a considerable hindrance to the freedom of establishment. 
A cross-border business affected by double taxation is in a less favourable situation 
than a purely domestic entity. In the absence of the harmonisation of national tax 
systems, member states remain competent to determine their income and wealth 
taxation criteria, as well as having the competence to eliminate double taxation by 
concluding international treaties and agreements.272 However, this competence 
must be exercised consistently with EU law.273  
As framed in Chapter 3, discrimination is prohibited as an obstacle to the 
exercise of the freedom of establishment. Both direct and indirect discrimination is 
contrary to the TFEU and can be justified on very rare occasions. The 
discrimination must be objectively justified (if indirect discrimination) or be 
expressly derogated (if direct discrimination). In addition, indirect discriminatory 
treatment is only allowed if the justification conforms to the proportionality test. 
The proportionality test provides that for a derogation to apply the national 
measures must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; must be justified by 
imperative requirements in the general interest; must be suitable for securing the 
attainment of the objective which they pursue; and must not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to attain the objective which they pursue.274 It is submitted that 
the CJEU favours a restrictive approach when the free movement rules are 
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threatened but that the Court narrows its reasoning on discrimination only in cases 
where the obstacles to the freedom of establishment are taxation measures.  
Basic notions and terminology concerning taxation will be explained first, 
before proceeding to examine a concrete case in relation to double taxation. Firstly, 
it is necessary to examine the principle of tax neutrality. It is submitted that tax 
neutrality is also an important factor which can ensure the freedom of 
establishment. Moreover, fiscal neutrality is considered to be the fundamental 
element of a good tax system.275 The two opposite concepts of fiscal neutrality are 
analysed below, depending on the state in which fiscal neutrality is sought: it may 
be sought either in the home state (‘capital export neutrality’) or in the host state 
(‘capital import neutrality’).  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first presents the basic 
principles of tax neutrality. The second is dedicated to a foreign subsidiary of an 
undertaking exercising a freedom of establishment and rights of the home member 
state to tax a foreign establishment. Finally, the rights of the home member state to 
tax a foreign permanent establishment will be examined. 
 
 
4.1 The Meaning of ‘Tax Neutrality’ 
4.1.1 Capital Export Neutrality (CEN) 
 
The concept of Capital Export Neutrality (CEN) provides that a tax 
consideration shall not be influenced by whether an investor resides in one 
jurisdiction and invests the capital at home or abroad.276 
CEN is the neutrality sought in a home member state. The concept can be 
illustrated by the following example: 
                                                          
275
 ‘A good tax law is a neutral tax law,’ Steuben, Norton L., ‘Fundamental aspects of a good tax 
system. Tax Notes International’ [2000] p. 1578; 
276
 Knoll, Michael. ‘Considering International Tax Neutrality’ [2010] Tax Law Review p. 99. 
71 
 
 
Figure 1 Capital export neutrality (sought in home member state) 
 
 
As presented in the above boxes, the neutrality is achieved in a home 
member state. The CEN does not promote business mobility. Its effects are 
irrelevant for a business operating solely in the domestic market but it might affect 
a decision on the mobility of a business. 
 The concept is based on the principle of worldwide taxation. This issue was 
already the subject of discussion when the nationality of legal persons was 
examined.277 It provides that a state is entitled to tax its residents/nationals 
regardless of where the income is generated (the principle of worldwide taxation). 
The principle has a long tradition in international and national jurisdictions.278 
Jérôme Monsenego279 aptly observed three basic problems of the pure 
application of CEN. Firstly, it is noted that foreign investment involves higher level 
of risk and a rational decision would tend to lead to the non-exercise of the freedom. 
One might argue that CEN ensures business mobility is used only if a business is 
genuine and avoids abusive or fraudulent mobility. It has already been stated that 
the freedom of establishment only covers a situation of genuine business activity. 
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However, the application of CEN also has a great influence on genuine business 
and its application is not limited to an abusive situation. If a genuine business cannot 
predict a solid chance of success, it might be discouraging by double taxation.280 
Secondly, Wolfgang Schön argues that CEN might breach the principle of 
fair competition.281 There are two possible outcomes; one is that a cross-border 
business would be in a worse situation, for example a broader tax base, or the cross-
border business could enjoy better tax treatment, for instance by obtaining a tax 
relief not available in a host member state. Alternatively, the majority of member 
states can apply an ordinary foreign tax credit, limited to the amount of taxes levied 
on foreign income in the home member state, instead of the full tax credit.282 
 
 
4.1.2 Capital Import Neutrality (CIN) 
 
Capital Import Neutrality (CIN) provides that tax considerations should not 
influence whether a particular investment is made by domestic or foreign investors. 
This concept is based on the principle of territoriality which provides that a state is 
entitled to tax a subject (or an object) based on a territorial connection, in respect 
of tax treaties (if they exist). CIN occurs when neutrality is sought in the host 
member state: 
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Figure 2 Capital Import Neutrality (sought in host member state) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIN also has some drawbacks as the principle leads to the isolation of tax 
bases across member states.283 Consequently, it creates the problem of deducting a 
foreign base when profits occur in different member states.284 Moreover, it may 
cause member states to become involved in harmful competition (the Delaware 
effect).285 It should be remembered that tax is revenue of a state and it is necessary 
that the tax is collected in sufficient amounts. 
To summarise, no satisfactory solution has been found so far. There is a 
major debate286 as to which theory - CEN or CIN - meets EU goals. However, there 
is no single answer to this question. The Treaty is mute on the subject of export or 
import neutrality.287 It does not help to search guidance in analogy to other 
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freedoms. The freedom of movement of workers refers to both capital export 
neutrality288 and capital import neutrality.289 The freedom to provide services 
focuses on capital import neutrality,290 whereas the freedom of capital concerns 
capital export neutrality.291 Furthermore, the CJEU’s case law292 is not consistent 
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with cases opting sometimes for293 capital import neutrality294 and other times for 
capital export neutrality.295  
 
As might be seen from the above boxes, CIN or CEN might have an 
important influence on results if equality is achieved. It is not the aim of this thesis 
to answer the question of which theory should prevail.296 However, it is crucial to 
note the criterion of comparison. The CJEU compares only domestic situations. In 
other words, the CJEU scrutinises if, within a single member state, domestic and 
foreign businesses are treated equally.297 For example, if a tax burden is the same 
for domestic and foreign businesses.298 It begs the question as to whether the aim 
of the freedom of establishment and the principle of a single market seek to promote 
the freedom in a single member state or in the EU as a whole.  
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Figure 3 CEN (worldwide tax) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An undertaking investing in Poland, it pays 20% and when investing in host state it 
pays 20%. If tax is paid in host state, it can be granted tax credit  
of 10-20%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 CIN 
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The CJEU does not find it discriminatory that a foreign business faces 
additional tax burdens resulting from its cross-border activity as long as within one 
member state equal treatment is assured, as it stems directly from the wording of 
the Treaty.299 
In fact, it is in accordance with the current state of EU law that a cross-
border business is deemed to be treated equally if neutrality is achieved within one 
member state. Indeed, it seems that in light of current acquis communautaire the 
freedom of establishment is understood as providing equity within a single member 
state. The CJEU cannot rule over the whole system as import and export neutrality 
cannot be achieved. Nonetheless, it is proposed that this approach should be 
modified, for example by the implementation of a common tax rate to achieve the 
single market, the freedom of establishment and other freedoms. However, this 
solution seems to be unrealistic. 
 
A further discrepancy results from the different forms of establishment. It 
has been previously stated300 that there are two types of establishment: primary and 
secondary. Secondary establishment can be executed through setting up agencies, 
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branches or subsidiaries. The first two forms (agencies and branches) are a 
permanent establishment (PE), as they are part of the existing enterprise. A 
subsidiary is a distinct, legal entity of an existing enterprise and therefore will be 
considered separately. The difference between them and the consequences are far-
reaching and the next part of this chapter is divided into sections devoted first to 
subsidiaries and secondly to PE. 
Given the growing number of cases referred to the CJEU on these issues, a 
selection of cases is necessary. The selected case is prominent and widely debated 
but the main reason for selecting them is that they are suitable tools to test the 
national practices of UK and Poland. It is submitted in this thesis that PEs and 
subsidiaries are not in comparable situations. However, in some circumstances, the 
CJEU accepts that each is an ‘autonomous fiscal entity.’301 Indeed, in some 
situations a subsidiary might be taxed as a PE. In fact, when the Controlled Foreign 
Company (CFC) rules apply, a member state taxes a foreign entity as a domestic 
one. This issue has already been discussed in Chapter 3 and will be further extended 
below in the section devoted to the issue of the double taxation of a subsidiary 
(Cadbury Schweppes)302. Section two contains an analysis of the double taxation of 
PE based on the famous case of Columbus Container303 and is then followed by an 
examination of the legal provisions of the selected two member states. 
It will be accompanied by an analysis of the legal provisions of the UK and 
Poland given their relevancy to the concrete case that inspired this thesis. Thus, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the thesis was inspired by the practical difficulties 
experienced by a SME, with a primary establishment in Scotland (UK), when it 
decided to trade in both the UK and Poland. The SME sought to exercise the 
freedom of establishment by having a secondary establishment in Poland. The most 
severe impediment the SME experienced was in relation to the national corporate 
taxation regimes of both countries. In order to provide context to the thesis the 
experience of the relevant SME will be described. 
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The business was started in 2008 in Scotland (UK). It was established as a 
Limited Liability Partnership (LLP). The main activity was to provide site 
management services. The place of the business was determined by the place of 
residence of its owners. Moreover, it was targeted to the UK market.  
As a result of a credit crunch, the construction industry in some member 
states, including the UK, suffered a decline of demand. At the same time there were 
a number of significant infrastructural projects under construction in Poland due to 
subsidies from EU Structural Funds 2007-2013. Furthermore, there was a high 
demand for qualified and experienced construction companies in Poland. In 2010, 
the partnership was contracted by an Irish group to provide services in respect of 
motorway construction in Poland (A4 - south east of Poland). The partnership 
decided to operate cross-border, in both countries. The partnership did not intend 
to move its seat to Poland and planned to realize only one project in this country. 
The business had no interest in setting up any permanent structure in Poland. At 
that stage, the partnership decided to offer its management services on the basis of 
providing cross-border services. The partnership did not suffer any restriction in 
scope of the freedom to provide services. Nevertheless, according to the Convention 
between the UK and Poland for the avoidance of double taxation304 if construction 
works are executed for more than 12 months the business is deemed to have a 
permanent establishment (PE) in the host state.305 
For the purpose of the Convention, the term ‘permanent establishment’ 
means a fixed place of business through which the business of an undertaking is 
wholly or partly carried on.306 Accordingly, the profits shall be taxed only in the 
host state unless the enterprise carries on business in the other contracting state 
through a permanent establishment situated therein.307 Thus, the fact of establishing 
a PE has serious fiscal consequences. 
                                                          
304
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/convention-between-the-uk-and-poland-for-the-
avoidance-of-double-taxation . 
305
 A building site or construction or installation project constitutes a permanent establishment only 
if it lasts more than twelve months. Article 5 (3) Convention between the UK and Poland for the 
avoidance of double taxation. 
306
 Article 5 (1) Convention between the UK and Poland for the avoidance of double taxation. 
307
 Ibid, Article 7 (1). 
80 
 
Analysing the A4 motorway project, the main contractor was a Spanish 
company with an Irish subcontractor and a Scottish LLP as sub-subcontractor. The 
works were planned for a period of over 12 months. Thus, the Irish undertakings 
would be deemed to have established PE in Poland if the work exceeds 12 
months.308 As a result, they might face a double tax burden. Having a PE in Poland 
and a head office in Ireland, an undertaking is a taxpayer in both countries. It will 
be noted that permanent establishment is treated less advantageously in respect of 
double non-deductibility of losses and double taxation than branch or group of 
companies.309 To avoid alleged permanent establishment, they have established a 
new business solely for the purpose of the project in Poland (subsidiary). However, 
based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCDE) Tax 
model conventions, this applies to construction companies only. The analysed 
partnership provides civil engineering services and is not assumed to be a 
construction company, thus, this special regulation is not applied. Moreover, the 
partnership is not a typical contractor. According to OCDE the project / site 
management is not ‘a building site or construction project.’310 Thus, the partnership 
operated solely as provider of services. The partnership has been contracted to work 
on other projects in Poland, by customers from a number of member states and is 
not required to establish a permanent establishment.  
The business considered setting up a branch or permanent establishment in 
Poland (secondary establishment). For reasons explained in above paragraph, in 
respect of the Spanish and Irish contractors, the option to create PE was 
disadvantageous.311 Moreover, it was not possible to find a legal advisor who had 
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been involved in the registration of a branch of a UK undertaking in Poland. Thus, 
this solution is not feasible in practice.312 A branch in another member state might 
also lead to a long investigation by tax authorities as to why expenses or incomes 
have been accounted for a branch and not for the headquarters. This situation creates 
uncertainty to a business. 
 
    4.2 Subsidiary 
 
As it was presented above a subsidiary is a company controlled or owned 
wholly or partly by another company.313 A subsidiary is a separate, distinct legal 
entity from the parent company that controls or owns it. According to Article 22 of 
Directive 2013/34/EU314 an undertaking is a parent if: 
‘(a) has a majority of the shareholders’ or members’ voting rights in another 
undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking); 
(b) has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the members of the 
administrative, management or supervisory body of another undertaking (a 
subsidiary undertaking) and is at the same time a shareholder in or member of that 
undertaking; 
(c) has the right to exercise a dominant influence over an undertaking (a subsidiary 
undertaking) of which it is a shareholder or member, pursuant to a contract entered 
into with that undertaking or to a provision in its memorandum or articles of 
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association, where the law governing that subsidiary undertaking permits its being 
subject to such contracts or provisions (...) 
(h) is a shareholder in or member of an undertaking and: 
(i) a majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory 
bodies of that undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking) who have held office during 
the financial year, during the preceding financial year and up to the time when the 
consolidated financial statements are drawn up, have been appointed solely as a 
result of the exercise of its voting rights; or 
(ii) controls alone, pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders in or 
members of that undertaking (a subsidiary undertaking), a majority of shareholders’ 
or members’ voting rights in that undertaking. The member states may introduce 
more detailed provisions concerning the form and contents of such agreements.’ 
The discussion of a subsidiary’s taxation will be based on the case of 
Cadbury Schweppes,315 the facts of which have already been stated. In summary, 
Cadbury Schweppes is an UK-based parent company which indirectly owns two 
Irish subsidiaries.316 The subsidiaries were subjected to a 10% tax burden in Ireland 
but the UK tax authority (HMRC) applied CFC rules and claimed tax on the income 
generated by the two subsidiaries.  
 A state has the right to tax on the basis of residence or source. The right is 
limited by the principle of personality of tax which provides that taxpayers are taxed 
on their own income and not on the income generated by another person. However, 
the principle is not absolute.317 For instance, a partnership can be considered 
transparent and taxed at an ownership level.318 The same situation can take place at 
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an international level. States dismiss principles of personality if they seek to avoid 
situations of abuse of their tax rights. There are various methods to eliminate tax 
avoidance, one of which might be regulations on Controlled Foreign Companies 
(CFC). CFC serves to discourage companies from establishing ‘tax havens’.319 It 
provides that if an undertaking is controlled by a national company, the income 
would be taxed regardless of whether it has been generated in a domestic tax system 
or elsewhere.  
As a result of the CFC application a subsidiary may be subjected to heavier 
taxation.320 Moreover, a taxpayer may face other financial costs. Some home states 
tax at source only at the time of the actual distribution of dividends. Usually, tax 
credits are granted at the level of the CFC but some states limit the tax credits to the 
tax paid by the CFC or even qualify the tax paid as an expense. If there is no tax 
paid at the time of accrual of profit from deemed or actual dividends, some CFC 
regimes will deny the possibility to offset in future. Moreover, some CFC regimes 
provide taxation of a later distribution if a specific time has elapsed since the 
taxation, as a deemed dividend.321 
Nonetheless, the CFC provisions are accepted by the OECD322 and 
European institutions323 and have an impact on the EU single market. Applying 
CFC provisions to an EU company is likely to discourage establishment in another 
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member state where the level of taxation is lower than the rate provided in the home 
state.324 The CJEU has already ruled on the CFC regime and concluded that it is 
allowed only if it serves as anti-abuse rule and only if it relates to purely artificial 
arrangements.325 In particular, in the seminal case, Cadbury Schweppes,326 the 
CJEU ruled that CFC rules may be applied only to wholly artificial arrangements 
aimed solely at escaping national tax normally due and where the regime does not 
go beyond what is necessary to achieve that purpose. 
CFC implements CEN. The CJEU, denying the application of CFC, 
indirectly stated that the application of CEN may be contrary to EU law. However, 
the issue of CEN and CIN was not expressly discussed in the ruling. 
Many member states still maintain a separate CFC regime which may 
impede freedom of establishment. A number of member states decided to regulate 
separately the issue of incomes coming from EU and non-EU foreign 
subsidiaries.327 These member states operate two regimes, one to be applied to EU 
subsidiaries and another to be applied to non-EU subsidiaries. The EU aims not to 
treat relationships between parent companies and subsidiaries of different member 
states less favourable than domestic ones. This right is based on the TFEU and is 
regulated by Council Directive on the common system of taxation applicable in the 
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different member states328 (Directive 
on CFC). This short Directive comprises only four articles. The Directive provides 
a general possibility to prevent arrangements which are, in their entirety, not 
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genuine.329 The Directive does neither define these non-genuine arrangements nor 
provide any guidance as to how they shall be prevented. 
The CFC rules are based on the principle of residence. However, these rules 
are difficult to reconcile with the freedom of establishment principle. As a result of 
the application of CFC rules, the attractiveness of the host state is limited and so 
the free movement of enterprises is discouraged. The application of CFC rules may 
also result in double taxation330 and cash flow disadvantages.331 
The CFC rules may have an impact on the decision as to where to conduct 
a business. If an entity chooses to establish in a member state which falls under the 
CFC regulations, they may be faced with an additional tax burden. Thus, the 
consequences of the possibility of the additional tax burden may have a detrimental 
effect on the freedom of establishment and constitute a restriction to the exercise of 
the freedom. It is difficult to advocate a justification for such a restriction. As shown 
in Cadbury Schweppes332 the CFC legislation is intended to deal with a specific 
type of tax avoidance involving the artificial transfer by a resident company of 
profits from the member state in which they were generated to a lower-tax state by 
means of the establishment of a subsidiary in that state and the effecting of 
transactions intended primarily to make such a transfer to that subsidiary. As the 
Court aptly observes, less restrictive measures shall be applied. It is not necessary 
to apply CFC measures to all businesses that have decided to trade in a lower tax 
state but only to a business that operates in wholly artificial arrangements. 
Moreover, Article 49 of the TFEU entrenched the freedom of establishment 
as a right to set up agencies, branches (so called PE in corporate and tax law) or 
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subsidiaries. CFC rules provide that a subsidiary is taxed at the same parent level, 
as a PE. It is submitted that this constitutes a restriction, as the TFEU expressly 
provides both forms of secondary establishment.333 It is argued that a subsidiary 
and a PE are not in a comparable situation.334 Otherwise, member states applying a 
tax credit method of avoiding double taxation might tax a foreign subsidiary and 
states applying exemption method might refuse cross-border loss relief of a PE.335 
This may lead to a situation of double taxation and double non-deductibility of 
losses which is not desirable.336 Furthermore, the criterion for the application of 
CFC is a tax rate. In other words, to establish if a member state is a tax haven it is 
sufficient to identify a nominal tax rate. Nonetheless, a tax rate does not provide 
full information about the tax system.337 To establish a final tax burden, it is 
unavoidable to examine a complex tax system. A formally higher tax rate might not 
include substantive tax allowances in order to attract cross-border businesses.338  
British and Polish legislative provisions vary significantly in the scope of 
the implementation of CFC regimes. There was no separate regulation of CFC in 
Poland until 1st January 2015. Moreover, Poland has not provided any general anti-
abuse rules [GAAR]. On the other hand, the UK has had CFC rules since 1984 
regulating this issue in a very detailed way and provides restrictive conditions to 
reduce taxable basis.  
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4.2.1 Poland – a State without CFC Rules? 
 
As already stated, there was no separate CFC regulation in Polish law until 
1st January 2015. However, the new provision raises substantial constitutional 
incompatibility problems. According to Article 1.2 of the EU Directive on CFC,339 
member states are not precluded from applying an anti-abuse regime. However, the 
Polish regulator did not include such a regime in the Polish legal system until 
2015.340 As a result, even purely artificial transactions may be considered legal. 
Conversely, there is a rule341 in Polish private law which provides for an 
anti-abuse regime and adopts the circumvention of law [obejscie prawa] principle. 
For the principle to be applied three conditions must be met. Firstly, an express 
legal provision which prohibits achieving the abuse must exist. Secondly, the use 
of the transaction to achieve this prohibited aim is precluded. And thirdly, the act 
must be formally legal. However, the anti-abuse rule has limited application in the 
field of the tax law, because it may be applied only if a transaction is declared void. 
The reform of the CFC regime was conducted in a hurry and in an 
atmosphere of disgrace. According to the Polish Act on Proclamation of Acts and 
some other legal provisions,342 a legal act may enter into force at least 14 days after 
the proclamation.343 Moreover, the Annual Finance Bill must be proclaimed at least 
three months before the start of a financial year. This vacatio legis ensures that all 
concerned have time to familiarise themselves with the provisions of a new legal 
act. Nonetheless, acts may enter into force within a shorter period if an important 
public interest requires it and the principles of democratic government do not 
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preclude it.344 It is clear from the wording of the Proclamation Act that to decide to 
confer immediate force to legislation is an extraordinary and exceptional situation. 
It is not understandable why the Polish legislator acted in excessive haste.  
The Polish Act provides that an entity may qualify as CFC only if it is 
established outside Poland and is either controlled by persons residing in Poland or 
controlled by at least 25 per cent by a Polish person for a period of at least 30 days. 
Solely passive incomes are taxed by the Polish CFC rules. 
It is surprising that Poland which had the most lenient provisions, adopted 
one of the strictest CFC rules in the EU. For instance, France, Germany, Estonia 
and Lithuania provide for at least 50 per cent control to qualify as CFC.345  
The French provisions are a good example to explain the evolution of a CFC 
system. France was the fourth country in the world to apply CFC.346 In 1993 a 
substantial reform introduced rigid provisions on CFC by extending the scope of 
the regime to foreign direct exploitations of French entities established in a state or 
a territory where they benefit from a favourable tax regime and by reducing the 
minimum participation threshold in foreign subsidiaries to 10 per cent.347 These 
provisions seem to be similar to those applied in the Polish legislation. However, 
the French CFC provisions were amended by reform in 2007 as they raised 
incompatibility issues regarding both EU Treaties348 and bilateral conventions.349 
                                                          
344
 Article 4 par. 2 Act on proclamation of acts and some other legal provisions [Ustawa o ogłaszaniu 
aktów normatywnych i niektórych innych aktów prawnych]. Dz. U. z 2005 nr 190, poz. 1606, nr 
267, poz. 2253, z 2006 r., nr 73, poz 501, nr 14, poz. 708, nr 145, poz. 1050, nr 220, poz. 1600 
345
 Panas, Adriana, Nogacki, Robert. ‘Taxation of controlled foreign companies in the world’ 
[Opodatkowanie zagranicznych spółek kontrolowanych na świecie] [2013] Skarbiec Kancelaria 
Prawna, p. 1 
346
 CFC was enacted in 1980 after the United States, Canada and Germany. Gutmann, Daniel, 
Meziane, Francois. ‘The French CFC Regime’. International Taxation and Competitiveness [2011]. 
Paper presented on the conference sponsored by the American Tax Policy Institute, Washington. 
347
 Gutmann, Daniel, Meziane, Francois. ‘The French CFC Regime’. International Taxation and 
Competitiveness [2011] Paper presented on the conference sponsored by the American Tax Policy 
Institute, Washington. 
348
 C-196/05 Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995. 
349
 The French Supreme Administrative Court for direct taxation and VAT matters ruled in 
Schneider Electric that article 7 of the France-Switzerland bilateral tax treaty precluded the 
89 
 
Currently, French CFC rules apply if a French legal entity, which is 
subjected to corporate tax, owns or controls directly or indirectly at least 50 per cent 
shares, share interest, voting rights or financial rights.350 The existence of a 
minimum participation threshold of 50% is determined either on the day of the 
closing of the financial year of the foreign entity or by reference to a 183-day 
period.351 Secondly, the CFC applies only if a tax rate in a state concerned is at least 
50% lower than in France.352 All incomes are included in the CFC tax base. There 
is no list of excluded countries. If an EU member state is involved, the CFC rules 
apply only if it is proven that the arrangement is artificial and there is no genuine 
economic activity. 
There are two crucial incompatibility issues in the new CFC Act in Poland. 
Firstly, the CFC provisions may be contrary to the Polish constitution. Secondly, as 
in France, the rules may be incompatible with EU law.  
For reasons presented below, it is likely that the provisions will be declared 
unconstitutional. The Opinion of Legislation Council announced on 5 July 2013 
suggests that twenty-five per cent is not enough to have real control over an 
enterprise. Some commentators sarcastically conclude that the CFC reform in 
Poland is inspired by Chinese provisions.353 A taxpayer might not have sufficient 
rights to provide the Polish Tax Authority with the documents required. Moreover, 
the reform is based on an assumption that a taxpayer has a right to profits over a 
single tax year. For example, a taxpayer has 30% shares for 31 days of Company 
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X. The company has achieved €2m profit for a tax year. The tax base would be 
€600,000, calculated as follows: €2m * 30% * 1 tax year. It might result in taxing 
a profit which has not been obtained.  
The Act also raises compatibility issues,354 in particular with wording of the 
Article 20 of the Polish Constitution,355 which provides for the freedom of 
establishment for all nationals. It should be read in the light of Article 148 of Polish 
Constitution which ensures a legal certainty in relation to the tax burden. Moreover, 
the Polish CFC provides that tax credits may be granted based only on bilateral 
conventions between the concerned states.356 If a convention is not concluded, a 
Polish resident cannot claim credits for tax already paid in another state.357 The 
CFC provisions do not provide a possibility for deducting foreign losses (negative 
income). The issue of double non-deductibility is further examined in Chapter 5. 
It should also be noted that the Polish regulator has attempted to introduce 
tax avoidance rules in the past. However, this attempt was declared contrary to the 
Polish Constitution,358 especially as it was held to be contrary to the predictability 
of law and the Polish free trade principles. The Constitutional Tribunal remarked 
that the constitutional obligation to pay ‘taxes specified in statute does not 
constitute either an obligation for taxpayers to pay the maximum amount of tax or 
a restriction on taxpayers seeking to take advantage of various lawful methods of 
tax reduction.’359 
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Moreover, there were a number of attempts to introduce a general anti-
avoidance rule [GAAR] in Polish case law360 but this was overruled each time by 
the Constitutional Tribunal which ruled consistently that the notion of legal 
certainty is a substantial one in the Polish legal order.361 In the famous Optimus 
case362 it was held that a school could not deduct VAT for computers they 
purchased. Thus, a special scheme was created. The manufacturer sold the 
computers to a Slovakian company. Then, the schools purchased them from the 
Slovakian company at a lower rate of VAT. The manufacturer transported the 
computers to Slovakia and brought them back in the same vehicle. It was clear from 
the facts that the scheme was artificial and had been created solely to circumvent 
the tax rules. However, the Polish Court was unable to find the scheme illegal as no 
GAAR existed in Poland and, therefore, the schools were not obliged to pay the 
higher rate of VAT.  
Poland is a member of the continental family of legal systems. It means that 
all legal provisions must possess a positive legal base in legislation. Courts and their 
decisions must not constitute a source of law.363 It is the responsibility of the 
legislator to formulate clear and understandable laws. The principle of reliance on 
the state and law means that no negative consequences may be imposed on legal 
actions. As a result, there is no legal base to conclude that a taxpayer is not allowed 
to benefit from lower taxation if he or she acts legally. 
It must be noted that the Polish Constitution safeguards both the free trade 
principle and the predictability of a taxation system in a very restrictive manner.364 
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Article 217 of the Polish Constitution proclaims the principle, its predictability and 
the certainty of tax duties. The wording of a CFC reform exceeds the normative 
content allowed by the Polish Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution provides 
for an internal examination of the compatibility of a legal act with the Constitution 
and with international acts.365 It is conducted by the Constitutional Tribunal. 
Currently, the CFC provisions are under scrutiny of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal. Secondly, it needs to be established whether the Polish CFC Act remain 
consistent with the freedom of establishment provided by the TFEU. Thus, it is 
possible to stipulate that CFC applies to any enterprise controlled above a certain 
percentage level. Theoretically, CFC is allowed to stipulate that even 1 per cent of 
shares constitutes control over an enterprise, as long as only purely artificial 
arrangements are included in the scope of application. Moreover, the Polish CFC 
rules apply solely to purely artificial arrangements if an enterprise is established in 
the EU.366 
 The CFC Act does not provide a single definition as to what makes an 
establishment genuine. This may raise compliance issues in regards to the Polish 
Constitution but not to EU law. There is no single definition of CFC and economic 
genuine activities at the EU level.367 In 2010, the Commission provided a non-
exhaustive list of indicators of artificial arrangements.368 The Commission stated 
that it is not genuine economic activity if there is inter alia insufficiently valid 
economic or commercial reasons for the profit attribution, there is no proportionate 
correlation between the activities carried on by the CFC and the extent to which it 
physically exists in terms of premises, staff and equipment, the non-resident 
company is overcapitalised, it has significantly more capital than it needs to carry 
on its activity; the taxpayer has entered into arrangements which are devoid of 
economic reality, serve little or no business purpose or which might be contrary to 
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general business interests, if not entered into for the purpose of avoiding tax.369 
However, this list is not exhaustive and member states are free to stipulate 
otherwise.  
To summarise, EU and international law provide for the possibility to 
regulate separately controlled foreign companies. Poland introduced the CFC Act 
in 2015 and it is concluded that, although the regime is compatible with EU and 
international law, it is not compatible with the Polish Constitution. 
 
4.2.2 United Kingdom – Is It Possible to Implement CFC 
Rules in Accordance with EU Law? 
 
The CFC regulations were implemented in the UK in 1984. As a result of 
Cadbury Schweppes370 the reform in the UK seemed to be inevitable. In May 2011 
the European Commission sent a reasoned Opinion371 to the UK asking the 
Government to modify the existing Controlled Foreign Companies’ provisions 
(CFC).372 According to the Commission a UK-owned CFC may reduce the taxable 
basis under ‘certain restrictive conditions.’373 The UK legislation provided that a 
company secured CFC status only if it was established outside the UK and was 
either controlled by persons resident in the UK or at least 75 per cent controlled by 
a British person. However, the UK failed to exclude from the scope of CFC all 
subsidiaries established in member states which are not purely artificial.374 As 
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explained in detail in Chapter 2, according to existing case law, member states may 
derogate from the EU freedoms only if the restriction is justified and meets certain 
conditions. Particularly in two cases, Cadbury Schweppes375 and Test Claimants in 
the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation,376 the CJEU emphasised that a company 
may be treated less favourably only if the activity is purely artificial. 
It is recalled that in Cadbury Schweppes the CJEU refused to tax controlled 
foreign companies in general. However, if the undertaking does not exercise 
genuine activity the profit might be distributed to a parent company and taxed as an 
‘own parent’ company income. The Court ruled that the activity is genuine if the 
premises, staff and equipment are established.377 A Commission Resolution offers 
further guidance.378 However, the British CFC rules differed from the solution 
presented by the CJEU and the Commission.379  
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cent of the voting power is owned by ‘ordinary shareholders who were unconnected member of the 
public’; 
- Threshold of £200,000 per year of accounting profits (de minimis profits exemption);374 
- Countries on a ‘white list’ of the Controlled Foreign Companies (Excluded Countries)- Regulations 
1998 (SI 1998/3081) if the qualified incomes and gains from foreign source do not exceed £50,000 
or 10 per cent of its commercial qualified income. 
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 C-196/05 Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995. 
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 C-201/05 The Test Claimants in the CFC and Dividend Group Litigation v HMRC [2008] STC 
1513. 
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 These elements do not perfectly match modern enterprises but Jérôme Monsenego wisely pointed 
out that choosing indicator ‘or’ instead of ‘and’ might lead to further circumvention. Monsenego, 
Jérôme. ‘Taxation of Foreign Business Income within European Internal Market’ (Intellecta Infolog, 
Göteborg, 2011) p. 141. 
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 Council Resolution on coordination of the Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and thin 
capitalisation rules within European Union, 8 June 2010, 2010/C 156/01, Official Journal of 
European Union, 16 June 2010. Read also ‘Taxation: Commission requests UK to further amend its 
treatment of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs).’ [2011] 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/606&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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 Council Resolution on coordination of the Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and thin 
capitalisation rules within European Union, 8 June 2010, 2010/C 156/01, Official Journal of 
European Union, 16 June 2010. Read also ‘Taxation: Commission requests UK to further amend its 
treatment of controlled foreign corporations (CFCs).’ [2011] 
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A new proposal was presented in February 2012.380 Despite difficulties 
observed by the UK Government, i.e. ‘unmanageable uncertainty, result in 
protracted negotiations with HMRC (…) and give rise to inconsistencies in tax 
treatment’381, it seems that it is a mechanism recommended by the Commission. 
Article 371 of the Company Finance Act provides that CFC rules apply to ‘an 
arrangement if the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of the arrangement 
is to reduce or eliminate any liability of any person to tax or duty imposed under 
the law of the United Kingdom and in consequence of the arrangement, at any time 
the CFC expects its business to be more profitable than it would otherwise be (other 
than negligibly so).’382 
The new regulation came into force in January 2013 and contains complex 
and detailed provisions. However, a detailed analysis of these provisions is outside 
the scope of this thesis.383 Thus, the only issues which are relevant to the freedom 
                                                          
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/606&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en . 
380
 ‘2.17 The Government also proposes that a reformed regime will include a new motive test for 
situations where other exemptions are not available. The policy principles document set out the 
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been undertaken in the UK would have been undertaken here, were it not for the tax advantage 
afforded to them in the overseas territory. This objective should be met through a redesigned motive 
test that would cover situations where a subsidiary that is properly established overseas is not 
engaged in activities intended to artificially divert UK profit. The test would provide an opportunity 
for such an overseas subsidiary to demonstrate the non-tax related commercial rationale for any 
specified transaction and/or its role or purpose as a member of the group as a whole.’ Proposals for 
controlled foreign companies (CFC) reform: discussion document, January 2011; O’Shea Tom 
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Gary, Fichardt, Liesl. ‘Corporate tax reforms - CFC proposals.’ [2011] British Tax Review, p.10. 
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35 and Schedule 15 - the worldwide debt cap.’ [2009] British Tax Review, p. 541; Röder, Erik. ‘Co-
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of establishment will be examined, as well as the Gateway test and low profits 
exemption. 
The UK introduced a new test, called Gateway, which replaced the motive 
test. One of the main aims of the reform was the simplification of CFC rules. 
However, it remained an empty promise and the reform provides further difficulties. 
New notions have been introduced: ‘key entrepreneurial risk-taking functions’ 
(KERT functions) for businesses in the financial sector or, for other businesses and 
‘significant people functions’ relevant to an assumption of risk or to the economic 
ownership of assets.384 The terms were based on the 2010 Report from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) on the 
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments. This might be criticised as the 
Report does not provide a uniform definition of these terms: 
‘24. Under the authorised OECD approach, the attribution of these risks 
within the single enterprise will follow from the identification of the significant 
people functions relevant to the initial acceptance and subsequent management of 
those risks: 
 The excess inventory risk is likely to be regarded as initially assumed by 
that part of the enterprise which makes the active decisions related to inventory 
levels. Depending on the circumstances of the case, this may be either the head 
office or the PE. 
The credit risk is likely to be regarded as initially assumed by that part of 
the enterprise which decides to conclude a sale to a particular customer after having 
reviewed the creditworthiness of this customer. A question may arise however 
where a review of the creditworthiness of each customer is performed by one part 
of the enterprise before a sale is concluded by another part of the enterprise. In such 
a case, the functional and factual analysis would have to examine whether the 
people in charge of reviewing the customers’ creditworthiness are in effect the ones 
making a decision that leads to the assumption of credit risk, or if they act as a 
                                                          
ordination of corporate exit taxation in the internal market and beyond’ [2014] British Tax Review, 
p. 574. 
384
 INTM200200 - Controlled Foreign Companies: The CFC Charge Gateway Chapter 4 - Profits 
attributable to UK activities: Terms used in Chapter 4 
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/intm200200.htm  
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support function for the PE which ultimately makes the decision of whether or not 
to sell to a particular customer. 
25. Note that the fact that general parameters for inventory levels or credit 
risks might potentially be set by another part of the enterprise would not change the 
assumption of the risk, as the significant people functions relevant to the assumption 
of risks are those which involve active decision-making.’385 
 
As can be understood from the above citation from the HMRC Manual, 
further explanation of these new contentious terms does not help us to provide a 
single interpretation. Thus, this can lead to uncertainty and entrepreneurs might be 
exposed to the application of ineptly defined terms. There is a significant risk in the 
application of restrictive measures to a genuine business. Below, a graphic 
illustration from the HMRC’s manual is reproduced. The illustration seeks to help 
entrepreneurs to establish whether their businesses fall within the scope of CFC. 
As the official ‘explanation’ showed below does not contribute significantly 
to the understanding of when a CFC rule applies, below there is an example based 
on a concrete case study, indicating when the CFC applies. 
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 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 2010 Report on the 
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Figure 5 CFC Charge 
386
 
 
The boxes below illustrate in a simplified form when the CFC applies. 
However, it needs to be recalled CFC rules provide that the CFC applies only if the 
sole or one of the main aims was tax avoidance. 
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As shown on above boxes, John is a UK resident. In the first case, John 
directly owns 50% of voting power or economic rights in company based in Ireland. 
Therefore, CFC regulations apply. In the second case, John own voting power or 
economic right indirectly but CFC regulations apply. In third case, John again owns 
indirectly voting power or economic right in Irish company. Thus, the calculation 
should be as follows: 80 x 65 = 52 %. Therefore, in the third example CFC rules 
also applies. 
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However, the further criteria of the Gateway387 may raise a compliance 
question and especially the finance rules in Chapters 9, 10 and 17. These refer to 
exemptions for profits from qualifying loan relationships which raised 
incompatibility issues and were amended by the Finance Bill 2014 (published on 
10/12/2013).388 The Chapters 9, 10 and 17 provide for a choice between the CFC 
Gateway test and other forms of taxation of non-trading finance profits arising from 
a qualifying loan relationship. The main advantage of the system was the avoidance 
of uncertainty in respect of the potential CFC apportionment.389  
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 ‘Even assuming that all three exclusions in the Gateway failed, i.e. significant UK SPFs were 
performed, trading income of the CFC would not be apportionable if five cumulative conditions 
were satisfied. These require: 
1. the CFC to have premises from which the CFC’s operations are wholly or mainly carried on in 
the territory in which it is resident; 
2. that either no more than 20 per cent of the CFC’s income, to the extent that income is derived 
from sales of goods not produced in the country where the CFC is resident, is generated from UK 
residents or UK permanent establishments and non-resident companies or if the CFC is carrying on 
a banking business regulated where it is tax resident, no more than 10 per cent of its relevant interest 
and other trading income is derived from the UK residents or UK PEs of non-resident companies; 
3. that in general terms not more than 20 per cent of the CFC's expenditure, either on its own staff 
or on staff of related persons who carry on activities managing assets or risks, is incurred in the UK 
directly or indirectly. Where this test cannot be satisfied but all of the other four conditions in section 
371 HE in relation to the CFC's activities are satisfied, trading income derived from an asset or risk 
of the CFC can be excluded from CFC apportionment where no more than 50 per cent of the “related 
management expenses’ on any particular asset is, directly or indirectly, incurred in the UK (the so-
called ‘50 per cent condition’); 
4. that an IP condition, identical to that discussed above in relation to the ETE is satisfied; and 
5. that the CFC does not derive more than 20 per cent of the CFC’s income from goods exported 
from the UK other than goods exported to the country where the CFC is tax resident.’ TIOPA s.371 
HE 
388
 ‘It is rather hard to see why, if a group finance company is genuinely established in and carrying 
on economic activity, in another member state, all of its finance income, whether that is derived or 
funded from the UK or not, should not be fully exempt. Or at least it is if one sets aside 
considerations of revenue protection and affordability. I have certainly heard tax directors muttering 
that 5.75% is a tax rise not a tax break.’ Slaughter and May ‘CFC focus – CFC reform and EU.’ 
[2012] Tax Journal, p. 1. 
389
 Mealey, Mat, Alexander, Kate, Thomson, Fiona. ‘CFC finance company exemption - anti-
avoidance' [2013] 
http://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&ved=0CDYQFjAD&url=h
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The new measure excludes certain loans from qualification for CFC loan 
relationships. As a result, an offshore financing regime would not apply, whereas a 
UK resident entity, connected with a CFC, has a loan receivable and an arrangement 
the main purpose of which is to reduce the loan relationship credits.390 
The low profits exemption391 applies if either the CFC’s accounting or 
assumed taxable total profits are not more than £50,000 or the CFC’s accounting or 
assumed taxable total profits are not more than £500,000 and the non-trading 
element is not more than £50,000.392 
At first sight it may seem also that CFC rules do not apply to SMEs (Section 
166 of Taxation International and other Provisions Act 2012). However, in the other 
sections of the Act we can see that393 the exemption is limited by a number of 
exceptions. As a result, SMEs are also covered by the Act and there is therefore a 
need to discuss the issue further.394 
Moreover, the UK has prepared a list of excluded countries. However, not 
all EU countries have been included in the list. Firstly, Ireland falls within the scope 
of the CFC in its full regime. Also, an industry established in Luxembourg cannot 
benefit from the exemption.  
To recall the facts of the case study presented above,395 a UK business 
contracted for engineering work to be carried out in Poland for a Polish subsidiary 
of an Irish contractor. It is important to remember that, if a UK business establishes 
a controlled company in Ireland, the Irish company might be subjected to the British 
CFC regulations. However, if the company is established in Poland and contracted 
a subsidiary of Irish contractors to undertake the engineering work, the company 
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 Section 167, 167A, 168 of Taxation International and other Provisions Act 2012. 
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would be excluded from the scope of the UK regulations. Thus, the UK CFC 
regulations lead to the disadvantageous treatment of businesses established in 
certain member states. 
Applying the above rules to the factual situation presented in Chapter 4, 
there is a difference in treatment between the subsidiaries established in Poland and 
Ireland. In the described situation, a UK business trades in Poland. The separate 
company has been established in Poland by UK residents. The company is owned 
100% by UK residents. The corporate tax rate in Poland is 19 per cent. A UK CFC 
regime applies to a CFC established in a state where a corporate tax rate is 25 per 
cent lower than in the UK. Thus, CFC does not apply.  
Figure 6 CFC in the UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
UK PERSON OWNS 
Company A in Ireland Company B in Poland 
Company A 
taxed in Ireland 
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Company A 
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If it is presupposed that a UK person established a company in Ireland, the 
CFC might apply. The corporate tax rate in Ireland is 12.5 per cent. Thus, it is 37.5 
per cent lower than in the UK.  
As illustrated above, a UK company wishing to trade in Ireland might be 
discouraged by the higher tax burden. It should be remembered that CFC is not 
connected with the taxed resident company and the deductibility of losses is limited. 
There is, therefore, a difference in treatment between the two CFC companies and 
the difference depends on the state of establishment. 
Is it justified to treat companies from different member states differently? 
In Dr Inspecteur D396 D claimed relief from a wealth tax in regards to his property 
located in The Netherlands. D was a resident in Germany, where 90% of his assets 
were located. Moreover, D owned a property in The Netherlands constituting 10% 
of his assets.  
 
Figure 7 Dr Inspecteur D 
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D was refused a tax allowance. He claimed to be discriminated against 
compared to Dutch and Belgian residents. The CJEU did not agree and decided that 
these situations were not comparable.  
D argued that it was discriminatory to treat residents from member state A 
differently from residents from member state B. The CJEU did not agree given that, 
although a bilateral tax Treaty had been concluded between The Netherlands and 
Belgium, no such agreement existed between The Netherlands and Germany. Thus, 
a reciprocity argument did not arise.  
The decision has been criticised, as a bilateral Treaty should not override an 
EU Treaty.397 The CJEU in Dr Inspecteur D explicitly rejected the requirements of 
the most favoured treatment which would result in equal (most favoured) treatment 
given out to residents of all member states. 
Dennis Weber suggested398 that the most favoured national treatment should 
be the standard for the EU. It is noted that this right has been included in EU 
agreements with member states acceding the Union on or after 1st May 2004.399 
Although the most favoured treatment is not part of customary international law, its 
application in the EU would be beneficial for competition in the EU and for the 
internal market.  
It is not contended that Mr. D’s situation was disadvantageous compared 
with residents of The Netherlands or even with other non-residents.400 Therefore, it 
is submitted that the CJEU should have provided different criteria for the analysis. 
The comparison should have been made between a resident and a non-resident. If 
                                                          
397
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there is a difference in treatment, then it is discriminatory. Thus, there is no 
obligation to apply the most favoured treatment in case of the taxation and this 
situation might hinder the freedom of establishment. However, the discriminatory 
measure may be allowed on the basis of a justified reason. Then, the CJEU should 
have determined whether the derogation was objectively justified. A proportionality 
test should then have been applied.  
By contrast, the CJEU did not find the situation discriminatory. The Court 
followed previous rulings in finding discrimination only when there is a prohibitive 
clause. The CJEU does not consider, within the scope of tax matters, other obstacles 
‘which might have a hindering effect’ on the freedom of establishment. 
Notions of ‘genuine activity’401 and ‘main aim’ are not precisely defined 
and courts may interpret them differently which may result in different decisions. 
It puts taxpayers in a highly disadvantageous situation when they cannot foresee 
the effects of their activities. Moreover, the lack of consistency in the interpretation 
of these terms may expose member states to a risk of wrong implementation of the 
TFEU. In such circumstances it may be wiser for the UK to repeal the separate CFC 
regulations and to provide general anti-abuse rules402 which may be applied to both 
national and non-nationals. It is submitted that any CFC provision may lead to 
compliance questions and only by amending them may EU law be fully 
implemented. In particular, in the wording of Test Claimants403 CJEU ruled that 
CFC rules cannot be applied if CFC is established in the host member state and 
carries on genuine economic activities there. The UK legislator avoided the motive 
test and the Act expressly and repeatedly stated that the CFC applies if the main or 
one of the main aims was to obtain a tax advantage. In light of the CJEU ruling, it 
should be assumed that if, despite tax motives, a genuine establishment exists then 
the CFC shall not apply.  
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 Report of a study group led by Graham Aaronson QC on the merits of introducing a general anti-
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However, in light of the CJEU line of ruling, it is not surprising that the 
Commission reached a different view and currently the British CFC rules are no 
longer under consideration by the Commission. 
Based on the Polish experiences, it might be questioned whether the CFC 
rules are necessary at all. On the one hand, the British Tax Authority has a useful 
tool to fight purely artificial arrangements. On the other hand, it leads to Tax 
Authorities’ discretion, as emphasised by Polish Constitution Tribunal.404 Notions 
of ‘genuine activity’405 and ‘main aim’ are not precisely defined, either in the EU 
law, or in national legal systems. The national courts interpret these terms 
differently, thus resulting in inconsistent rulings. It places taxpayers in a highly 
disadvantageous situation where they cannot foresee the effects of their activities. 
Thus, it is not recommended to exclude the CFC regime from undertaking trading 
within the EU, unless it is purely artificial. It has been argued above that any CFC 
provision leads to compliance questions and that only by amending them will EU 
law be fully implemented. However, the Commission reached a different solution 
and currently British CFC rules are no longer under Commission observation. 
However, it is questionable if the solution proposed by the UK does not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective it pursues.406 There was an 
interesting informal initiative of the HMRC, who appointed a research group to 
prepare a proposal of general anti-avoidance rules (GAAR). The Aaronson 
Report407 proposed to use GAAR instead of the CFC. It was argued that the CFC 
rules are unnecessarily discriminatory and the GAAR should be used instead.  
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In March 2011 the European Commission published a draft of general anti-
avoidance rules.408 It was based on the influential CJEU ruling in Halifax.409 The 
Court ruled that ‘artificial transactions carried out for the sole purpose of avoiding 
taxation shall be ignored for the purposes of calculating the tax base. The first 
paragraph shall not apply to genuine commercial activities where the taxpayer is 
able to choose between two or more possible transactions which have the same 
commercial result but which produce different taxable amounts.’  
The proposal for reforms is examined in Chapter 6. However, the reform 
proposal needs to include all aspects of the double taxation issue.  
 
4.3 Permanent Establishment 
 
Before proceeding to examine the tax treatment of permanent establishment 
(PE), it is essential to define it. It must be noted that PE is not a separate entity and 
constitutes a part of a resident company. A PE is a fixed place of business which 
may raise tax liability in a particular jurisdiction. 
The Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income, in 
particular Article 5, gives a detailed analysis of what PE is. Paragraph 1 states that 
to decide the existence of PE it is needed to establish ‘place of business’ such as 
premises, machinery or equipment.410 Secondly, this place must be ‘fixed’, i.e. it 
must be established at a distinct place with a certain degree of permanence and 
eventually the business must be carried through this fixed place of business.411  
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 Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
COM (2011) 121/4 published on March 16, 2011, http://eur-
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In the introductory section of this chapter (Section 4.1.), it was stated that 
there are nine substantial differences between subsidiaries and PE, observed by 
Professor Peter Wattel.412 The most important difference is that a branch is not 
considered to be resident for tax purposes in the host state.413 A non-resident PE 
cannot automatically enjoy the same tax benefits as residents.414 A PE is taxed only 
for state source profits in a host member state, whereas the subsidiary has unlimited 
taxation. However, subsidiary suffers unlimited tax subjection in a host member 
state but it might be taxed in the home member state solely if their activity is not 
genuine and the sole or one of the main aim of foreign establishment is tax 
avoidance.415  
The Model Double Taxation Treaty of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) accepts the principle of worldwide taxation 
of residents. Article 7 paragraph 1 provides that ‘profits of an enterprise of a 
contracting state shall be taxable only in that state unless the enterprise carries on 
business in the other contracting state through a permanent establishment situated 
therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits that are 
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 The distinctions might be divided into differences from home and host member state perspectives. 
From a host member state perspective:  
• PE needs some duration to qualify as PE (nexis) 
• No capital duty is payable in a host state 
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• Costs incurred by parent company are deductible in the state of PE 
• Losses (including temporary losses) incurred by PE are tax deductible in host member state 
• PE profits are taxed in home member state 
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attributable to the permanent establishment in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 2 may be taxed in that other state.’416 Moreover, there are number of EU 
Directives in favour of worldwide taxation in the state of residence, inter alia 
Council Directive 90/435/EEC on the common system of taxation applicable in the 
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different member states, Council 
Directive 2003/49/EC on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and 
royalty payments made between associated companies of different member States 
and Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of 
interest payments. Furthermore, the CJEU agrees with the opinion that worldwide 
taxation is compatible with the freedom of establishment.417 Given the growing 
number of judgments delivered by the CJEU, it is necessary to select one judgment 
for further analysis. The chosen case is Columbus Container.418 This seminal ruling 
provides a justification for the double taxation of a PE. 
Columbus’ shares were held by eight members of the same family residing 
in Germany, whereby each member has 10% holding. The remaining 20% shares 
were owned by a German partnership, shares in which are also held by members of 
that family.419 All shareholders were represented by the same person at Columba’s 
general meeting. 
In 1996, Columbus was taxed by the Belgian tax authority at the normal rate 
of 30% of the profits achieved.420 In accordance with the German tax law, on 8 of 
June 1998, a tax notice was issued to Columbus. The partners were taxed on the 
profit derived from Columbus’ ‘trading results.’421 Columbus contested the tax 
notice, claiming that the Bilateral Tax Convention should apply and that 
withdrawing a tax advantage infringes the freedom of establishment.422 such as that 
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in issue in the main proceedings, under which the income of a re[s]ident national 
derived from capital invested in an establishment having its registered office in 
another member state is, notwithstanding the existence of a double taxation 
convention, concluded with the member state in which that establishment has its 
registered office, not exempted from national income tax but is subject to national 
taxation against which the tax paid in the other member state is set of.’423 
Figure 8 Columbus Limited Partnership - Belgium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The German tax law provides that, instead of the exemption method from 
the Double Taxation Convention, the set-off method has been used. It is important 
to highlight that it resulted in a 53 per cent increase of the tax burden.424 The 
Finanzgericht Münster made a preliminary reference to the CJEU. By its question, 
the Finanzgericht Münster asked, ‘whether the freedom of establishment must be 
interpreted as precluding tax legislation of a member state.  
The CJEU ruled that EU law does not provide any general criteria for the 
attribution of competence between member states as to elimination of double 
taxation. The CJEU was found to have no competence to rule on the infringement 
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of the provisions of double taxation convention by contracting states.425 Member 
states enjoy ‘a certain autonomy’426 and are at liberty to determine the condition 
and level of taxation for different types of establishments. However, member states 
shall not treat companies trading solely in one member state and cross-border in a 
discriminatory manner.427 Columbus Container contested the tax notice and 
claimed that the Double Taxation Convention shall apply.  
The CJEU stated that in the current state of harmonisation of EU law, 
member states enjoy certain autonomy and decided not to be competent to rule over 
the application of the Double Taxation Convention.428 The CJEU ruled that it is not 
precluded that ‘income of a resident national derived from capital invested in an 
establishment which has its registered office in another member state is, 
notwithstanding the existence of a double taxation convention concluded with the 
member state in which the establishment has its registered office, not exempted 
from national income tax but is subject to national taxation against which the tax 
levied in the other member state is set off.’429 As it is noticed, the answer from the 
Court is not easy to interpret. An in-depth analysis was made by number of 
commentators whose reactions were mainly negative as there was a high level of 
expectance after the Advocate General’s Opinion had been delivered.430 However, 
for the reasons explained below, the CJEU reached a different conclusion from the 
Advocate General. 
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Some commentators431 argued that Columbus Container provided the 
acceptance of the principle of the tax treaty overriding.432 Rene Offermanns pointed 
out that it is an example of treaty override as Germany introduced ‘an unilateral 
measure interfering with the taxing powers of other contracting state many years 
after the conclusion of the tax treaty.’433 What is more, Advocate General Mengozzi 
expressed in the Opinion that ‘application of the double taxation convention 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom of Belgium 
ensured that the partners in Columbus would enjoy a tax exemption in Germany on 
the profits they made in Belgium’434. Moreover, some authors argued that the treaty 
overriding makes a ruling important for establishing a consistent line of EU ruling 
and that the treaty overriding is a core argument to differentiate between Cadbury 
Schweppes and Columbus Container.435  
However, it is considered that this conclusion is too far-reaching. It is 
observed that the national legal provision overrides an International Act but the act 
does not constitute a part of acquis communautaire. This constitutes non-
compliance with international law but lies outside the scope of EU law and CJEU 
competence. One of the crucial rules of international law is ‘pacta sunt servanda;’436 
thus, it may be argued that Germany does not apply a double taxation convention 
and the tax burden shall not apply.  
Nonetheless, it is submitted that not including a permanent establishment 
into the scope of the tax treaty does not constitute abuse of international law. As 
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stated in this section, a substantial difference between subsidiary and PE is that the 
latter is not considered to be a tax resident.437 As a consequence, tax treaties do not 
apply to PE.438 The difference in treatment between subsidiary and PE is found to 
be justified and compliant with the freedom of establishment. The Treaty provides 
a choice of different types of secondary establishment. If these two forms shall be 
treated as identical, the Treaty would be meaningless.439 Both forms have different 
features, advantages and disadvantages. For instance, PE enables the company to 
deduct foreign losses, whereas a subsidiary assures that a genuine undertaking 
would not be double taxed. In Columbus Container the founders decided to 
establish a PE and their decision determined that the undertaking is not a subsidiary.  
Moreover, the Court observed that the problem does not relate to EU law 
and EU freedoms. The issue relates, rather, to national unilateral measures which 
raise compliance questions about the double taxation convention, not to an EU act. 
Moreover, as stated above,440 the German measures also remain in accordance with 
international law. Thus, the Court consistently takes a position that, under Article 
267 TFEU, the Court is not competent to decide on possible infringements by 
member states of the provisions of tax treaties. The CJEU was ruled to be 
incompetent to rule over direct taxation and leave the autonomy to member 
states.441  
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Next, some commentators442 compared Columbus Container with the Royal 
Bank of Scotland443 case and claimed that it is not understandable why the Court 
did not apply a non-discrimination analysis in Columbus Container.444  
To recall the facts445 in Royal Bank of Scotland446 the Court considered 
whether Greece had entrenched a discriminatory treatment. The case concerned tax 
legislation which, in relation to companies having their seat in another member state 
and carrying a business in the first member state through a PE situated there, 
excluded the possibilities, accorded only to companies having their seat in the first 
member state, of benefiting from a lower rate of tax profits.447 Indeed, Greek 
companies might benefit from the taxation of 35%, whereas companies having their 
seat in another member state are subject to a sole tax rate of 40%. Some 
commentators complain that the CJEU is inconsistent. In Royal Bank of Scotland, 
the CJEU ruled that the undertaking was in a situation objectively comparable to 
residents.448 
It is essential to stress that Royal Bank of Scotland449 concerned an inbound 
situation whilst Columbus Container concerned an outbound situation. 
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Figure 9 Royal Bank of Scotland v. Columbus Container 
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Chapter 3 of the thesis showed the differences between inbound and 
outbound cases. The selected, seminal rulings were divided into two groups to 
indicate disparities between these two categories. The consistency in the CJEU 
rulings might be observed if this criterion is applied. In the outbound cases, for 
instance, Daily Mail450 or Cartesio,451 the Court did not apply discrimination-based 
or restriction-based analyses. Notwithstanding, where the Court examined inbound 
situations, the discrimination-based analysis was a core part of the judgment. The 
clear examples are cases discussed in Chapter 3: Centros,452 Inspire Art,453 
Überseering,454 Vale455 and Royal Bank of Scotland. 456 Columbus Container is an 
example of an outbound case. Thus, it is not surprising that the CJEU did not apply 
either a restriction-based analysis or a discrimination-based analysis. Moreover, the 
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CJEU was not found to be competent to rule over outbound situation in the scope 
of national taxation provisions. 
It might interesting to understand why the CJEU did not rule that the higher 
tax burden might be applied solely to non-genuine activity, as was the case in 
Cadbury Schweppes.457 Some authors expressly stated that, ‘non-application of the 
ECJ’s [CJEU] case law on anti-avoidance rules to a case such as Columbus 
Container Services is difficult to understand.’ 458 The authors claimed that there was 
no substantial difference between these cases and that the only reason for the CJEU 
to differentiate between them was the treaty overriding. This argument has already 
been aptly rejected by the CJEU and detailed reasons have been presented above. 
Other commentators justify the difference between rulings by the fact that in 
Columbus Container there are no specific CFC provisions and the issue relates 
solely to the attribution of income on the basis of income generated through a tax-
transparent entity. This argument is also not convincing. Firstly, concerned rules 
serve the same objective as CFC and they aim to counterpart the abusive tax 
avoidance. Secondly, concerned rules have been implemented in the same 
legislative act as CFC. Thus, this argument shall be rejected. 
However, the real reason can be shown in the following graph: 
Figure 10 Cadbury Schweppes v. Columbus Container 
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It is illustrated in the above boxes that these cases show a significant 
disparity. Cadbury Schweppes concerned the taxation of non-residents and 
Columbus Container relates to the taxation of residents. It was stated above that the 
CJEU consistently ruled that residents and non-residents are not in comparable 
situations. There is a consistent line of ruling of CJEU that discrimination can arise 
only through the application of different rules to comparable situations or the 
application of the same rule to different situations. The situations of residents and 
of non-residents are not, as a rule, comparable.459 Thus, it is not surprising that the 
Court did not apply the same reasoning to Columbus Container. Indeed, Columbus 
Container was taxed equally to other residents. It is argued that such treatment does 
not constitute a restriction on freedom of establishment. 
In the analysed case the partnership was treated as PE. Columbus Container 
was treated as a ‘coordination centre’ based on Belgian Royal Decree number 187 
of 30 December 1982 on the creation of coordination centres. As a coordination 
centre, Columbus Container benefits from taxation on less than 30% profit actually 
made in 1996. According to Belgian law, a coordination centre is a PE.460 
Moreover, German national provisions treated tax transparent partnership as a 
resident of Germany and a PE abroad. Accordingly, Columbus was treated as a 
German undertaking and the profit from ‘trading results’, both in Belgium and 
Germany, have been taxed in full. However, the amount of tax paid in Belgium was 
offset.461 
It is clear from what has been explored above that Columbus Container 
intended to establish a PE in Belgium. The legal form was chosen to benefit from a 
special regime provided solely for coordination centres. The choice was not limited 
by host or home member states and Columbus might select any other legal form 
available in Belgium. Unless, the free choice is made, a business has to face 
advantages and disadvantages of legal and fiscal form.  
Nonetheless, it is argued that Columbus Container has exercised its freedom 
of establishment and cannot claim that a treatment is discriminatory. Columbus 
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Container decided to establish a PE and thus, remain a German resident. Columbus 
Container was treated equally to other German residents and taxed alike. Moreover, 
it was already stated that, trading as a PE, Columbus Container benefited from the 
easier deduction of losses. This is particularly examined in the following chapter. 
The ruling significantly differs from the Opinion that Advocate General 
Mengozzi delivered in the case.462 The Advocate General established that freedom 
of establishment is restricted. If PE is located in a country with lower taxation, the 
tax on capital is not levied. However, if taxation is lower, as was the case in 
Columbus Container, German legislation treats a PE differently. The Advocate 
General found these situations comparable and recommended that a restriction on 
freedom of establishment exists.  
Nonetheless, the CJEU follows a discrimination-based analysis, instead of 
the restriction-based scrutiny proposed by Advocate General Mengozzi. The TFEU 
used the word ‘restriction’ with regard to free movements and ‘discrimination’ in 
relation to different treatments based on some protected characteristics, in particular 
nationality.463 The CJEU tends to find national tax provisions EU compliant if they 
meet the so-called Gebhard test and apply the discrimination-based approach. 
However, it is argued that the non-discrimination approach is not sufficient to 
achieve the single market and freedom of establishment. 
Nonetheless, it is argued that a restriction-based analysis of the CJEU might 
be difficult to achieve. It is not possible to state in general what might constitute a 
hindrance. It needs to be done on a case-by-case basis and even then, it is still 
problematic. This would be the case if the CJEU follows the Opinion of the 
Advocate General. Jérôme Monsenego464 suggests imagining a state with high 
levels of taxation, providing high benefits from the welfare system. It is difficult to 
compare the state with another state which offers a low level of taxation and low 
benefits from the welfare system. 
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To summarise, taxation of a PE at the same rate as residents is not precluded 
by the Treaty. It is noteworthy that this double taxation of permanent establishment 
might affect businesses’ decisions to establish using this legal form. It might be a 
restriction to achievement of the single market and free movement but current EU 
law does preclude national legislation taxing PE by its home member state. 
In the analysed case study outlined in the beginning of this thesis,465 
according to the Convention between the UK and Poland for the avoidance of 
double taxation,466 if construction works are executed for more than 12 months the 
business is deemed to have a PE there.467 For the purposes of the Convention, the 
term PE means a fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise 
is wholly or partly carried on.468 Accordingly, the profits of an enterprise shall be 
taxed only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other 
Contracting State through a PE situated therein.469 Thus, the fact of establishing a 
PE has a serious fiscal consequence. 
Not all Polish resident companies operate entirely within the boundaries of 
Poland and their profits include foreign profits. These companies therefore have to 
consider the interaction of the principle of worldwide taxation and the tax systems 
of other states. If a Polish business establishes a PE abroad, the Polish legislation 
provides that it is treated as resident and taxed on all worldwide income.470 It means 
that the resident company can charge corporation tax on all its profits, wherever 
they arise.471 As such, double taxation might be avoided if the Tax Convention is 
concluded. It is not fully understandable why, in the chapter dedicated to CFC, it is 
stated that provisions on CFC apply also to PE.472  
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Polish provisions on PE are similar to the German ones concerned in 
Columbus Container. However, according to the Polish legal system, it is not 
possible to apply a treaty override. The supremacy of the international act is one of 
the most approved principles in the Polish legal system, as indicated in Chapter 2. 
If a Polish court has under its scrutiny a Polish legal provision which is not 
compliant with an international act, it must apply the international act directly. 
UK provisions on the taxation of PE applied the same reasoning as the 
Polish one until 19 July 2011. The reform introduced a ‘foreign branch exemption’ 
which gives companies an option to state that the profits of their foreign permanent 
establishments are exempt from UK corporation tax. Where such an election 
applies, the company is no longer subject to UK tax on its worldwide profits.473 
 
 The foreign branch exemption allows UK corporations to exempt the tax 
profits of worldwide PE of a UK resident company. A company has a choice to opt 
for foreign branch exemption or keep being taxed on worldwide income. The 
exemption option from UK taxation may seem more beneficial. However, if a 
company remains under fiscal sovereignty, it may reduce its UK tax by losses 
generated by foreign PE. A company is eligible to make one irrevocable election474 
which applies to all of the PEs of a company. Nonetheless, it is important to 
examine whether such a preclusion of offset losses is accepted by EU law which is 
the subject of the following chapter. 
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4.4 Concluding Observations 
 
The Chapter briefly presents CEN and CIN. There is a short discussion on 
whether CEN or CIN meets EU goals. However, there is no single answer to this 
question and it cannot be found directly in the text of the EU treaties or CJEU case 
law. Both theories CEN and CIN use the same criterion of comparison. In both 
cases only the domestic situation is compared. In other words, the CJEU scrutinises 
whether domestic and foreign businesses are treated equally in the member state 
concerned. It is concluded that the CJEU does not find it discriminatory that a 
foreign business faces additional tax burdens resulting from its cross-border activity 
as long as within the member state concerned equal treatment is assured. The 
wording of the Treaty is applied strictly. Thus, it is in accordance with the current 
state of EU law that a cross-border business is deemed to be treated equally if 
neutrality is achieved within one member state. Indeed, it seems that in light of 
current acquis communautaire the freedom of establishment is understood as 
providing equity within a single member state. 
 
The chapter also refers back to the notions of subsidiary and permanent 
establishment. It is argued that a subsidiary and a PE are not in a comparable 
situation. A subsidiary is analysed in light of CFC provisions, in particular in the 
context of the new regulation introducing for the first time CFC rules to the Polish 
legal system and the situation of the reform of existing provisions by UK regulators. 
It is contended that Poland which had the most lenient provisions, adopted one of 
the strictest CFC rules in the EU. The reform in the UK is inspired by Cadbury 
Schweppes and the need to adapt existing rules to EU standards of non-
discrimination. Nonetheless, the British CFC rules differ from the solution 
presented by the CJEU and the Commission but it is anyway in accordance with 
current EU law. 
It is questioned whether the CFC rules are necessary at all. On the one hand, 
the CFC is a useful tool to deal with purely artificial arrangements. On the other 
hand, it leads to Tax Authorities having a wide discretion as notions of ‘genuine 
activity’475 and ‘main aim’ are not precisely defined either in the EU law or in 
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national legal systems. The national courts interpret these terms differently thus 
resulting in inconsistent rulings. It places taxpayers in a highly disadvantageous 
situation where they cannot foresee the effects of their activities. Thus, it is not 
recommended to exclude the CFC regime from undertaking trading within the EU, 
unless it is purely artificial. 
 
Moreover, a CFC regime may expose member states to a risk of wrong 
implementation of the TFEU.476 It might be recommended for member states to 
avoid separate CFC regulations and provide general anti-abuse rules477 which may 
be applied to nationals and non-nationals alike. It has been argued above that any 
CFC provision leads to compliance questions and that only by amending them will 
EU law be fully implemented. However, the Commission reached a different 
solution and currently British CFC rules are no longer under Commission 
observation. 
 
 The difference between a subsidiary and a PE was also highlighted. A 
subsidiary, as a non-resident, might be taxed by a ‘home’ member state only if it 
lacks genuine economic activity and the sole or one of the main aims is tax 
avoidance. Member states struggle to proclaim EU-compliant national CFC 
provisions and it is argued that EU member states should not be included in CFC 
regulations.478 In contrast, the double taxation of a PE is not precluded by EU law. 
Member states exercise autonomy in the scope of taxation. Thus, it is it is not likely 
to enact a national provision which is incompliant with EU law, as the competence 
is granted solely to member states. 
The chapter presents the difference between Columbus Container and 
Cadbury Schweppes or Royal Bank of Scotland. The comparisons demonstrate that 
there is an essential difference between subsidiary and permanent establishment.  
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The following chapter is dedicated to looking at the offset of negative 
incomes generated by, firstly, subsidiaries and, secondly, by permanent 
establishments.  
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CHAPTER 5: DOUBLE NON-DEDUCTIBILITY OF 
LOSSES 
 
This chapter presents an analysis of the losses incurred by a connected 
undertaking based in another member state. As a result of a non-deductibility of 
losses, markets may be segmented instead of creating a single integrated market. It 
also impedes freedoms, in particular the freedom of establishment. 
As a result of the lack of sufficient integration of member states, only final 
losses are deductible. The strictest definition of ‘final losses’ would-be liquidation 
of a company. However, the CJEU in Marks & Spencer479 did not limit losses only 
to those existing at the time of liquidation but rather refers to the situation when the 
possibilities to offset have been exhausted. The problem of a lack of common 
solutions among member states will be observed in further sections. Moreover, the 
perspective (home or host member state) from which final losses will be computed 
is not determined.480 Also, it needs to be determined who in a group of companies 
is entitled to claim loss deduction. Moreover, in the light of the most recent CJEU 
rulings,481 the question might be posed as to whether the offset is possible at all. 
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On the one hand, a company who intends to have a secondary establishment 
abroad faces a bigger risk than if they establish in the same member state. The 
company faces risks of failure of the undertaking and, moreover, might be denied 
the chance to offset losses incurred.482 On the other hand, member states do not 
deny taking into account such a loss if incurred by a domestic branch or subsidiary. 
Of course, there is a risk that the loss would be used twice. The CJEU deliberately 
and persistently ruled (Marks & Spencer,483 Oy AA,484 Papillon485 and Lidl486) that 
losses might be offset in another member state only if they cannot be taken into 
account in the member state of residence. Consequently, if a loss cannot be taken 
into account in the member state of residence, it might be allowed elsewhere. As 
discussed below, the criteria of ‘being not taken into account’ is not very clear and 
gives rise to a number of problems. 
A national provision limiting or denying the offset losses concerns both 
subsidiaries and PE and may constitute a restriction to the freedom of establishment. 
The Chapter is consequently divided into two parts; one is devoted to subsidiary 
establishments and the second to permanent establishments. Also, a special 
category of loss is presented: a loss which is a result of a currency fluctuation. The 
CJEU decided that not accepting such a loss is contrary to Article 49 TFEU 
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(especially in Deutsche Shell).487 This category of loss may be identified only if 
accounts are held in a different currency.  
 
5.1 Subsidiary  
 
 A loss is often treated as a negative income or the ‘other side of the coin’. 
The unity of the taxable basis provides that if a member state does not tax the profits 
incurred abroad it does not have to allow deduction of costs or losses.488 It is then 
unsurprising that double non-deductibility of losses takes place in the EU. 
Moreover, this is in accordance with the fact that the CJEU accepts double taxation. 
According to international law a state might not permit the offsetting foreign losses. 
However, the CJEU has ruled on a number of occasions to allow deductions of 
foreign final losses but only under limited conditions. 
The problem arises in a number of cases but only two of the most seminal 
cases have been selected for analysis in this chapter: Marks & Spencer489 and 
European Commission v. United Kingdom.490 Both judgments refer to the same 
facts, as the first judgment turned out to be not clear enough. Marks & Spencer is a 
company incorporated in England and Wales and trades through a number of 
companies established either in the UK or in other member states.491 Marks & 
Spencer, as a group of companies, seeks to benefit from the British group tax 
scheme by claiming group tax relief in respect of the losses incurred by its 
subsidiaries in Belgium, Germany and France.492 However, the British provisions 
were open only to British undertakings or undertakings active within the UK. The 
relief was denied, as the subsidiaries were neither registered nor active in the UK.493 
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The UK tax authorities claimed that the profits of concerned subsidiaries were not 
taxed in the UK. Under section 11(1) ICTA, non-resident companies are charged 
corporate tax solely in respect of the profits attributable to their United Kingdom 
branches or agencies.494 Thus, if the profits are not taxed, the offset of losses 
generated by such a subsidiary must be denied. 
The CJEU ruled that such a provision constituted a hindrance to the freedom 
of establishment.495 However, the offset denial might be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner if it is justified by imperative requirements in the general 
interest, is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue 
and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.496  
Participant member states have submitted three arguments to justify the 
restriction. Firstly, it was submitted that profits and losses are two sides of the same 
coin and must be treated symmetrically in the same tax system in order to protect a 
balanced allocation of the taxing power of the different member states. The CJEU 
agreed that giving a company the option to have its losses taken into account in the 
member state in which they are established or in another member state may 
jeopardise a balanced allocation of the taxing power.497 Secondly, participant 
member states claimed that such a legal provision might cause the same losses to 
be offset twice. Once more, the CJEU agreed that such a danger exists.498 Finally, 
member states submitted that, if the losses were not taken into account in the 
member state in which a subsidiary is established, there would be a risk of tax 
avoidance. The CJEU accepted that the risk of tax avoidance exists. A concerned 
entity may decide to transfer the losses incurred by a non-resident company to a 
resident company with the consequence that ‘company’s losses will be transferred 
to companies established in the member states which apply the highest rates of 
taxation and in which the tax value of the losses is therefore the highest.’499 
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In summary, the Court observed that concerned restrictive provisions pursue 
legitimate objectives, are justified by overriding reasons in the public interest and 
are apt to ensure the attainment of those objectives.500 
Finally, the CJEU examined if the concerned provisions do not go beyond 
what is necessary to attain the objective. The CJEU ruled that there are less 
restrictive measures available and stated that the offset cannot be prohibited in 
general. It shall be permitted if ‘the non-resident subsidiary has exhausted the 
possibilities available in its state of residence of having the losses taken into account 
for the accounting period concerned by the claim for relief and also for previous 
accounting periods, if necessary by transferring those losses to a third party or by 
offsetting the losses against the profits made by the subsidiary in previous periods 
and there is no possibility for the foreign subsidiary’s losses to be taken into account 
in its State of residence for future periods either by the subsidiary itself or by a third 
party, in particular where the subsidiary has been sold to that third party.’501 In other 
words, a parent company can deduct a loss incurred by a subsidiary if the loss is 
final and cannot be offset in the host member state.502 
The suggested solution in Marks & Spencer has been highly criticised, as the 
automatic deduction is contrary to both arm’s length principle503 and the ability-to-
pay principle and also promotes tax planning. Jérôme Monsenego observed that the 
CJEU did not consider a ‘recapture mechanism’ in this case. In her Opinion in the 
European Commission v. United Kingdom,504 Advocate General Kokott noted that 
the CJEU registered 142 academic publications which deal directly with the 
judgment and provides a criticism for wide range of possible interpretations of 
Marks & Spencer. 
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It is observed that the CJEU did not follow the reasoning of Mark & Spencer 
in the following cases. The issue arose in other cases, i.e. Oy AA.505 In this case, a 
UK company owned a Finnish subsidiary indirectly. The subsidiary claimed to 
offset losses incurred by the UK auxiliary parent company. The CJEU sought to 
establish who in the group of companies was entitled to the deduction, that is, the 
ultimate parent company, any parent company or maybe a subsidiary 
 
Figure 11 Oy AA 
 
 
Under Finnish law, for tax purposes, a group contribution allows the transfer 
of cash or receivables within a group of companies. As a result, it allows the transfer 
of taxable profits to other companies belonging to the same group, thus enabling 
the offsetting of profits and losses. However, the possibility was open only to 
Finnish undertakings. 
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In this case, the CJEU denied the offset.506 The Court ruled similarly in 
another seminal judgment, X Holding.507 In this case, a Dutch parent company 
claimed ‘tax unity’ with its subsidiary in Belgium. The Dutch ‘tax unity’ law 
provides an opportunity to constitute a consolidated tax entity between companies 
belonging to the same group. According to article 15 of a corporation tax law from 
1969, a parent company and one or more subsidiaries owned to 95% could be taxed 
as one entity. All assets and activities are deemed to be undertaken by a parent 
company. As a result, all internal transactions are deemed not to exist and a group 
can submit only one tax return. The tax is levied only on the parent company for all 
companies included in the tax unity. 
Figure 12 Tax unity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
506
 It should be noted that there are two main differences between Oy AA and Marks & Spencer. 
Firstly, in Oy AA it is a subsidiary that claimed the offset. If the CJEU allows such a scheme, 
companies may establish complicated tax schemes to structure their businesses and locate them 
within tax havens. This could lead to uncertainty as to which subsidiary in a group is allowed to 
offset losses incurred by a parent company. Secondly, the losses in Oy AA were not final. 
507
 C-337/08 X Holding [2010] ECR I-1215. 
X Holding  
The Netherlands 
Subsidiary F 
Belgium 
100 % 
Tax unity in The Netherlands? 
131 
 
The CJEU denied the right for a Dutch parent company to constitute a tax 
unity with its Belgian subsidiary.508 The CJEU concluded that ‘the member state of 
origin is not obliged to apply the same tax scheme to non-resident subsidiaries as 
that which it applies to foreign permanent establishment.’509 The CJEU pointed out 
the risk of a shift of income from Belgium to The Netherlands.510 The Court noted 
that a significant risk of double deduction of losses exists. It might be the case, for 
example, if a tax unity is dissolved and the loss would not be recaptured. The CJEU 
has been explicitly encouraged to rule over a recapture mechanism.511 However, the 
CJEU found itself incompetent to rule over a recapture mechanism without further 
harmonisation of member states’ national laws. These two cases support clearly that 
the CJEU did not confirm the position affirmed in Marks & Spencer in its latter 
judgments. 
Nonetheless, following the Marks & Spencer judgment, the UK introduced 
cross-border group relief. Under the Corporation Tax Act 1988 [ICTA] final losses 
are allowed to be offset if the condition relating to the exhaustion of all possibilities 
of the non-resident subsidiary’s losses is taken into account in the member state 
where a subsidiary is resident. Thus, the Marks & Spencer was again under the 
scrutiny of the UK Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled on 22 May 2013 that 
the concerned losses must not be deducted. The reform of the UK provisions relates 
to losses incurred on or after 1st of April 2006 and do not reflect the losses incurred 
in preceding periods. 
On 19 July 2007, the Commission sent a letter of formal notice to the UK 
‘drawing its attention to the possibility that the tax rules adopted by that member 
state in the wake of the judgment in Marks & Spencer (EU:C:2005:763) are 
incompatible with the freedom of establishment to the extent that they are based on 
a particularly restrictive interpretation of the condition relating to the exhaustion of 
all possibility of the non-resident subsidiary’s losses being taken into account in the 
member state where that subsidiary is resident. In addition, according to the 
                                                          
508
 There was a suggestion to compare a subsidiary with PE but this was rightly denied by the CJEU. 
The proper comparator seems to be resident and non-resident subsidiaries (vertical comparison). 
509
 C-337/08 X Holding [2010] ECR I-1215. 
510
 Monsenego, Jérôme. ‘Taxation of Foreign Business Income within European Internal Market’ 
(Intellecta Infolog, Göteborg, 2011) p.178. 
511
 C-337/08 X Holding [2010] ECR I-1215. 
132 
 
Commission, those rules apply only from the date on which the new legislation 
entered into force, that is to say, from 1 April 2006.’512 
The UK did not agree that the concerned provision is not consistent with the 
Marks & Spencer judgment. Thus, the Commission brought the action before the 
CJEU513 claiming that Section 119(4) of the CTA 2010 makes it virtually 
impossible for a resident parent company to obtain cross-border group relief.514 In 
the Commission’s opinion, there are only two situations when a loss may be offset. 
Firstly, if there are no legal provisions in the state of residence of the non-resident 
subsidiary for losses to be carried forward. Secondly, if a non-resident subsidiary 
enters into liquidation before the end of the tax year in which the losses occurred.515 
The Commission argued that the lack of the possibility to offset non-resident losses 
shall be assessed at the time when a claim is made.516 
However, the CJEU did not agree with the Commission. Accordingly, 
Section 119 (4) of the CTA 2010 sets the date by reference to which it must be 
decided whether losses sustained by a non-resident subsidiary are definitive. The 
Court ruled that the Commission failed to prove that the concerned provisions made 
the offset virtually impossible.  
Next, the CJEU ruled that it is not inconsistent with EU law that the CTA 
2010 applies to the period after 1 April 2006. The cross-border group relief is 
available for preceding periods based on the legislation applicable to those earlier 
periods, construed in accordance with EU law.517 
A further justification may be found in the Opinion of the Advocate General 
Kokott.518 The Advocate General advised that the judgment of Marks & Spencer 
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should not be followed.519 She stated that solutions presented in Marks & Spencer 
are impracticable. She added that this regime does not protect the interests of the 
internal market but constitutes ’a virtually inexhaustible source of legal disputes’ 
between taxpayers and ta authorities.520 This reasoning is also supported by the 
literature.521 The Advocate General offered four reasons for this statement. Firstly, 
the definitive lack of possibility to offset losses exists only if a subsidiary ceased to 
exist in law.522 In other situations it is always possible to argue that the offset may 
become possible. Moreover, it may lead to long disputes between the real and 
theoretical possibilities to deduct losses. This is not recommended as it does not 
provide legal certainty.523 Secondly, as mentioned above, the case law following 
Marks & Spencer does not support the possibility of offsetting the losses of a 
foreign subsidiary.524 Third, the Advocate General pointed out that the impossibility 
of loss relief elsewhere can be created arbitrarily by the taxpayer.525 In her Opinion, 
‘it is very difficult to clarify in a specific case when, for example, a subsidiary is 
wound up for tax reasons and when it is not.’526 Finally, member states are obliged, 
under the freedom of establishment rules, to accord equal treatment. Thus, to grant 
cross-border relief, a member state may need to determine retrospectively what tax 
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results the non-resident subsidiary would have produced had it been established 
within that member state.527 
Thus, for the reasons presented above, the Advocate General recommended 
to the Court to abandon the ‘Marks & Spencer exception.’ The further advantages 
are legal certainty,528 consistency of CJEU case law529 and reaffirming the ability-
to-pay principle.530 
The CJEU ruling in European Commission v. United Kingdom531 completed 
the “saga’ of the Marks & Spencer litigation. The case led to thousands of 
commentaries and was widely discussed. As a result of 14 years of proceeding 
before the courts, Marks & Spencer was not allowed to deduct the final losses 
incurred by the foreign subsidiary. It is, however, surprising that there is limited 
literature referring to European Commission v. United Kingdom.532 
Moreover, it has to be noted that Marks & Spencer was not deprived of the 
possibility to offset losses in principle. It was a decision of the company to choose 
the legal form of the subsidiary. If one supposes that Marks & Spencer had been 
established as a PE, the company would have paid taxes in the UK and would also 
be entitled to benefit from the deduction of losses. Marks & Spencer used the right 
to choose the most convenient legal form. As a result, it was not obliged to pay 
taxes in the UK when the subsidiaries generated profits. Thus, it is hardly 
understandable why it might be entitled to loss deduction. The company had 
properly taken advantage of the freedom of establishment and freedom to choose 
the legal form of its presence.  
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5.1.1 The Legal Position in Poland 
 
 
Firstly, it seems that the offset of losses from a foreign subsidiary is not 
permissible. The Polish Tax Authority justifies the position by the fact that profits 
from the foreign subsidiary are not taxable in Poland.533 It means that Poland 
decided that if the Tax Authority could not get revenues from a source, the losses 
from that source could not be deducted. According to existing agreements on 
avoiding double taxation, Poland is allowed to offset losses incurred only in Austria 
and Belgium.534 Losses from other member states cannot be offset. 
Moreover, this issue has not been discussed in the literature. It is considered 
to be obvious that an entity that is not liable to taxation in Poland cannot offset 
losses incurred in a different jurisdiction. The only theoretically possible situation 
is the creation of the tax group. 
The Polish legal system provides for the possibility of creating Tax Capital 
Groups [Podatkowe Grupy Kapitalowe] (Tax Group). A Tax Group entitles the 
parties to joint assessment of costs and profits. It may provide substantial benefit 
for members of a Tax Group. According to article 1a Income Tax on Legal Persons 
Law [Ustawy o Podatku dochodowym od osob prawnych] (CIT) Act, joint stocks 
and limited liability companies [spolki kapitalowe]535 have the opportunity to 
establish Tax Group. Nonetheless, the CIT provides that all members of a Tax 
Group must have their seats in Poland and be effectively managed from Poland. If 
a controlling company does not possess its seat in Poland, a Tax Group cannot be 
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formed.536 Moreover, neither a non-resident subsidiary nor a branch can become 
part of a group. A Tax Group can be established in the form of a notary act only 
after registration with the Polish Tax Authority.537 These provisions constitute the 
discrimination of non-residents undertakings and seriously obstruct the freedom of 
establishment.  
The issue has been raised by the CJEU in the case X Holding presented in 
preceding section. The Dutch ‘tax unity’ serves the same aim as Polish tax groups 
as it provides an opportunity to constitute a consolidated tax entity between 
companies belonging to the same group. It is necessary to refer back to X 
Holding.538 In this case the CJEU ruled that a member state is allowed to limit a 
right for constituting tax unity for a domestic subsidiary only. 
 When considering the factual situation outlined in X Holding, the question 
that needs to be posed and answered is whether the business may establish a 
subsidiary. It must be restated that a Polish subsidiary cannot surrender losses 
incurred by a foreign parent company. Moreover, a foreign subsidiary of a Polish 
company cannot establish a tax group and thus losses incurred are not deductible. 
Likewise, the taxation of groups is in accordance with the current acquis 
communautaire. 
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5.1.2 The Legal Position in the United Kingdom 
 
The UK’s relevant provisions have in the main been already discussed above 
in the context of the CJEU’s case law. As a result, there is no need to analyse again 
the UK legal system in respect of group taxation. 
However, in the context of the factual case outlined in Chapter 1.3 and 4.1, 
it is not likely that a Polish subsidiary of a UK company can surrender losses 
incurred in Poland. The business is not deprived of the possibility of offsetting 
losses in principle. Under the Corporation Tax Act 1988 [ICTA] the business is 
allowed to offset final losses if the condition relating to the exhaustion of all 
possibilities of the non-resident subsidiary’s losses are taken into account in the 
member state where the subsidiary is resident. However, as shown in Marks & 
Spencer, despite the formal wording of ICTA, it is not very likely that a company 
would be able to meet all the conditions. 
However, the issue of special relief for tax groups requires additional 
attention.539 The relief is the result of the implementation of the European Mergers 
Tax Directive (EMTD) which covers partial divisions. Jonathan Cooklin wisely 
defined a partial division as an operation such a company transfers, without being 
dissolved, one or more branches of activity, to one or more existing or new 
companies, leaving at least one branch of activity in the transferring company. In 
his opinion UK terms, a partial division is a demerger of part of the demerging 
company's business. Transfers between companies residing in the same the EU 
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member state will therefore not benefit from this relief. Thus, this relief has usually 
of no use for non-UK resident persons.540 
The relief was implemented in the Taxation (International and other 
Provisions) Act 2010 and takes into account the tax group of non-resident 
companies. The tax relief is open for non- resident subsidiaries only.  
 
Figure 13 Tax group 
 
 
 
 
The relief provided in the Directive does not apply to UK residents and the 
question is posed as to whether it would constitute reverse discrimination. Firstly, 
this thesis seeks to establish whether the principle of non-discrimination is 
recognised in UK law. The issue is not straightforward, because the UK has no 
single core constitutional document which includes the most important principles. 
Usually the constitution results from revolution, peaceful negotiation or freedom 
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from colonial rule, where in the UK there was no such political shift.541 The answer 
might be found in a number of acts and case law. However, there is no indigenous 
principle of equality or non-discrimination in the UK. 542 The non-discrimination 
principle is expressly proclaimed in, for example, the Chronically Sick and 
Disabled Persons Act 1970, the Equality Act 2010 and the Employment Relations 
Act 1999. It might be thus stated that the no-reverse-discrimination principle is 
present in the UK’s legal system and that the above-mentioned sources of UK law 
are commonly accepted. Accordingly, the non-discrimination principle applies.  
 In the UK there are a number of special schemes provided for nationals: 
Venture Capital Scheme; Venture Capital Trust; and Corporate Venturing Scheme. 
However, they are available only for a specific purpose and so their scope is limited. 
On the other hand, there are special reliefs for non-resident companies regulated 
separately. For example, there is no similar relief to these provided by EMTD open 
to nationals. Nationals are subject, for example, to 18 or 28 per cent capital gains 
tax. It might be noted that Entrepreneurs’ Relief provides relief and 10 per cent 
capital gains.543  
Moreover, national businesses are not only deprived of a tax advantage but 
are exposed to less favourable treatments. The tax group is predetermined in the 
UK. A Tax Group created inside the UK is called an Associated Company. 
According to HMRC, the companies are associated if one has control over the other, 
or both companies are under the control of the same person or persons.544 If the 
conditions are met, HMRC uses different accountancy rules and small profit relief 
may be reduced. It does not include the possibilities to account for losses or profits 
generated by another associated company.  
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It may also be argued that this is not purely a national situation. The EMTD 
requires that the merging companies do not reside in the same member state. 
However, it is possible that the merging companies are resident in the same member 
state but are involved in cross-border activity. The cross-border activity will 
therefore trigger a consideration of EU law. Thus, it must be noted that a national 
business is in a less favourable situation than a non-national one. National 
undertakings cannot benefit from the relief which constitutes reverse 
discrimination. It was stated that the UK should not accept any kind of 
discrimination, even those concerning its own nationals.  
So, there is a need to find out if there is any justified reason for derogation. 
It is believed that there is neither argument for fiscal cohesion, nor effectiveness of 
the fiscal system, nor misuse of the EU law. In this case, there is no justification to 
treat a member state’s own nationals differently from non-nationals.  
 
5.1.3 Summary 
 
The full integration and implementation of the freedom of establishment 
requires member states to allow non-final losses to be offset. Unfortunately, the 
current status of acquis communautaire does not provide for this. There is a realistic 
risk that losses will be deducted in more than one state but there is no existing 
information exchange system between member states which is adequate.545 
Moreover, tax systems and tax bases vary significantly between member states. 
Without some common basic rules, a deduction of losses would not be possible. 
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 Member states enact VIES but it serves in a very limited way. ‘VIES does not maintain itself a 
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by the member state. This information includes at least a ‘YES/NO’ answer on the validity and 
existence of the supplied number and it may also include additional information such as the holder’s 
name and address, if this information is provided by the member state. VIES optionally provides a 
unique consultation number that can be used to prove to a tax administration that a given VAT 
number at a given time resulted in a given validation reply.’ Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VAT_Information_Exchange_System. It was firstly introduced in 
1993, based on regulation 218/92 to strengthen the exchange of information for intra-community 
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Some solutions have already been proposed such as Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base546 or Current Inclusion547 but they have not yet come into force. 
These proposals are the subject of the following chapter. 
                                                          
546
 CCCTB is a new initiative of the Commission. The study started in 2001 and on 16 March 2011 
the proposal Council Directive was presented. It might go into force if a minimum of eight member 
states or nine after ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon ratify it. The Proposal includes detailed 
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• Assets: All fixed tangible assets, including buildings, airplanes and machinery will be covered. The 
costs incurred for R&D, marketing and advertising in the 6 years prior to a company entering the 
CCCTB will also be included as a proxy for intangible assets for 5 years. 
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50% the number of employees. 
• Sales: This will be calculated on the basis of where the goods are dispatched to/destined for. For 
services, this will be where the service is physically carried out. ‘MEMO/11/171. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/171 
It is believed that the crucial point would be how to establish a principal place of business. It might 
create conflicts and might result in unwillingness of member states to ratify the Directive. 
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The UK legal provisions have been significantly amended during the last 
decade. Currently, the possibility to offset final losses under certain restrictive 
circumstances exists. Thus, to form a subsidiary may be the central interest of a 
domestic business wishing to expand abroad. 
Conversely, in Poland there is no legal reform of existing legal provisions. 
There is no possibility to offset the losses incurred by a foreign subsidiary and it is 
not possible to create a tax group. Nonetheless, the Polish legal provisions remain 
in accordance with EU law. The reform is highly desirable but the common 
cooperation of member states is needed to achieve it. As noted above, there are 
particularly interesting EU proposals, aiming to modify existing acquis 
communautaire. The reform proposals, with a corresponding critical review are 
presented in the next chapter. Finally, it is noted that the situation of a PE is less 
restricted than that of a subsidiary. A PE is closely bound to a company and 
constitutes part of it, when that subsidiary is a separate legal entity. Despite that, 
some authors attempt to agitate to treat PE as if they are separate entities and agree 
with the solution proclaimed in Krankenheim548 and Philips Electronics.549  
 
5.2 Permanent Establishment  
 
Striking the balance between European Union harmonisation and member 
state discretion in the context of direct taxation is particularly problematic in 
relation to the double non-deductibility of losses incurred by PE. In the scope of 
direct taxation, the European Union has no competence. However, the CJEU has 
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 The alternative solution called Current Inclusion (CI) has been proposed by Schreiber, Ulrich, 
Fuhrich, Gregor. ‘European group taxation – the role of exit taxes.’ [2009] European Journal of Law 
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consistently stressed that powers retained by the member states must be exercised 
consistently with EU law.550  
The notion of PE has been defined in chapter 4. However we should 
remember that a PE shall not be confused with a secondary establishment which is 
sometimes observed in the EU literature.551 However, this thesis refers to the notion 
of PE used by tax and corporate lawyers, closely defined in particular by Articles 5 
and 7 of the model tax convention drawn up by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).552 This definition has been recognised by 
the CJEU in a number of rulings.553 Thus, Article 5 of the OECD model tax 
convention provides that the term “permanent establishment’ means a fixed place 
of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried 
out. Contrary, a subsidiary is a legally independent subdivision in another member 
state and constitutes a separate legal entity.554 
As shown in chapter 4, these terms are recognised by tax lawyers but not 
frequently recognised in scope of EU law. The clear example of not recognising 
these differences might be seen in Lidl Belgium.555 In this seminal ruling the CJEU 
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assimilated a situation of a single company to that of the groups of companies. The 
Court stated ‘Indeed and as is shown by the provisions of the Convention, a 
permanent establishment constitutes, under tax convention law, an autonomous 
entity.’556 This statement is contrary to the definition of PE accepted by 
international tax law. An establishment which constitutes an autonomous entity is 
thus called a subsidiary. Lack of understanding of tax law by the CJEU requires 
special attention when case law is analysed. The terms subsidiary and PE might be 
confusing as they have a different meaning. The CJEU seems not to notice these 
discrepancies. It is clear from the case law, for example, in Lidl Belgium557 and 
Krankenheim558. 
Nonetheless, to present the issue of double non-deductibility of losses 
incurred by the PE a careful selection of case law is needed. The case chosen is 
Krankenheim.559 This seminal ruling has not been noticed by numerous 
commentators. However, it may have a significant influence on the deduction of 
losses in the UK and Poland. Moreover, there is seminal case law provided by the 
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Polish courts which is based on the ruling of Krankenheim560, Lidl Belgium561 and 
Marks & Spencer.562 
In Krankenheim a German resident company established a PE in Austria. 
According to the Austria-Germany double tax convention, Germany exempted the 
profits of an Austrian PE. Austria joined the European Economic Area [EEA] on 1 
January 1994 and the EU on 1 January 1995. The PE was generating losses from 
1982-1990 and became profitable from 1991-1994. The loss reintegration took 
place in 1994 and the CJEU decided that the tax mechanism might be subject to 
scrutiny in relation to Article 31 of the EEA Agreement.563 
The German tax mechanism provides that Germany may provide relief for 
the losses of a German resident company incurred by its PE in a foreign state on the 
condition that the deducted amount is reintegrated in a later taxation period when 
the PE becomes profitable.564  
The Austrian tax law made no provision for the carrying forward of losses 
incurred by partially taxable companies, as was demonstrated in Krankenheim. The 
deduction was introduced in 1989, including in relation to losses incurred before 31 
December 1988, during the preceding seven years.565 However, such a carrying 
forward was allowed only for PE belonging to a foreign company and only if the 
undertaking concerned did not make any profit overall, for example, in regard to its 
worldwide income.566 
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Figure 14 Krankenheim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, Krankenheim received a tax notice from Germany requesting 
deduction of sums which had been reintegrated into the basis for calculation of the 
tax drawn up in Germany.567 Krankenheim argued that as a result of the carrying 
forward of losses in Austria being limited to seven years, reintegration of those 
sums was unlawful. The Bundesfinanzhof referred the question to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling.  
The CJEU firstly stated that Germany granted a tax advantage to the resident 
company with PE in Austria but subsequently withdrew the benefit of that tax 
advantage by reintegration of losses.568 The CJEU ruled: ‘Even though that 
reintegration operated only up to the amount of the profits made by that permanent 
establishment, the fact remains that, to that extent, the German legislation thus 
subjected resident companies with permanent establishments in Austria to less 
favourable treatment than that enjoyed by resident companies with permanent 
establishments situated in Germany.’569 The CJEU found that the situation of a 
company with PE abroad is less favourable than of a company with a domestic PE. 
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The difference in treatment may discourage a company from carrying on business 
through a PE situated in Austria570 and constitute a restriction on the right set out in 
the Treaty.571  
However, the CJEU stated that ‘the reintegration of losses provided for by 
the German tax system at issue in the main proceedings cannot be dissociated from 
there having earlier been taken into account. That reintegration, in the case of a 
company with a PE in another state in relation to which that company’s state of 
residence has no power of taxation, as the referring court indicates, reflects a logical 
symmetry. There was thus a direct, personal and material link between the two 
elements of the tax mechanism at issue in the main proceedings, the said 
reintegration being the logical complement of the deduction previously granted.’572 
Thus, a restriction on the freedom of establishment is permissible as guarantee the 
coherence of the German tax system.573 The Court found the restriction appropriate 
to achieve the coherence of tax system574 and stated that it is ‘entirely 
proportionate’575 to the objective pursued, since the reintegration of losses was 
made only up to the amount of the profits made. 
Finally, the Court held that that freedom of establishment cannot be 
understood as meaning that a member state is required to draw up its tax rules on 
the basis of those in another member state in order to ensure, in all circumstances, 
taxation which removes any disparities arising from national tax rules, given that 
the decisions made by a company as to the establishment of commercial structures 
abroad may be to the company’s advantage or disadvantage.576 The fact that a PE 
ended with a negative result and the losses were final is declared to be irrelevant.577 
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Jérôme Monsenego focused on the non-deductibility of the final losses 
incurred by the PE. Paragraph 53 of the analysed case states ‘the principal company 
disposed of its PE and that the profits and losses made by that establishment 
throughout its existence end with a negative result.’ Jérôme Monsenego578 observed 
that CJEU statement is ‘puzzling’ and is incompatible with Marks & Spencer.579 
He argued that the CJEU should not uphold the symmetry of the German system, 
despite the existence of a loss in Austria that would never be deducted. In his view, 
the CJEU might change its line of ruling and as a result of Krankenheim the 
deduction of final losses might not be permissible at all or a loss relief will be 
required solely for subsidiaries, but not for PE.580 
On the other hand, Tom O’Shea claimed that Krankenheim is an important 
judgment for at least two reasons.581 Firstly, the Court upheld tax cohesion 
justification or so-called Bachman coherence.582 Secondly, the CJEU recommended 
a mechanism of recapturing losses as a proportionate measure to sort out the issue 
of double non-deductibility of losses.  
Justifications for a restriction have been the subject of debate in Chapter 2. 
However, there is a need to recall the particularity of Bachmann cohesion. The 
cohesion of fiscal systems might be a reason in some circumstances to apply 
derogation.583 In Bachmann584 the Kingdom of Belgium argued that sickness and 
invalidity insurance contributions or pension and life assurance contributions might 
be tax deductible only in the member state where they are paid. This solution 
seemed, at first sight, to be contrary to the TFEU but the Court found it was justified 
by cohesion of the systems. The Court stated: ‘It follows that, as [EU] law stands at 
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present, it is not possible to ensure the cohesion of such a tax system by means of 
measures which are less restrictive than those at issue in the main proceedings and 
that the consequences of any other measure ensuring the recovery by the State 
concerned of the tax due under its legislation on sums payable by insurers pursuant 
to the contracts concluded with them would ultimately be similar to those resulting 
from the non-deductibility of contributions.’585 It is justified through direct 
correlation between deductibility of the contributions from income taxable and the 
taxation of payments made by insurers. Some member states have bilateral 
conventions enabling tax deduction but at this stage of the EU law there are no 
universal rules governing social insurance contributions.  
The CJEU did not apply the same solution in later cases such as 
Skandia/Ramstedt,586 Safir,587 Wielockx588 and Danner.589 The main differences 
between the above is that in the later cases the defendant member states argued that 
the advantages for foreigners will appear when the benefits are paid. The CJEU 
agreed that an advantage delayed in time usually puts the foreign insurance 
institution in a less favourable situation. In Bachmann the tax was taken 
immediately by an insurance company or in the case of a foreign institution by the 
Belgian tax authority. This was not the case in Skandia, Safir, Wielockx and Danner. 
In Danner, the Finnish and Danish governments also claimed that the non-
deductibility of contributions paid to schemes operated by foreign insurance 
institutions is justified by the need to ensure the effectiveness of fiscal controls and 
to prevent tax evasion.590 The CJEU did not uphold the argument. The Court found 
that information could be obtained from authorities from other member states and 
the aim could be attained by less restrictive measures. 
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Figure 15 Danner v Bachmann 
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Firstly, it is argued that in Krankenheim, the CJEU made a mistake stating 
that the location of the branch was irrelevant for the tax treatment of its results in 
the hands of the resident company.591 Losses of both foreign and domestic branches 
could be deducted from the company’s profits in Germany and the profits 
subsequently made by both foreign and domestic branches were taxed in Germany. 
Thus, the situation is similar to the one seen in Bachmann, where residents and non-
residents are treated alike. Moreover, Ben Terra Wattel wisely concluded that this 
case certainly should have ended at the first step of the rule of reason.592 
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Secondly, the CJEU indirectly approved a mechanism of deduction and 
recapture. The Court took into consideration rules already existing and ruled that 
they are necessary to ensure the coherence of the tax system. However, it is not 
within the competence of the Court to establish a tax mechanism and it is regrettable 
that member states do not achieve a common solution in this scope. The Court ruled 
that this system stays in accordance with the EU law. It is necessary to highlight 
that German tax recapture was done up to the amount of profits generated. The tax 
notice was limited to losses already deducted.  
It is necessary to stress and repeat that PE is a division of a company and 
does not constitute a separate entity. As a part of an existing enterprise, profits and 
losses of a company and PE are taken into account jointly. A PE in another member 
state might benefit from a possibility to offset losses in a member state of a 
company. However, it might need to suffer from taxation, both from the member 
state of the primary establishment and the member state of the PE. As already stated, 
profits and losses are often treated as two sides of the same coin.  
A company choosing to have a secondary establishment has to make a 
decision. Possibilities to offset losses of a subsidiary are very limited. Nonetheless, 
a genuine business does not need to suffer double taxation. On the other hand, if a 
company opts for a PE it might offset losses in a member state of a primary 
establishment. However, if a company generates profits, it might face double 
taxation. 
 
5.2.1 Poland 
 
Despite the fact that Polish law is regulated only by written regulations, 
national courts have attempted to modify them in accordance with EU law. The 
latest case law shows that there are possibilities to deduct some losses incurred by 
foreign PE.  
On 28 November 2011, the Polish Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny 
Sad Administracyjny) ruled on a case regarding the deduction of losses incurred by 
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foreign PE.593 A Polish construction contractor had been involved in works in 
Hungary. The works has been undertaken for more than 12 months and were 
accordingly subject to the double taxation Treaty between Poland and Hungary as 
the company was deemed to have a PE in Hungary. The company paid tax for the 
activity undertaken in Hungary both in Poland and Hungary during the 2006 tax 
year. The PE suffered losses in 2007. Part of these losses had been offset in 2008. 
Subsequently, the PE was liquidated in 2008 and part of the losses could not be 
deducted in Hungary. The company sought to deduct unused losses in Poland.  
The Supreme Court found the claim justified on the basis of EU law 
especially article 49 TFEU (ex. 43 TEC) and CJEU case law, particularly cases: 
Marks & Spencer, Lidl Belgium, Deutsche Shell, Cadbury Schweppes and Test 
Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation. 
The ruling seems to be in accordance with EU law. However, the Court did 
not consider how the loss would be calculated (import or export neutrality).594 The 
decision is in favour of the taxpayer; however, it lacks a practical solution for tax 
authorities on how to estimate a tax base. It might lead to further legal proceedings 
and delay the advantage in time. 
The same reasoning has been also presented in other cases, e.g. 21 May 2010 
Polish Regional Administrative Court (Wojewodzki Sad Administracyjny).595 
However, there is an urgent need to modify Polish law and international tax treaties 
to meet EU standards. A judgment of a Polish Court cannot constitute a source of 
law. Thus, a legal act shall be proclaimed in the Polish legal system. Without legal 
written provisions, businesses having a PE abroad are not guarantee that the offset 
would be possible at all. 
Secondly, Polish Tax Authorities do not accept the loss incurred as result of 
currency fluctuation. The problem was subject of Deutsche Shell.596 The CJEU 
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determined that refusal to offset a final loss which cannot be deducted elsewhere is 
contrary to the TFEU.  
In Deutsche Shell597 the CJEU decided that a difference in depreciation of a 
currency might be treated as a cost of a company. A German company had a branch 
in Italy. The depreciation of Italian currency was observed when the Italian branch 
was liquidated. The German Tax Authority denied accepting it as a loss. They 
argued that taking account of the loss leads to a ‘non-coherent’ tax system since any 
equivalent FOREX gain (gain in appreciation of a currency) would not be taxed. 
The CJEU found that there was no direct relationship between the FOREX loss and 
any FOREX gain. As a result of FOREX gain, a company does not benefit either in 
a home member state or in a member state where a branch is located.598 Moreover, 
the German government claimed that loss might be taken into account effectively 
twice because it was deducted as operating expenditure but that the operating profit 
of PE is not taxed. This argument was also rejected, as Germany was unable to tax 
a PE’s profit because it waived its taxing power under the German-Italian Treaty.599 
The CJEU observed also that FOREX loss could only arise in Germany and be 
relieved there. 
 
Despite the CJEU decision, this kind of loss is not accepted in Poland. The 
General Administrative Court [Naczelny Sad Administracyjny] decision600 stated 
that this category of expense could not be treated as a loss, because they also do not 
constitute profit in tax terms.601 It might be argued that in these situations residents 
and non-residents are treated equally. However, a national company does not face 
a risk of the changing value of a currency. Only businesses trading simultaneously 
in more than one member state must calculate dividends in more than one currency. 
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In the case concerned, the Polish Limited Liability Company had a branch in the 
Czech Republic. A branch was operating well and generated most of the profits for 
the company. When dividends were paid, there was a need to transfer funds into a 
Polish bank account. Thus, the funds were paid out in the form of dividends. In 
1999 and 2000 the company suffered losses as a result of depreciation of the 
currency. The company requested the Tax Authority offset the loss. They were 
denied on the grounds that the losses were incurred by the Czech branch and have 
no relation to a tax obligation in Poland.602  
This conclusion should be criticised. The loss suffered as a result of 
depreciation could not be offset in the State of source (Czech Republic). The 
depreciation was not ‘visible’ in Czech currency but only in the Polish one. 
Moreover, both the company and its branch were co-operating closely and the loss 
was generated as result of internal transactions between the company and its branch. 
Accordingly, it is concluded that there is no possibility to offset the loss incurred as 
result of currency fluctuation in Poland. It is a restriction to the freedom of 
establishment and it is contrary to the TFEU. This problem should be addressed at 
EU level. 
All in all, the possibilities to offset losses incurred by a PE are very limited 
in Poland. The latest decision from 2011603 is in favour of the taxpayer. However, 
it lacks the same practical solutions as CJEU judgments. Both Courts have granted 
rights to taxpayers but do not provide the calculation methods. There is no common 
tax base in the EU and member states’ regulations vary in how they structure tax 
allowances, calculate a tax base, establish allowed costs etc.604 
To emphasise, the issue of the deductibility of losses incurred by PE and 
losses which are the result of currency fluctuation, are regulated in Poland 
discordant with the EU law. In respect to losses incurred by PE as result of its 
activity, it is possible to deduct them in Poland. However, losses resulting from 
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currency fluctuation which are characteristic for cross-border businesses only, are 
not permissible.  
Nonetheless, it might be argued that Poland encourages businesses to extend 
abroad as PE. The possibilities to deduct losses incurred abroad extend the 
‘minimum level’ proposed by the EU law and CJEU.  
 
5.2.2 United Kingdom 
 
The right to deduct losses has been firstly provided in the Finance Act of 
2006; however, strict conditions apply. The surrendering company must be a 
subsidiary of a claimant company which is resident in the UK or a surrendering 
company and a claimant company must be 75 per cent subsidiaries of a third party 
which reside in the UK. Moreover, the surrendering company must be subject to a 
charge under the tax law of any member state, for example, by being a resident or 
trading there through a PE and in some circumstances meeting further conditions.605 
A foreign loss needed to be of a kind relievable in the UK (equivalence condition). 
The loss had to be attributable to activities which were taxed in the territory of a 
member state and were not exempt from a tax basis of double taxation convention606 
(the tax loss condition). Moreover, a tax deduction could be available in a resident 
member state or any territory outside the EU in any period, future or previous607 
(qualifying loss condition). Lastly, a deduction was not available in the territory of 
residence of any intermediate company between the surrendering company and the 
UK resident company. The intermediary company must be at least a 75 per cent 
subsidiary of the UK resident company608 (precedence condition). The losses or 
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gains that resulted from currency fluctuation were treated as loan and derivative 
contracts,609 so the general rules apply as well. 
Moreover, section 107 of the Company Tax Act (CTA) 2010610 prohibited 
using the losses of a UK branch of a non-UK-resident company. It applies when the 
surrendering company is a non-UK resident company carrying on a trade in the 
United Kingdom through a PE.  
The problem had already emerged in Philips Electronics UK Ltd v HMRC 
(Philips Electronics).611 In this case, the UK tax provisions on tax group relief were 
questioned. Under section 403D(1)(c) ICTA foreign companies may surrender the 
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losses of a UK-resident PE only if they cannot be used for the purposes of any 
foreign tax.612 
In Phillips Electronics this included also a British company which claimed 
to surrender losses of its intermediate PE. 
The company was firstly granted a deduction but the United Kingdom tax 
authorities then brought an appeal before the Upper Tribunal.613 The main reason 
for the UK Tax Authority denying the offset was that part of the losses had already 
been deducted from non-UK profits under a Dutch fiscal consolidation scheme.614 
Notwithstanding, the Upper Tribunal615 along with the Tax and Chancery Chamber 
referred the question to the CJEU. 
 
 
 
                                                          
612
 If all companies concerned had been resident in the UK then the UK branch of The Netherlands’ 
subsidiary would have been able to surrender about half of its losses to the taxpayer. ‘The claims 
failed because of two provisions of UK tax law. The first was section 406(2) of ICTA. This has the 
effect of limiting a claim to circumstances where “link’ companies, as defined, could have made 
consortium relief claims if they had taxable profits. The link companies in this case are KPE and its 
German subsidiary. They could not have made consortium relief claims. They were not UK resident 
nor did they carry on business in the UK. The second provision was section 403D(1)(c) of ICTA 
(section 403D(1)(c)). This prevents the use of losses of a UK branch of a non-resident company, 
such as LG.PD (UK branch of Netherlands subsidiary), if any part of the losses corresponds to 
amounts deductible for foreign tax.’ Lyons, Timothy. ‘Philips Electronics UK Ltd v HMRC: more 
unjustifiable restrictions on loss relief.’ [2010] British Tax Review. 
613
 Philips Electronics UK Ltd v HMRC [2009] UKFTT 226 (TC); [2009] ECR I-532, par. 9.  
614
 Englisch, Joachim. ‘HMRC v Philips Electronics UK Ltd: another contribution to EU law 
jurisprudence on loss relief.’ [2012] British Tax Review, p. 586; Schuch, Josef, Staringer, Claus, 
Lang, Michael. ‘ECJ - recent developments in Direct Taxation 2009.’ [2010] Vienna, Linde, p. 257; 
Brokelind, Cécile. ‘Pending Court of Justice of the European Union Cases.’ [2012] European 
Taxation, p. 382. 
615
 Philips Electronics UK Ltd v HMRC [2009] ECR I-532. 
158 
 
Figure 16 HRMC v. Philips Electronics UK, Ltd. 
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Firstly, there is a need to recall the differences between a subsidiary and a 
permanent establishment. A subsidiary possesses its own legal entity when a PE is 
a part of a parent company. A PE does not possess its own separate legal entity and 
is closer bound to the main business. Thus, the PE is an entity related closer to the 
parent company than to the subsidiary. It is argued in published papers616 that a PE 
should be granted more possibilities to deduct losses than a subsidiary. 
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The Court stated that imposing certain conditions on companies claiming to 
deduct losses by non-resident PE and not imposing these conditions if a situation is 
purely domestic is an unequal treatment. It results in non-resident PE being a less 
attractive form of exercising the freedom of establishment.617 The CJEU wisely 
concluded that such a difference in treatment, in order to be compatible with the 
freedom of establishment, must relate to a situation that is not objectively 
comparable. Nonetheless, the Court did not consider any difference in the situation 
of a non-resident company with only a PE in the United Kingdom and the situation 
presented in Philips Electronics.618 
Next, the Court proceeded to examine if such a difference in treatment is 
justified by overriding public interest.619 The CJEU concluded that objective of 
preventing the risk of double use of losses cannot allow the member state in which 
the permanent establishment is situated to exclude the use of losses on the ground 
that those losses may also be used in the member state in which the non-resident 
company has its seat.620 Moreover, the Court stated that a restriction cannot be 
justified solely on a basis of the preservation of the allocation of taxing powers 
between member states, by the prevention of double use of losses, or by a 
combination of both objectives.621 
Cécile Brokelind observed that ‘it is not clear from the facts of the case 
whether the remaining losses incurred by the Dutch branch could have been set off 
within the Dutch consolidation in The Netherlands but since the Dutch Joint 
Venture was wound down and terminated, there was basically no risk of double use 
of losses.’622 The commentators regretted that the CJEU did not follow the deep 
analysis of Advocate General Kokott.623 The Advocate General proposed to assess 
comparability in a source country situation involving PE taxation. Moreover, it is 
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stressed that granting the option to deduct could impose further problems. The PE 
is a part of any one singular business and it would be difficult to assess which costs 
stemmed from the activity of a main business and which of a branch. In Centro 
Equestre the CJEU ruled that only costs directly connected to the PE such as travel 
and accommodation could be deducted.  
Taxation of a foreign business income of a PE conforms to international law. 
It is also provided in the double taxation convention entreated between the United 
Kingdom and The Netherlands, Article 7 ‘(…) If the enterprise carries on business 
as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so 
much of them as is attributable to that permanent establishment.’ However, the UK 
does not provide possibilities to deduct losses from abroad. Nevertheless, in Centro 
Equestre, it was determined that preventing all possibilities to deduct is not in 
conformity with EU law, especially Article 43 TEC (presently 4 TFEU).’ Joachim 
Englisch concluded that source country entitlement to profits also entails source 
country responsibility for loss relief.624 
All of these difficulties resulted in reform of the Finance Act.625 The new 
provisions are called foreign branch exemption.626 The new regime has its 
justification in the reasoning applied in Philips Electronics. A company may have 
a right to surrender losses of its foreign PE if the UK has a right to charge a 
corporate tax.  
The new regime applies to the period after 19th July 2011. The foreign 
branch exemption allows a UK resident company627 to select between maintaining 
the old tax with a credit system or using the exemption regime. It must be stressed 
that the old tax regime may not cover all of the UK tax due. The new tax regime 
does not make the UK corporate tax system strictly territorial628 but it does enable 
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the total taxable profits of a UK tax resident company to be adjusted, so profits 
located abroad might be exempted from the UK corporate tax. 
The exemption stays in accordance with the international taxation rule of 
‘two sides of a coin.’ If a company has decided to be exempt from taxation in the 
UK, it cannot claim losses deduction. However, if it opted for taxation, the offset 
of the losses applies. The election is irrevocable and done on a company base. If a 
head office company elects to be exempt, the decision applies to all branches 
(permanent establishments). The election might be beneficial for a company, if at 
least one branch generates profits.629 
The new regulation deserves close analysis, as it shows the interests of 
member states. A state might grant offset of losses, if it obtains, at least 
hypothetically a chance to get revenues (taxes) from the concerned entity. States 
are reluctant to grant a deduction of losses to a business which is out of its 
jurisdiction. If a UK company opts not to be covered by worldwide UK taxation, it 
is treated as subsidiary and the CFC rules apply. Thus, the situation of a PE using 
the branch exemption is identical to a subsidiary. As a result, it is not the legal form 
that is chosen but a structure of the tax regime is the deciding factor. In author’s 
opinion this solution is noteworthy and provides a clear and simple criterion to 
differ between entities operating cross-border. Moreover, an election of a company 
may reduce differences between meaning of PE and subsidiary between member 
states. Thus, it is highly recommended that a new reform introduces a possibility 
for an undertaking to choose whether it wishes to be treated and taxed like PE or 
subsidiary. 
 
5.3 Concluding Observations 
 
It is obvious that not allowing offsetting losses incurred in other member 
states might act as discouragement to establishing abroad. Nonetheless, member 
states face hardship when searching for precision criteria for the offset of losses.  
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There is no coherent system of accounting and it also makes it harder to 
assess the amount of losses allowed. The common system of accounting and 
financial reporting has been discussed not only by members of the EU but become 
subject of worldwide discussion. There are two most significant accounting 
standards: one is International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the second 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Both of these accounting 
standards are not legally binding. The standards are an attempt of creating a 
common language for international businesses. Both of them are have their 
followers and adversaries.630 They are not part of a legal order; they are more codes 
of good practices. For example, in Poland the national provisions of accounting and 
taxation are not based by IFRS. However, many accountants based their annual 
accounts on IFRS. They are not used to calculate a tax base but only to provide 
accurate information about the business to its owners and customers. Nonetheless, 
it leads to the situation then the factual situation of a business is different than this 
accepted by tax office. However, IFRS and GAAP, even in this modest form, are 
raising a high debate across on the worldwide arena. It is not the aim of this research 
to establish whether solutions provided in IFRS and GAAP are worthy to be 
followed but only mention that the agreed system of accounting is an issue difficult 
to be achieved. 
The CJEU has given very vague hints about when to accept the offset of 
subsidiary losses. This is particularly noted in the seminal case Marks & Spencer631 
followed by the European Commission v. United Kingdom.632 The offset of losses 
incurred by a subsidiary are not widely accepted by member states. Lack of 
acceptance has its source in international tax law which seems to be reluctant to 
provide for the deduction of losses for a separate entity. Moreover, a member state 
of a parent company has very limited possibilities to obtain revenues/taxes from a 
subsidiary – this might be a case only if a business is not genuine. A loss is treated 
as a negative income and the ‘other side of the coin’. If a positive income lies 
outside of the taxation power of the member state, negative income shall not be 
surrendered. 
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It is not possible to surrender losses by a Polish company incurred by a 
foreign PE. The legal system remains mute and there is no relevant case law on this 
matter. On the other hand, the UK tax system provides a possibility to offset losses 
under severe conditions. This results in it not being likely that a loss might be 
surrendered. Nonetheless, these regulations have come under the scrutiny of the 
CJEU633 and were declared to be in conformity with EU law. In regard to the tax 
group in the scope of the application of the EMTD, non-national businesses benefit 
from wide ranges of tax benefits. These advantages are not available for national 
entities. Subsequently, the tax groups are obligatory in the national realm, whereas 
they are restrained within the parameters of cross-border activity.  
The situation seems to look opposite if a PE is concerned. The deduction of 
losses is generally accepted but the home member state retains taxation power and 
may recapture the losses in future if a company becomes profitable. Poland has 
incorporated this idea by the line of ruling but no written provisions guarantee this 
right. On the other hand, the British tax system proposes a choice to taxpayers. It is 
not only the name of a legal form that can be decided but taxpayers might elect to 
be taxed in the UK and surrender losses or be exempt from the UK tax system and 
give up a right to offset losses. 
Nonetheless, there is a significant need to make the tax systems of EU 
member states uniform. As shown above, using the examples of Poland and the UK, 
the national legal systems vary and their reform is urgently needed. The next part 
outlines the previous efforts of member states to achieve some level of uniformity 
and illustrates reform proposals. It has been established that the freedom of 
establishment is hindered by the double taxation and double non-deductibility. 
There is currently an intense debate in the EU on the reform of the taxation system. 
The recent proposals are presented below with their accompanying critical review. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSALS FOR 
TAX REFORM 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The significant role of taxation and customs duties has been reaffirmed by the 
Commission in the Lisbon Strategy Communication.634 The removal of double 
taxation and high compliance costs would improve market access. Currently, there 
are 28 different corporate tax systems and both double taxation and double non-
deductibility hinder the freedom of establishment, as indicated in the preceding 
chapters. 
This chapter first examines the Commission's proposals for two directives 
which were not adopted due to opposition from several member states (subsection 
6.2). The proposals were: a directive on a common corporate tax base (the CCCTB 
proposal) and another directive on arrangements for taking into account by 
enterprises of the losses of their permanent establishments and subsidiaries situated 
in other member states (the Losses directive proposal). Then the chapter will focus 
on the future and it will propose solutions that may enable the member states to 
accept a directive setting out a single (common) set of rules to calculate companies' 
taxable profits in the EU (subsection 6.3). 
This is particularly important as currently the European Commission635 is 
working on a new proposal to facilitate access of companies to the single market 
through introducing a common tax base. The tax reform proposal has already been 
drafted but has not yet been adopted as any legislative measure. It is currently again 
in the early initiative phase and the text of the draft proposal has not yet been 
proposed officially. 
 
As already stressed, there are significant differences between a subsidiary and 
a permanent establishment (PE) which constitutes a part of a business, while a 
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subsidiary is a distinct, legal entity separate from the existing enterprise. It is argued 
that PE is closely linked to parent and shall be entitled to offset both final and non-
final losses. The chapter analyse an option of the automatically recaptured. 
The situation is the opposite when it concerns a subsidiary. As concluded by 
the CJEU and discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the CFC (Controlled Foreign 
Companies) rules may be applied only to wholly artificial arrangements aimed 
solely at escaping the national tax normally due and where the regime does not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve that purpose. Genuine businesses shall not be 
exposed to the risk of double taxation within the single market. However, if a 
subsidiary has no right to offset non-final losses and based on Marks & Spencer636 
and European Commission v. United Kingdom637 it is difficult to imagine when 
final losses might be offset. Lack of a possibility to deduct losses stays in 
accordance with the ‘two sides of the same coin’ rule. The rule provides that if a 
positive income of subsidiary cannot per se become taxable at the level of the parent 
company, the negative income is also not deductible. Some member states, 
including France, had already implemented the temporary deduction and automatic 
recapture for small and medium foreign subsidiaries. As such, we will examine 
whether the special beneficial regime for SMEs may be beneficial for the EU. 
 
6.2 Past Proposals 
 
This part highlights the valuable elements of the previous draft proposals. 
Nonetheless, it is submitted that the aims of the CCCTB proposal discussed in this 
chapter are not likely to be achieved by the previous draft version of the proposed 
directive. Moreover, the costs of introducing the new tax regime compared with the 
potential savings of beneficent companies are marginal. Nonetheless, only nine 
member states rejected the previous proposal of the CCCTB directive. It shows that 
member states are eager to reform the common tax system, unless it does not 
jeopardise their national tax systems. As a result, it is argued that the mechanism of 
recapture presented in the proposal for a Council directive concerning arrangements 
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for the taking into account by enterprises of the losses of their permanent 
establishments and subsidiaries situated in other member states should be 
reconsidered. It is noted that member states are more amenable today to accepting 
tax reform and the discussion is highly desirable. 
 
6.2.1 Past Proposals: the draft proposal for a Council directive on a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
 
The Commission announced in 2004 that ‘companies would only be able to 
take full advantage of the Internal Market if they have the possibility to use a 
common consolidated corporate tax base.’638 The Commission had planned to 
submit a proposal in 2008. However, during the annual International Fiscal 
Association (IFA), the general meeting decided that the introduction of common 
consolidated corporate tax base would be delayed.639 This might have resulted from 
the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by the Irish people in June 2008. Secondly, 
reports of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group and 
public consultations showed that the proposal needs further work before it is 
submitted to the Council.640 Thirdly, the business lobby seemed not to support the 
proposal.641 
The proposal was published on 16 March 2011 under the name of Council 
Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB proposal).642 
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The Commission relaunched a ‘one-stop-shop’ system for filling tax returns643 and 
the consolidation.644 Consolidation means adding up all the profits and losses of a 
company from different member states to provide a net profit or loss for the whole 
activity in the EU.  
It is important to remember that there is no legal base in the TFEU for 
legislative initiatives concerning direct taxation. The basis for this legislative 
initiative was therefore based on Articles 115645 and 352 of the TFEU.646 Under 
these provisions, unanimity is required for the EU to adopt the CCCTB proposal. 
However, the CCCTB proposal has not assumed that some member state might 
wish to opt-out from its scope. 
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The Commission favoured that the CCCTB regime would be optional for 
companies and open only to those operating cross-border. In the view of the 
Commission the measure should not apply to purely domestic situations. This 
ensured that the principle of subsidiary is observed. The Commission highlighted 
that the CCCTB proposal was aimed to remove obstacles to the Internal Market and 
to lowered the costs of cross-border operations. The Commission argued that it 
could only be successfully implemented at EU-level. The main elements of the 
proposal were inter alia cross-border loss relief and allocation of the tax base 
through a common formula.647 
In the initial phase, the Commission invited member states to comment on the 
common CFC regime648 then published these in 2007. The member states proposed 
that CFC should cover passive incomes and not interfere with genuine economic 
activity.649 Nonetheless, the member states were not eager to implement common 
CFC rules within the whole European Union.650 Nonetheless, the final draft of the 
CCCTB proposal included both CFC rules651 and a switchover clause.652 These also 
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caused additional resistance from member states.653 All in all, the main advantage 
of the CCCTB proposal was declared as the reduction in compliance costs. The 
Commission argued that the CCCTB regime would make cross-border operations 
cheaper and simpler for a business. Namely, the Commission argued that current 
compliance costs could be reduced by 7% (€0.7 billion savings), the costs of 
expanding to another member state by creating a subsidiary would be reduced for 
large enterprise from €140,000 to €87,000 (62%) and for medium enterprise from 
€127,000 to €42,000 (67%). Moreover, the Commission claimed that there would 
be additional savings of €1.3 billion for companies across the EU resulting from tax 
purpose such as consolidation. All in all, the CCCTB proposal was aimed to provide 
in total savings for businesses of €0.7 billion in reduced compliance, €1 billion in 
reduced costs to expand cross-border and €1.3 billion through consolidation.654 
However, commentators argued that these savings are ‘unlikely to 
materialise.’655 Moreover, this opinion was shared by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which stated that compliance 
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costs of consolidation are ‘intolerable.’656 This result, inter alia, from the fact that 
member states need to maintain two different tax systems within one member state, 
as will be discussed below. 
However, the main argument against the previous version of the CCCTB 
proposal, supported by 9 member states,657 was the non-compliance with the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.658 These principles are not the main 
subject of this thesis but as member states indicated them as a reason for rejection 
of the CCCTB proposal there is a need to consider them briefly.  
Article 5 of the TEU defines that: 
‘1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of 
conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. 
2. Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits 
of the competences conferred upon it by the member states in the Treaties to attain 
the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the 
Treaties remain with the member states. 
3. Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of 
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states, either at 
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central level or at regional and local level but can rather, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.’ 659 
The principle of subsidiarity entails two tests. Firstly, it checks if the 
objectives cannot be achieved by the member states (‘national insufficiency’). 
Secondly, it determines whether the EU can achieve better the objective 
(‘comparative efficiency’).660  
Brady Gordon observed that subsidiarity is irrelevant in the case of CCCTB 
proposal, as it refers to purely international elements such as eliminating obstacles 
caused by different tax systems.661 Thus, he aptly pointed out that the focus should 
be put on the principle of proportionality which has been comprehensively 
discussed in Chapter 2.662  
It is clear from the Impact Assessment that the CCCTB proposal did not meet 
the proportionality criteria.663 The CCCTB Impact Assessment664 itself stated that 
moving from separate accounting does not result in any significant economic 
improvement. Brady Gordon argued that overall welfare, GDP, investment and 
revenue effects showed in above Impact Assessment665 is far too optimistic 
forecast, in his opinion the CCCTB proposal could give a 0.02 per cent net welfare 
gain from tax compliance, the proposal harmed investment (-.74 per cent), GDP (-
.15 per cent), tax revenue (-4.5 per cent of the steady state base) and employment 
                                                          
659
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union Official Journal of the European Union 
C-115/13  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:en:PDF.  
660
 Gordon, Brady. ‘Tax competition and harmonisation under EU law: economic realities and legal 
rules.’ [2014] European Law Review, p. 809; Schütze, Robert. European Constitutional Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p. 178. 
661
 Gordon, Brady. ‘Tax competition and harmonisation under EU law: economic realities and legal 
rules.’ [2014] European Law Review, p. 809. 
662
 It must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; must be justified by imperative requirements 
in the general interest; must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they 
pursue; and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the objective which they pursue. 
663
 ‘Impact Assessment to the Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base.’ COM (2011) 121, pp. 136-139. 
664
 Ibid, p. 27. 
665
 Ibid, p. 27. 
172 
 
(in 16 of 27 countries). 666 Thus, such a small savings have no substantive meaning 
and the need of implementation of CCCTB proposal might be questioned. 
Additionally, the member states objected to the optional choice of CCCTB 
regime and the consolidation. The CCCTB was open to eligible companies which 
could opt to apply a common tax base.667 Annex I listed the types of eligible 
companies which must be subject to corporate tax in a member state. If a company 
was non-resident in a member state, it might opt for a common tax base if it has a 
PE in another member state.668  
It is stressed that the draft CCCTB regime was open to a subsidiary or a PE 
under restrictive conditions. The parent company held the right to exercise more 
than 75% of the company’s capital or more than 75% of the rights giving 
entitlement to profit.669 The threshold should be maintained throughout the tax 
year.670 
It is important to note that the Commission did not presuppose that there 
might be CCCTB member states and non-CCCTB member states but the CCCTB 
is an election within one member state. The UK implementation study of CCCTB 
proposal correctly observes that CCCTB would lead to the existence of two 
different tax bases within one member state. It might be important to note, however, 
that during the initial stage of drafting the CCCTB, the Commission compared four 
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options: optional CCTB (no consolidation), a compulsory CCTB, an optional 
CCCTB and a compulsory CCCTB.671 The Commission found that the welfare 
effect of optional CCCTB was the most favourable.672  
It might be surprising, but member states did not agree with the Commission 
that an optional CCCTB regime would encourage member states to implement the 
proposed directive. Member states who objected to the proposal pointed out that the 
elective nature of CCCTB is an essential argument to reject reform proposal.673 As 
has been already stated, member states wished to avoid maintaining two different 
tax regimes within one state. Moreover, the two regimes might compete with each 
other and might lead to tax planning or tax avoidance.  
The UK’s report on CCCTB proposal argued that the co-existence of two 
systems was very likely to result in increased compliance costs for multinationals 
having CCCTB and non-CCCTB group companies. It follows the argumentation 
that it would result in additional costs to governments collecting the consolidated 
tax base. The lower compliance costs resulting from the common tax base might 
not outweigh the compliance costs of running two systems, both from the 
perspective of CCCTB groups and of tax authorities.674 Moreover, it was argued 
that an election might lead to a situation when a company chose to apply more 
lenient anti-abuse rules. Moreover, it was noted in the Commission’s 12th CCCTB 
meeting that an elective CCCTB system might result in an unfair situation, in 
particular for SMEs. The CCCTB Working Group summarise that only large 
companies would in practice have the resources to analyse the potential benefits 
that might arise from CCCTB regime.675 
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Secondly, the apportionment formula enabling the consolidation was 
contested by member states rejecting the proposal directive. It is argued that 
CCCTB proposal might not be useful tool to combat tax planning. Many 
commentators distressed that is likely that international tax planning under CCCTB 
regime will only shift from transfer pricing to a tax-optimal geographic allocation 
and manipulation of formula factors.676 
The factors chosen in CCCTB proposal were labour, assets and sales. The 
arguments against formula apportionment were widely discussed. As far as assets 
were concerned, the European Business Initiative on Tax commented that the 
exclusion of intangible property from assets677 factors would have a serious 
implication. The analysis had not been conducted before presenting the draft of 
CCCTB proposal but it might discourage member states involved in ‘innovation’.678 
Secondly, the sales factor might also be susceptible to avoidance. It was 
argued that a company might create a tax scheme where a product goes to the low 
tax country before reached a final customer.679 
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Further criticism was the use of a sector-specific formula. The Ernst & 
Young680 impact assessment study indicated that there have been too many sectors 
and formulas introduced as some businesses might be categorised in more than one 
sector. 
The concerned version of the Commission’s CCCTB proposal was in the 
form of a directive based on Article 115 TFEU, as it requires unanimity was not 
likely.681 Some authors682 have suggested that the enhanced co-operation procedure 
was more likely to succeed.683 This procedure will be closely examined below, 
when the reformed proposal is presented.684 However, it is submitted in the thesis 
that the tax reform provisions are likely to come into force by enhanced co-
operation only and there are objectives to adapt the provision within a reasonable 
period by the Union. Nonetheless, the Commission is currently working on a new 
text to relaunched a CCTB directive proposal and the new Commission’s initiative 
is presented below in section 6.3.  
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6.2.2 Past Proposals: Proposal for a Council directive 
concerning arrangements for the taking into account by 
enterprises of the Losses of their PE and Subsidiaries situated 
in other member states (‘Losses directive proposal’) 
 
The Losses directive proposal based its reasoning on the conclusion that ‘one 
of the obstacles which might seriously hamper the activities of enterprises in a 
common market having the same characteristics as an internal market is their 
inability to deduct from their profits the losses incurred by permanent 
establishments and subsidiaries situated in member states other than the one in 
which the enterprise in question is resident for tax purpose.’685 The aim of the 
Losses directive proposal was to facilitate cross-border loss relief.686 
The Losses directive proposal firstly noted that a PE and a subsidiary differ 
and did not require equal tax treatment.687 In the case of a PE, the losses directive 
proposal introduced a method of deducting losses and reincorporating subsequent 
profits.688 Nonetheless, member states were permitted to reincorporate 
automatically amounts previously deducted if reincorporation had still not occurred 
after five years or if the PE ceased to exist.689 
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In respect of the subsidiaries, the Losses directive proposal allowed the 
enterprise heading the group to deduct the losses incurred in a given tax period by 
its subsidiaries situated in other member states from its taxable profits for the same 
tax period, with any subsequent profits by these subsidiaries being reincorporated 
into the enterprise’s taxable results to the extent of the loss previously deducted. 
Under the same condition as a PE, an automatic reincorporation was to take place 
after a maximum of five years.690 
It is worth noting that these provisions, contrary to the CCCTB proposal, 
concerned not only corporate tax but also personal income tax. The Losses directive 
proposal was never adopted. It is argued that the main disadvantage was the 
provisions on subsidiaries. It was not clear from the proposed directive who in a 
group might have been entitled to offset: whether it was only the direct parent 
company, the ultimate parent company or any other member of the group. This 
situation could have led to a multiple use for the same loss. 
The Losses directive proposal was submitted to the Council at the end of 1990 
but was not adopted. The repeated recommendation of the Ruding Committe and 
the Commission request to amend the proposal basing on guidelines on company 
taxation.691 It was planned that the proposal would be adopted in late 1992. 
However even late 1990 it was not expected to be adopted in the near future.692 
It is noted that the main fear behind past directive proposals were the loss of 
revenue by member states and so called ‘race to the bottom.’693 It is particularly 
interesting to observe that corporate statutory rates have already decreased. Eurostat 
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presents clear evidence that between 1995 and 2013 the average top statutory CIT 
rates decreased significantly and simultaneously tax revenues increased. 
Figure 17 Average Top Statutory Rates and Tax Revenue in EU 27 and 
EU 17 
 
Average Top Statutory Rates 
 
 
Figure 24 Tax Revenue in EU-27 and EU-17, in € (billions) 
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Commentators argued that the ‘race to the bottom’ has not occurred in the EU 
because member states have remained free to expand their tax base.694 It is difficult 
to predict what might happen if a common tax base is introduced in the EU, 
regardless of the social security systems, the size of the state or other economic 
attributes. On the other hand, it is clear from the above statistics that ‘the effects of 
tax competition are demonstrably concomitant with the objective of EU tax policy: 
It has reduced top nominal rates by an astounding 34.28 per cent and broadened the 
tax base, without affecting revenues from corporate factors.’695 
In the next section of this chapter, when setting out proposals that may be 
more acceptable to the EU member states, the recapture mechanism presented in 
Losses directive proposal will be reconsidered and promoted as a useful tool from 
EU perspective. 
 
6.3 The Future: proposals for EU tax reform 
 
In this section, some reforms will be presented as suitable solutions to the 
problems identified in the earlier chapters. The non-deductibility of losses was 
recognised as a hindrance to the internal market both in the rejected CCCTB 
directive and in the Losses directive proposals. However, these two proposals were 
not adopted so the need remains to find solutions which may have a chance of being 
acceptable to the EU member states. 
The new tax reform proposal which is planned to be announced in late 2016696 
and offers an answer to two core issues. 
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This thesis submits that replacing CCCTB with CCTB (common corporate 
tax base, without a consolidation element) would be more feasible for member 
states. the Federal Government of Germany rejected the CCCTB proposal but are 
likely to welcome a CCTB only proposal, long before the formal CCTB proposal.697 
It can be observed from the former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy and the 
German Federal Chancellor, Angela Merkel, stated that both member states wished 
to introduce a common set of rules for tax base.698  
All in all, the new CCTB will offer only a common tax return: common rules 
in the calculation of the tax base. The CCTB regime will be obligatory for non-
domestic businesses. However, member states will be required to maintain two 
different tax regimes within one member state.  
Thus, it is unavoidable to examine what are advantages offered by the 
proposed CCTB regime. 
Firstly, CCTB claimed to be ‘about removing obstacles to the internal market, 
so that it is cheaper and easier for businesses to operate cross-border’699 The 
obstacles to the internal market have been identified as double taxation and double 
non-deductibility of losses. A common tax return does not help to override these 
obstacles. It must be observed that businesses located in different member states 
may indeed not be linked. A compulsory CCTB may need to be applied to genuine, 
non-economically linked companies but may also require businesses to operate 
under a completely new regime, where no one is familiar with the rules and 
requirements. It is submitted that it is not more difficult for a business expanding 
abroad to get familiar with the tax rules of host member state or with the new EU 
regime.  
Secondly, does the proposed CCTB enforce an exchange of information 
between tax authorities and member states? The answer to this question needs to be 
positive. A common corporate tax base and a common tax return will help to control 
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the information provided to different tax authorities. As the same tax base is 
accepted amongst member states, tax avoidance is more likely to be detected. Thus, 
the new the proposed CCTB regime may reinforce the exchange of tax information 
between member states and strengthen the control of tax authorities. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that strengthening tax control was not an 
ambition of the previous CCCTB or of the current CCTB projects. Moreover, if 
strengthening tax control is the only one aim of the new proposal, the principle of 
proportionality may be infringed.700 
Figure 18 CCTB 
 
 
 
             
  
 
 
  
 
In summary, it is concluded that neither the CCCTB nor the CCTB are useful 
tools to remove obstacles to the cross-border activity of EU businesses. 
Nevertheless, an interesting initiative was Losses directive proposal.701 The Losses 
directive proposal suggested that a recapture mechanism might help to encourage 
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businesses to trade cross-border in other member states. The proposal was never 
favoured by member states. However, as indicated above, the majority of member 
states were keen to accept the proposal CCCTB directive, even though the positive 
effects were marginal and the member states might face high compliance costs. In 
this atmosphere, it may be worthwhile to re-debate some elements of the proposal 
for the Losses directive. In particular, the recapture mechanism desires decent 
notice. 
This section will be divided into two parts. One relates to a subsidiary and 
one to a PE. As has been highlighted several times, there is a substantial difference 
in these two forms of establishment. Only a clear understanding of the differences 
between them will lead to a successful reform proposal. The international taxation 
rule of ‘two sides of a coin’ provides easy guidance. A subsidiary cannot be taxed 
in the state of the parent company; thus, the parent company cannot offset the losses 
of its subsidiary.702 On the contrary, a PE is part of an existing business and its 
profits are taxed in the home member state. Accordingly, the PE losses are deducted 
in the home member state. Nonetheless, there are no common rules at the EU level 
and the rights of a PE and its subsidiary are often threatened, as presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
The underlying common mistake in the unsuccessful two earlier proposals 
(CCCTB and Losses) was a confusion between these two forms of establishment. 
Thus, for a subsidiary the solution of a deduction followed by a recapture 
mechanism is not dedicated. Nonetheless, some member states have already offered 
a recapture mechanism to subsidiaries of SMEs.703 It is submitted that if a member 
state provides a loss deduction for a ‘subsidiary’ it is in fact often treating the entity 
as a PE.704 
Nonetheless, the proposed solution for a PE is a recapture mechanism. This 
reasoning is in line with CJEU rulings, presented in Chapter 4 and 5. 
                                                          
702
 To see exemption, read Chapters 4 and 5. 
703
 For instance, France, Article 209 C Code général des impôts [Tax Law] Ordonnance no. 2013-
676 on 25 July 2013. 
704
 For instance, the UK, sections 18F(1)(a), 18F(6) Corporation Tax Act 2009. 
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6.3.1 The Situation of a Subsidiary 
 
It was stated that a subsidiary is a distinct legal entity from the parent 
company. Personal or capital control shall not, therefore, be a factor to justify 
double taxation, or a right to deduct losses incurred. The conclusion is supported 
by the CJEU’s ruling in Cadbury,705 where the CJEU observed that only a purely 
artificial arrangement may be faced with a restrictive CFC regime. However, it is 
worth taking note of the new tax regime on CFC and profit exemption introduced 
in the UK in 2011.706 To recall a subsidiary or a PE may be granted to offset losses 
if, at least hypothetically, the company may become a taxpayer in the UK. If a UK 
company opts to be exempted from worldwide UK taxation, it is treated as a 
subsidiary and CFC rules apply. Thus, the situation of a PE using the branch 
exemption is identical to the subsidiary. As a result, the meaning given by the tax 
regime is the deciding factor as opposed to the legal form chosen. Thus, if a loss 
deduction is granted to a ‘subsidiary’ it is in fact treated as a PE. 
It was argued many times in this thesis that qualification as a subsidiary or 
PE is crucial for establishing a right of the concerned entity. In some situations, it 
may be difficult to decide if an entity is a PE or subsidiary. For instance, in some 
situations a partnership might be declared tax transparent and treated as a PE.707 
The UK has offered the option to choose whether a foreign entity wished to be taxed 
and profit from offset of losses (thus, it is treated as permanent establishment) or is 
not taxed in the UK and cannot deduct any losses (thus, it is treated as subsidiary).708 
Thus, it is recommended that an entity establishing a new business in another 
member state and wishing to be treated as a PE should make an irrevocable choice 
in this matter. 
                                                          
705
 C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes [2006] ECR I-7995. The case has been discussed in Chapter 5. 
706
 Sections 18F(1)(a), 18F(6) Corporation Tax Act 2009. The foreign branch profit exemption is 
presented in Chapter 4. 
707
 The situation is under discussion in Chapter 4 and is related to the seminal case: C-298/05 
Columbus Container Services BVBA & Co v Finanzamt BielefeldInnenstadt [2007] ECR I-10451. 
708
 Supra, Chapter 4.1.2. 
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Nonetheless, some member states have previously conferred a right to deduct 
the losses incurred by foreign subsidiaries. For instance, France offered the 
possibility to offset the losses incurred by a foreign subsidiary to SMEs.709 The 
amounts were due to reincorporation when a subsidiary became profitable or after 
period of 5 years whichever came first.710  
This solution requires more comment. The recapture of losses followed by 
automatic deduction was also suggested in the Losses directive proposal. It offers a 
temporary tax advantage for cross-border SMEs. Moreover, it is highlighted that 
many member states offer tax group relief for affiliated domestic companies.711 
Figure 19 Automatic recapture with no deduction 
 
Parent 
Company Subsidiary 
Automatic Recapture No deduction 
Tax Base Tax 
Burden 
20% 
Tax Base Tax 
Burden 
20% 
Year 1 100 -100 0 0 100 20 
Year 2 100 -100 0 0 100 20 
Year 3 100 -50 50 10 100 20 
Year 4 100 -50 50 10 100 20 
Year 5 100 -50 50 10 100 20 
Year 6 100 0 200 40 100 20 
Total 600 0 350 70 600 120 
 
It is submitted that such a solution might become beneficial for cross-border 
trade and does not significantly influence the fiscal policy of home member state. 
                                                          
709
 Article 209 C Code général des impôts [Tax Law] Ordonnance no. 2013-676 on 25 July 2013. 
Nonetheless, the provision was amended in 2013 LOI n°2013-1278 29th December 2013 - art. 26. 
710
 Article 209 VII Code général des impôts Ordonnance [Tax Law] no. 2013-676 on 25 July 2013.  
711
 For example, the UK provides Group Relief see: CTM80105 - Groups: group relief: outline, 
ICTA88/S402 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/ctmanual/ctm80105.htm and Poland “Ustawa o 
podatku dochodowym od osób prawnych z dnia 15 lutego 1992 r.’ [Corporate Tax Act] – Dz. U. Nr 
21, poz. 86; Art. 1a. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19920210086  
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The solution applied by France might become exemplary, as it is offered to small 
and medium size enterprises only. 
As presented above, a home member state offered only cash flow advantage, 
as the amount previously reclaimed would be recaptured when the subsidiary 
became profitable, would be wound up, sold or after a maximum period of 5 years. 
Nonetheless, this solution is not recommended for the proposed EU directive. 
Firstly, it is not likely that member states will allow a deduction of losses, if the 
profits are simultaneously exempt for a taxable basis. Moreover, it might cause 
unnecessary confusion on forms of foreign establishment.  
The situation is the opposite if a PE is concerned. It is submitted that not only 
temporary losses but also final losses, should be deducted. 
 
6.3.2 The Position of the PE 
 
It is submitted that relief should be granted in taxing a PE for both final and 
temporary non-final loss. It might be submitted that, as a part of the one enterprise, 
a PE shall be entitled to the consolidation and deduction of all losses incurred. 
However, the taxation powers of the home member state in the case of a PE are 
usually limited by Double Taxation Tax Treaties. The CCCTB proposal has been 
rejected and it is not likely than consolidation will become a rule in the near future. 
It is argued that temporary relief for ‘temporary losses’ might be a reasonable 
project for the current status of integration in the EU. Firstly, enterprises gain a cash 
flow advantage. Secondly, member states’ interests in the realm of fiscal policy 
would not be jeopardised. 
The comparative analysis of the option to use deduction and recapture 
mechanisms and lack of deduction, is presented below: 
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Figure 20 Recapture and deduction 
 
  
Head Office 
 
PE 
Deduction & Recapture No deduction 
Tax Base Tax 
Burden 
20% 
Tax Base Tax 
Burden 
20% 
Year 1 100 -100 0 0 100 20 
Year 2 100 -50 50 10 100 20 
Year 3 100 -50 150 30 100 20 
Year 4 100 50 150 30 100 20 
Year 5 100 50 150 30 100 20 
Total 500 0 500 100 500 100 
 
The temporary loss relief constitutes a cash flow advantage. It should be noted 
that the CJEU stated that ‘a cash flow disadvantage may constitute a restriction of 
the fundamental freedoms.’712 Moreover, the temporary cash flow advantage 
facilitates setting up a new PE and meeting its initial costs. 
Secondly, the recapture of losses would ensure that the interests of member 
states are observed. The common tax return proposed by CCTB would be 
beneficial. However, it might also be achieved by adding an obligation to report on 
the situation of a PE to the relevant state tax authority. It must be noted that an 
enterprise with PE has access to information on PE, as PE is only a division of an 
enterprise. 
It is worth recalling a case we discussed in Chapter 5, Krankenheim713 and 
figure number 23.714 
 
                                                          
712
 C-9/02 Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant [2004] ECR I-2409 and C-470/04 N v Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo [2006] ECR I-07409. 
713
 C-157/07 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt GmbH v Finanzamt für 
Körperschaften III in Berlin [2008] ECR I-8061, p. 9. 
714
 See section 5.2. of Chapter 5. 
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In this case, the CJEU indirectly approved a mechanism of deduction and 
recapture. Krankenheim had received a tax notice from Germany requesting a 
deduction of sums which had been reintegrated into the basis for a calculation of 
the tax drawn up in Germany.715 Krankenheim argued that, as a result the carrying 
forward of losses in Austria being limited to seven years, reintegration of those 
sums was unlawful. The CJEU approved the German tax recapture system which 
was allowed up to the amount of profits generated,716 because the tax notice was 
limited to losses already deducted. Nonetheless, it was also stated to be in 
accordance with the freedom of establishment to deduct only the amounts which do 
not exceed taxable base in the home member state. 
                                                          
715
 C-157/07 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt GmbH v Finanzamt für 
Körperschaften III in Berlin [2008] ECR I-8061, p. 19. 
716
 It is recalled that CJEU ruled that ‘the reintegration of losses provided for by the German tax 
system at issue in the main proceedings cannot be dissociated from there having earlier been taken 
into account. That reintegration, in the case of a company with a permanent establishment in another 
state in relation to which that company’s state of residence has no power of taxation, as the referring 
court indicates, reflects a logical symmetry. There was thus a direct, personal and material link 
between the two elements of the tax mechanism at issue in the main proceedings, the said 
reintegration being the logical complement of the deduction previously granted.’ C-157/07 
Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt GmbH v Finanzamt für Körperschaften III 
in Berlin [2008] ECR I-8061, par. 42. 
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Figure 21 Recapture and no deduction. 
 
  
Head Office 
 
PE 
Recapture No deduction 
Tax Base Tax 
Burden 
20% 
Tax Base Tax 
Burden 
20% 
Year 1 100 -200 0 0 100 20 
Year 2 100 -50 50 10 100 20 
Total 200 0 50 10 200 40 
 
 
Firstly, as is clearly stated in the concerned ruling, incorporating more than 
previously deducted to the tax notice may not be compliant with the principle of 
proportionality.717 Secondly, it is argued that final losses incurred by a PE should 
be deducted in the home member state.  
This solution is compatible with the line of CJEU rulings. In the seminal case, 
Nordea Bank Denmark A/S718 foreign PEs of the Danish bank had been transferred 
or sold to foreign affiliated subsidiaries.  
Nordea Bank has its seat in Denmark and between 1996 and 2000 undertook 
retail banking activities in Finland, Sweden and Norway through loss-making PEs. 
The losses of foreign establishments have been lawfully deducted from taxable 
income in Denmark.719 In 2000 PEs were restructured and their offices were closed, 
with their customers offered the possibility of retaining their accounts on identical 
terms with subsidiaries of Nordea Bank in the same state, while half of their staff 
were taken on by those subsidiaries.720 
The tax authorities in Denmark sent a tax bill for Nordea Bank stating that 
deducted losses which were not matched by profits were included in the calculation 
                                                          
717
 C-157/07 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt GmbH v Finanzamt für 
Körperschaften III in Berlin [2008] ECR I-8061, par. 50. 
718
 C-48/13 Nordea Bank Denmark A/S v Skatteministeriet [2014] ECR I-2807. 
719
 Ibid, par. 10. 
720
 Ibid, par. 11. 
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of taxable incomes.721 The decision was made based on paragraph 33 D (5) of the 
Law on the assessment of state income tax722 in the case of a sale of a permanent 
company to an affiliated company. 
Figure 22 Nordea Bank Denmark A/S 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                   
 
 
 
 
       
  
 
 
Nordea Bank contested the tax authority’s decision, arguing that such 
treatment was contrary to Articles 49 and 54 of the TFEU and the question was 
referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The CJEU found that such a treatment 
                                                          
721
 C-48/13 Nordea Bank Denmark A/S v Skatteministeriet [2014] ECR I-2807, par. 12. 
722
 Ibid, par. 8. 
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constituted a disadvantageous treatment for companies with PE abroad.723 Thus, 
this disadvantageous treatment is liable to deter a Danish company from carrying 
on its business through a PE situated in another member state.724  
It is remarkable that the CJEU did not consider if domestic and foreign PE 
were in comparable situations and therefore hinders its exercise of the freedom of 
establishment.725 However, the taxation of profits of a foreign establishment was 
assumed to be equated to profits of domestic PE.726 Thus, the Court proceeded to 
examine if the restriction was permissible.727 
The Court agreed that the reasoning behind the concerned provisions of the 
Danish law on the assessment of state income tax were to prevent Danish companies 
from making deductions for losses in a foreign branch and, when the branch 
becomes profitable, to transfer them to a foreign affiliated company to avoid the 
reincorporation of losses by Danish tax authorities.728 This was also noted by 
Advocate General Kokott: ‘It is easy to see how this might create an opportunity 
for tax avoidance, particularly given the course traditionally followed by an 
investment, that is to say a loss-making phase — resulting from the initial 
investments — followed by a profit-making phase. For that reason, transferring the 
activity of a foreign permanent establishment within a group of companies, even if 
the company taking it over no longer qualifies for relief on its losses, may be 
advantageous if the foreign rate of tax is lower than the Danish rate.’729 
                                                          
723
 Ibid, par. 21. 
724
 Ibid, par. 22. 
725
 In this point, the CJEU follows the Opinion of the Advocate General Kokott: ‘The Court’s entire 
case-law does not make it clear in which circumstances a difference in the situations compared 
should preclude their objective comparability. In the present case, for example, it must be concluded 
that the situations of a foreign branch and of a domestic branch are objectively different, because 
only in the case of a foreign branch can foreign tax be offset against Danish tax.’ Opinion of the 
Advocate General Kokott C-48/13 Nordea Bank Denmark A/S v Skatteministeriet [2014] par. 26. 
726
 C-48/13 Nordea Bank Denmark A/S v Skatteministeriet [2014] ECR I-2807, par. 24. 
727
 Ibid, par. 25. 
728
 Ibid, par. 28. 
729
 Opinion of the Advocate General Kokott C-48/13 Nordea Bank Denmark A/S v Skatteministeriet 
[2014] par. 59. 
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Nonetheless, the CJEU stated that the legislation went beyond what was 
necessary to attain the objective to eliminate tax avoidance.730 
 
Figure 23 Recapture with and without automatic recapture 
 
  
Head Office 
 
PE 
Recapture Automatic Recapture 
Tax Base Tax 
Burden 
20% 
Tax Base Tax 
Burden 
20% 
Year 1 100 -100 0 0 0 0 
Year 2 100 -100 0 0 0 0 
Year 3 100 -100 0 0 0 0 
Year 4 100 Wound up 100 20 400 80 
Year 5 100 Wound up 100 20 100 20 
Total 500 -300 200 40 500 100 
 
The Court rejected the argument of the Danish government that it is difficult 
to assess the market value of the transaction taking place in another member state. 
The Court took the position that a member state investigates such a suspicious 
transaction within their borders and are free to seek any documents that appear to 
them necessary in order to verify the value of the transaction concerned.731 
Nonetheless, it is regrettable that the CJEU did not provide guidance on how 
member states may lawfully protect their fiscal interests. 
The Advocate General stated that ‘the taxable person must be given an 
opportunity to provide evidence of any commercial justification. Secondly, the 
corrective tax measure must be confined to the part which exceeds what would have 
arisen if the companies did not have a relationship of interdependence.’732 She also 
                                                          
730
 C-48/13 Nordea Bank Denmark A/S v Skatteministeriet [2014] ECR I-2807, par. 31. 
731
 Ibid, par. 39. 
732
 Opinion of the Advocate General Kokott C-48/13 Nordea Bank Denmark A/S v Skatteministeriet 
[2014] par. 60. 
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concluded that the definition of tax avoidance was exceeded.733 A taxable person 
has no way of indicating lack of tax avoidance, even a PE has an economic 
justification for this activity which was in this case successfully demonstrated 
reducing the duplication of capacity. Moreover, EFTA Surveillance Authority 
argues, disproportionate to require previous loss relief to be recaptured in full in the 
case of any sale or wounding up of a permanent establishment.734 
It is clear from the reasoning of the Advocate General and the judgment of 
the Court that the current status of EU law does not provide an automatic recapture. 
If a member state provides a PE with the possibility to offset foreign losses, the 
deduction is not automatically recaptured. However, it is essential to remind that 
some member states, including Poland, do not have any legal base for reintegration 
of the losses of foreign establishment. Thus, it is very desirable for member states 
to agree on the common rules of recapture. 
Finally, member states are not helpless and might charge a capital gains tax 
based on an appropriate sale price determined by reference to an objective market 
value, in accordance with the ‘arm’s length’ principle.’735 Secondly, it is submitted 
that if a transaction is fictitious and has no economic justification, the host member 
state may apply its own CFC rules to combat tax avoidance. 
It is submitted that it is not only SMEs that will benefit from a right to deduct 
losses. As we have stated many times a PE is a division of an enterprise. All of its 
incomes are taxable in home member states. Thus, all losses shall be offset. 
It is also submitted that not only corporate tax but also personal tax, shall be 
included in the reform proposal, similar to the losses directive. Many SMEs trade 
as self-employed and do not create a legal person. Thus, they do not have to pay 
corporate tax, only personal tax. For instance, both in the UK736 and Poland the 
profits from self-employed activity are taxed but losses incurred as a result of 
                                                          
733
 Ibid, par. 62. 
734
 Ibid, par. 62. 
735
 ‘To that extent, the taxation is entirely consistent with the right of a member state to tax such 
capital gains on a company’s assets as fall within its tax jurisdiction’ Opinion of the Advocate 
General Kokott C-48/13 Nordea Bank Denmark A/S v Skatteministeriet [2014], par. 50. 
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 HMRC Income Tax losses toolkit [2014] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hmrc-
income-tax-losses-toolkit. 
193 
 
foreign business activity are not even reported. This is contrary to the international 
tax rule of ‘two sides of the coin’, as positive incomes are taken into the taxable 
base but negative incomes are irrelevant. However, it is noted that the offset shall 
be related to self-employed activity both in home and host member states. 
It is submitted that the reform shall take the form of an enhanced co-operation 
procedure.737 It holds true that enhanced co-operation can only be used when the 
Council has established that the objectives of such co-operation cannot be attained 
within a reasonable period by the Union.738 It is highlighted that the ‘internal market 
without tax obstacles’ has been one of the Commission’s political aims since 
2001.739 As such, enhanced co-operation would be applied to participating states 
only.740 
All in all, it is essential to examine if the above reform remains in accordance 
with the principles of national insufficiency and comparative efficiency. As in the 
case of the CCCTB directive proposal, the subsidiarity is irrelevant, as it refers to 
purely international elements such as eliminating obstacles caused by different tax 
systems. Thus, the focus shall be put on the principle of proportionality. 
It is essential to examine what the advantages are of the above reform 
proposal. Firstly, it was established that the obstacles to the internal market have 
been identified as double taxation and double non-deductibility of losses. Does the 
reform proposal eliminate these obstacles? It is admitted that the temporary 
deduction of losses, followed by recapture, does not eliminate full double taxation. 
Nonetheless, as stated in Chapter 4, double taxation exists even within one member 
state.741 Thus, it is not an ambition of the reform proposal to eliminate it in total. 
Otherwise, some may oppose given that cross-border businesses would be in a more 
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 Articles 326-334 of the TFEU. Read more in Ceroni, Luca. ‘Postponement of the Commission’s 
Proposal for a CCCTB Directive: Possible Ways Forward’ [2010] Bulletin for International 
Taxation, p. 98.  
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 See Article 20(2) TEU. 
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 European Commission ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate 
Tax Base.’ [2001] COM 12/4. 
740
 Article 327 of the TFEU: ‘Any enhanced cooperation shall respect the competences, rights and 
obligations of those member states which do not participate in it. Those member states shall not 
impede its implementation by the participating member states.’ 
741
 Chapter 4.1. 
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favourable situation than purely domestic ones. Therefore, it is an aim of the reform 
to reduce obstacles and promote cross-border activity. The reform indeed offers a 
temporary tax advantage to help businesses to expand abroad. Moreover, if reform 
would be extended to personal taxation of the self-employed, it might result in 
removing obstacles to the Internal Market, by making cheaper and easier for 
businesses to operate cross-border. 
Secondly, the reform proposal provides clear criteria of taxation, accordingly 
to the international rule of ‘two sides of the coin.’ A member state is entitled to tax 
positive incomes if it offers a deduction of negative incomes. Moreover, this 
solution has already been implemented in some member states, including the UK 
and has been confirmed in a number of the CJEU rulings. It can be observed here, 
that not only member states might implement the EU law but some elements of 
national legal orders might become part of the biggest picture of common EU 
policy. 
As has already been shown above under the subheading 6.2.2, member states 
are afraid that the common tax base may cause a ‘race to the bottom’ which is not 
desirable for the EU. The further advantage is that, tax rates and tax base remain 
with no competence of the member states. Moreover, the proposed solutions are 
substantially cheaper to implement than introducing a new CCTB or CCCTB tax 
regime within each member state. Thus, the solution is more proportional and does 
not go beyond what is necessary. Furthermore, member states are more likely to 
accept deduction of losses for PE which is taxable within its territory and deny it to 
foreign subsidiaries which are not taxable, unless the economic activity is genuine. 
All of these factors shall increase the chance of acceptance of the reform proposal 
within the EU. 
 
6.4 Concluding Observations 
 
This chapter has outlined the previously drafted proposals which aimed at 
eliminating the obstacles of double taxation and double non-deductibility of losses. 
The CCCTB proposal, the common tax base and the consolidation do not overcome 
the identified obstacles. It was also concluded that the competitiveness between 
member states reduces the top average corporate tax rate without affecting tax 
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revenues and that it is not beneficial for member states to implement a common tax 
base. Nonetheless, the Losses directive proposal provided an interesting idea of 
recapture, whose elements should be taken into account when drafting a new reform 
proposal. The drawbacks of the Losses directive proposal are equal treatment of PE 
and subsidiaries but also the automatic recapture of losses incurred in other member 
states after a period of five years. 
According to the international rule of ‘two sides of the coin,’ a subsidiary and 
a PE should not be treated equally. A subsidiary is a distinct legal entity and shall 
not be taxed at the parent’s level. As a result, a foreign subsidiary is not entitled to 
offset losses at the parent’s level. The situation is the opposite as far as a PE is 
concerned. Following again the ‘two sides of the coin’ international tax rule, the 
positive and negative income shall be taxed at parent company level. This can be 
done in accordance with the principle of the personality of the tax, as PE constitutes 
a division of the existing company. The difference in treatment between a 
subsidiary and a PE is justified by the objectively different situation of each entity. 
It is also concluded that the reform should concern not only corporate tax but in 
near future also personal income tax if it relates to a self-employment activity in 
more than one EU member state. Finally, it is recommended that the procedure of 
enhanced co-operation is applied. 
The chapter shows that the negative impact of the identified hindrances to the 
freedom of establishment, namely double taxation and double non-deductibility of 
losses, can be significantly reduced. It is submitted that the change proposed in this 
chapter will not eliminate fully double taxation but may reduce the detrimental 
impact. Moreover, the solution is already applied in some member states and such 
national solutions remain in-line with the CJEU rulings on these issues. Thus, the 
EU legislator, the Council, may be more likely to adopt such a directive and the 
member states are also more likely to implement the directive correctly. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Scope of the research undertaken 
 
As stated in chapter one of the thesis, the research is focussed on evaluating 
the extent to which tax rules found in the national laws of two selected EU member 
states (Poland and the UK) restrict the exercise of the EU’s freedom of 
establishment. Moreover, the scope of the thesis was limited to secondary 
establishment of legal persons, meaning situations where a legal person establishes 
itself in another EU member state by either creating a subsidiary or a branch. This 
thesis’ hypothesis was that double taxation and double non-deductibility of losses 
constitute significant hurdles to achieving a complete freedom of establishment. 
The approach chosen to test the hypothesis was as follows: first a theoretical 
framework was set out based on the non-discrimination principle, on the basic 
principles of the freedom of establishment right and on the exemptions to that right; 
secondly, the scope of the right of freedom of establishment was tested against three 
practical obstacles: the nationality prerequisite requirement; the double taxation of 
companies operating in more than one EU member state; and the double non-
deductibility of losses. Two EU member states, the UK and Poland, were then 
selected for testing the practice. In conclusion, the thesis offers recommendations 
as to how to improve the reforms currently being undertaken. 
The originality of this thesis lies in the hypothesis and in the approach taken 
to establish the hypothesis, namely: the distinction between restrictions imposed on 
inbound and restrictions imposed on outbound undertakings to explain the case law 
of the European Court of Justice (CJEU); the distinction made between a permanent 
establishment and a subsidiary; the comparison between United Kingdom (UK) and 
Polish relevant national taxation provisions; and the focus on the examination on 
pertinent case law and on the Commission’s proposals for reform.742 
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 See Chapter 6. 
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7.2 Findings 
 
In order to prove the hypothesis, the thesis focused on five topics presented 
in six chapters. The thesis presents the theoretical framework with particular 
emphasis on the principle of non-discrimination, the scope of the freedom of 
establishment and the exemptions. An analysis of direct and indirect discrimination 
in EU law with particular focus on legal persons was also provided. Next, it is 
sought for evidence and argumentation that a legal person can be directly 
discriminated. Protected characteristics are not identical for natural and legal 
persons and only the criterion of ‘nationality’ was identified as a prerequisite for 
direct discrimination as far as legal persons are concerned. The CJEU line of ruling 
varies and there is no criterion which may serve as an equivalent of a nationality 
for a natural person. Nonetheless, Article 54 TFEU states that ‘companies and 
firms’ shall be treated in the same way as natural persons. It was a core argument 
that companies and firms deserve protection against direct discrimination.  
It was stated that a member state is free to choose a factor which links a 
company to its legal system. As a result, it cannot be unambiguously defined what 
is a ‘nationality’ of a company. Nonetheless, it was also contended that a residence 
criterion cannot always serve as a substitute for the nationality of a company. It was 
concluded that the criterion for direct discrimination of a company should be 
inherent to t the connecting factors that link a company to a legal system. 
Next, the most significant case law on the scope of the freedom was 
presented. It was followed by a ramification of the inbound and outbound case law 
depending on whether the restrictions were imposed on the companies by the home 
or the host EU member state. This ramification provided an explanation for the 
reasoning of the CJEU and provided a degree of consistency in the Court’s rulings. 
Chapter 3 also presented the abuse theory in the EU. This theory outlined conditions 
to combat non-genuine activity ('letter-box companies'). It was concluded that 
letter-box companies may benefit from the freedom of establishment in a limited 
way but only a business conducting a genuine economic activity is entitled to 
benefit fully from the freedom. It was highlighted by the examination of existing 
CJEU case-law that member states can protect their interests related to their 
sovereign taxation powers more easily than interests related to private interests. 
Thus, taxation was identified as the main barrier to the freedom of establishment. 
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However, taxation remains within the scope of the sovereignty of the member 
states. In principle, member states may exercise their taxation powers but the 
exercise of those powers should not impede the freedom of establishment. 
Chapter 4 examined double taxation as experienced by a legal person seeking 
a permanent establishment or a subsidiary. Chapter 5 was dedicated to offsetting 
negative incomes generated by either subsidiaries or by permanent establishments. 
In particular, these two chapters examined whether double taxation or offsetting 
losses (double non-deductibility of losses) are treated differently depending on 
whether they were incurred by subsidiaries or by permanent establishments. One of 
the conclusions reached was the importance of the difference between subsidiary 
and permanent establishment. Chapter 4 also provided definitions of permanent 
establishment and subsidiary. 
Chapters 4 and 5 inlayed a particularity of national legal provisions in respect 
of double taxation and double non-deductibility of losses both in the UK and 
Poland. The current line of CJEU rulings was used as a comparative basis for the 
examination of national legal provisions of the selected two EU member states. A 
subsidiary, as a non-resident undertaking, may be taxed by the home member state 
of the parent only if it lacks genuine economic activity and one of the main aims of 
owning the subsidiary is tax avoidance. Member states struggle to proclaim EU 
compliant national CFC provisions which are aimed at combating tax avoidance. It 
is a conclusion of the thesis that EU member states should not be included in CFC 
regulations. Next, it is stressed that the possibility of deducting losses incurred in 
other member states is desirable to secure fully the freedom of establishment. 
Nonetheless, member states face hardship when searching for precision criteria for 
offsetting losses. The CJEU case law provides only vague hints as to when to accept 
the offset of foreign subsidiary losses. Moreover, lack of a possibility to deduct 
losses incurred in another state has its source in international tax law. A loss is 
treated as a negative income according to the international tax rule of the ‘other side 
of the coin.’ The member state of the parent company has limited possibilities to 
obtain revenue from the subsidiary in another member state. The company might 
be taxed only if the business is not genuine. If positive income lies outside the 
taxation powers of the member state, also negative income shall not be offset. 
In contrast, double taxation of a permanent establishment is precluded neither 
by the EU nor by international law. Member states exercise autonomy in the scope 
199 
 
of taxation. Thus, they are not likely to enact national provisions which are not 
compliant with EU law, as the competence on taxation is granted solely to member 
states. Thus, double taxation of a permanent establishment is accepted and the 
deduction of losses is generally accepted but the home member state retains taxation 
power and, in the future, may recapture the losses if a company becomes profitable. 
Chapter 6 reviewed past and present law reform proposed by the European 
Commission in respect of corporate taxation. The chapter analysed the current 
reform initiative and suggests amendments to the proposals. It is submitted, that the 
proposals may reduce significantly this major barrier to the freedom of 
establishment. Based on past proposals, the feasibility of the new proposals was 
also assessed. 
The main disadvantage that was identified was that the proposed Losses 
directive stipulate for an equal treatment of permanent establishment and subsidiary 
but also for automatic recapture of losses incurred in other member state after period 
of five years. However, the main aim for chapter 6 was to find elements which are 
worthy of adoption in the new reform proposal. In particular, the proposal should 
take into consideration the conclusion of the thesis that subsidiary and a permanent 
establishment should not be treated equally. 
A subsidiary is a distinct legal entity and should not be taxed at the parent’s 
level. As a result, a foreign subsidiary is not entitled to offset losses at the parent’s 
level. The situation is the opposite if a permanent establishment is concerned. A 
permanent establishment is a division of a company in a home member state and 
should be taxed at this level. As a consequence, losses incurred, both final and non-
final, should be deducted at headquarter level. In case of non-final losses, the 
automatic recapture mechanism may ensure a cash flow advantage for companies 
and also safeguard the revenues of member states.  
Finally, it is concluded that taxation barriers to the freedom of establishment 
remain and that they significantly impede the mobility of companies across the EU. 
It is not possible to ensure the freedom of establishment without minimum 
harmonisation of national taxation laws and the EU has competence to adopt the 
necessary measures to achieve this. As highlighted in chapter 6, it is recommended 
that the reform proposal should be promoted under the enhanced co-operation 
procedure which may facilitate the adoption of a tax reform proposal in the 
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foreseeable future. The tax reform proposed in chapter 6 contains elements which 
are absolutely necessary to ensure that the freedom of establishment of EU 
businesses operating across EU borders is not significantly restricted by current 
national taxation practices. 
There are a number of additional areas for further research that have been 
highlighted by the studies undertaken for the thesis. These include the further 
investigation of a company’s presence in a host member state743 as regards of 
double taxation and double non-deductibility of losses or a relocation of a primary 
establishment of a company to another member state.744  The complexity of these 
issues requires further independent research.  
 
 
                                                          
743
 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
744
 See Chapter 3. 
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